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OF 



Marcus aurelius Antoninus 

EMPEROR OF TEE ROMANS 



TRANSLATED BY GEOEGE LONG 



NEW AND COMPLETE EDITION 



Chicago : 

CORNELIUS H. SHAVER, 

MDCCCLXXXII; 



^e^° 






Gift 
Kebekah Crawford 
Mar. 14-19 2?7 



PRINTED AND BOUND 

BY 

BONOHUE & HENNEBERRY, 

CHICAGO. 



To 
KALPH WALDO EMERSON, 

THIS EDITION OF 

THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS 
ANTONINUS, 

IS INSCBIBED BY THE PUBLISHERS. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Life of Marcus Aurelius 7 

Philosophy of Marcus Aurelius ... 36 
Meditations of Marcus Aurelius . . 81 
Index of Greek Terms, with corres- 
ponding English 307 



The portrait of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus is 
from a bust in the British Museum. The medallion 
die is from a coin of the time of Aurelius. 



M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 




ANTONINUS was born at Rome 
A. D. 121, on the 26th of April. 
His father Annius Verus died while 
he was praetor. His mother was 
Domitia Calvilla, also named Lu- 
eilla. The Emperor Antoninus Pius married 
Annia Galeria Faustina, the sister of Annius 
Verus, and was consequently Antoninus' uncle. 
When Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius and de- 
clared him his successor in the empire, Antoninus 
Pius adopted both L. Ceionius Commodus, the 
son of Aelius Caesar, and M. Antoninus, whose 
original name was M. Annius Verus. Antoninus 
took the name of M. Aelius Aurelius Verus, to 
which was added the title of Caesar in A. D. 139 : 
the name Aelius belonged to Hadrian's family, 
and Aurelius was the name of Antoninus Pius. 
When M. Antoninus became Augustus, he dropped 
the name of Verus and took the name of Anto- 
ninus. Accordingly he is generally named M. 
Aurelius Antoninus, or simply M. Antoninus. 

The youth was most carefully brought up. He 
thanks the gods (i. 17) that he had good grand- 
fathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, ■ 



8 M. A U RE LI US 

good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly 
everything good. He had the happy fortune to 
witness the example of his uncle and adoptive 
father Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in 
his work (i. 16 ; VI. 30) the virtues of this ex- 
cellent man and prudent ruler. Like many young 
Romans he tried his hand at poetry and studied 
rhetoric. Herodes Atticus and M. Cornelius 
Fronto were his teachers in eloquence. There 
are extant letters between Fronto and Marcus, 
winch show the great affection of the pupil for 
the master, and the master's great hopes of his in- 
dustrious pupil. M. Antoninus mentions Fronto 
(i. 11) among those to whom he was indebted for 
his education. 

When he was eleven years old, he assumed the 
dress of philosophers, something plain and coarse, 
became a hard student, and lived a most labori- 
ous abstemious life, even so far as to injure his 
health. Finally, he abandoned poetry and rhet- 
oric for philosophy, and he attached himself to 
the sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect 
the study of law, which was a useful preparation 
for the high place which he was designed to fill. 
His teacher was L. Volusianus Maecianus, a dis- 
tinguished jurist. We must suppose that he 
learned the Roman discipline of arms, which was 
a necessary part of the education of a man who 
afterwards led his troops to battle against a war- 
like race. 

Antoninus has recorded in his first book the 
names of his teachers and the obligations which 



ANTONINUS. 9 

he owed to each of them. The way in which 
he speaks of what he learned from them might 
seem to savor of vanity or self-praise, if we look 
carelessly at the way in which he has expressed 
himself ; but if any one draws this conclusion, he 
will be mistaken. Antoninus means to com- 
memorate the merits of his several teachers, what 
they taught and what a pupil might learn from 
them. Besides, this book like the eleven other 
books, was for his own use, and if we may trust 
the note at the end of the first book, it was writ- 
ten during one of M. Antoninus' campaigns against 
the Quadi, at a time when the commemoration of 
the virtues of his illustrious teachers might re- 
mind him of their lessons and the practical uses 
which he might derive from them. 

Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus 
of Chaeroneia, a gi'andson of Plutarch. What 
he learned from this excellent man is told by him- 
self (i. 9). His favorite teacher was Q. Junius 
Rusticus (i. 7), a philosopher and also a man of 
practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus 
was the adviser of Antoninus after he became 
emperor. Young men who are destined for high 
places are not often fortunate in those who are 
about them, their companions and teachers ; and 
I do not know any example of a young prince 
having had an education which can be compared 
with that of M. Antoninus. Such a body of 
teachers distinguished by their acquirements and 
their character will hardly be collected again ; and 
as to the pupil, we have not had one like him since. 



10 M. AURELIUS 

Hadrian died in July a. d. 138, and was suc- 
ceeded by Antoninus Pius. M. Antoninus mar- 
ried Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, 
probably about A. r>. 146, for he had a daughter 
born in 147. M. Antoninus received from his 
adoptive father the title of Caesar and was associ- 
ated with him in the administration of the state. 
The father and the adopted son lived together in 
perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus 
Avas a dutiful son, and the emperor Pius loved 
and esteemed him. 

Antoninus Pius died in March 161. The 
Senate, it is said, urged M. Antoninus to take 
the solemn administration of the empire, but he 
associated with himself the other adopted son of 
Pius, L. Ceionius Commodus, who is generally 
called L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first time 
had two emperors. Verus was an indolent man 
of pleasure and unworthy of his station. Anto- 
ninus however bore with him, and it is said that 
Verus had sense enough to pay to his colleague 
the respect due to his character. A virtuous 
emperor and a loose partner lived together in 
peace, and their alliance was strengthened by 
Antoninus giving to Verus for wife his daughter 
Lucilla. 

The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by 
a Parthian war, in which Verus was sent to com- 
mand, but he did nothing, and the success that 
was obtained by the Romans in Armenia and on 
the Euphrates and Tigris was due to his generals. 
This Parthian war ended in 165. 



ANTONINUS. 11 

The north of Italy was also threatened by the 
rude people beyond the Alps from the borders 
of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic 
These barbarians attempted to break into Italy, 
as the Germanic nations had attempted near 
three hundred years before ; and the rest of the 
life of Antoninus with some intervals was em- 
ployed in driving back the invaders. In 169 
Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus administered 
the state alone. 

In A. d. 175 Avidius Cassius, a brave and skil- 
ful Roman commander who was at the head of 
the troops in Asia, revolted and declared himself 
Augustus. But Cassius was assassinated by some 
of his officers, and so the rebellion came to an 
end. Antoninus showed his humanity by his 
treatment of the family and the partisans of 
Cassius, and his letter to the senate in which he 
recommends mercy is extant. (Vulcatius, Avid- 
ius Cassius, c. 12.) 

Antoninus set out for the east on hearing of 
Cassius' revolt. We know that in a. d. 174 he 
was engaged in a war against the Quadi, Marco- 
manni and other Germanic tribes, and it is prob- 
able that he went direct from the German war 
without returning to Rome. His wife Faustina 
who accompanied him into Asia died suddenly at 
the foot of the Taurus to the great grief of her 
husband. Capitolinus who has written the life 
of Antoninus, and also Dion Cassius accuse the 
empress of scandalous infidelity to her husband 
and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus 



12 M. AURELIUS 

says that Antoninus either knew it not or pre- 
tended not to know it. Nothing is so common 
as such malicious reports in all ages, and the 
history of imperial Rome is full of them. Anto- 
ninus loved his wife and he says that she was 
" obedient, affectionate, and simple." The same 
scandal had been spread about Faustina's mother, 
the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was 
perfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius 
says in a letter to Fronto that he would rather 
live in exile with his wife than in his palace at 
Rome without her. There are not many men 
who would give their wives a better character 
than these two emperors. Capitolinus wrote in 
the time of Diocletian. He may have intended 
to tell the truth, but he is a poor, feeble biog- 
rapher. Dion Cassius, the most malignant of 
historians, always reports and perhaps he believed 
any scandal against anybody. 

Antoninus continued his journey to Syria and 
Egypt, and on his return to Italy through Athens 
he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. 
It was the practice of the emperor to conform to 
the established rites of the age and to perform 
religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We 
cannot conclude from this that he was a supersti- 
tious man, though we might perhaps do so, if his 
book did not show that he was not. But this 
is only one among many instances that a ruler's 
public acts do not always prove his real opinions. 
A prudent governor will not roughly oppose even 
the superstitions of his people, and though he 



ANTONINUS. 13 

may wish that they were wiser, he will know that 
he cannot make them so by offending their prej- 
udices. 

Antoninus and his son Commodus entered 
Rome in triumph on the 23rd of December a. d. 
176. In the following year Commodus was asso- 
ciated with his father in the empire and took the 
name of Augustus. This year a. d. 177 is memor- 
able in ecclesiastical history. Attalus and others 
were put to death at Lyon for their adherence 
to the Christian religion. The evidence of this 
persecution is a letter preserved by Eusebius 
(E. H. v. 1 ; printed in Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, 
vol. i. with notes). The letter is from the Chris- 
tians of Vienna and Lugdunum in Gallia (Vienne 
and Lyon) to their Christian brethren hi Asia 
and Phrygia ; and it is preserved perhaps nearly 
entire. It contains a very particular description 
of the tortures inflicted on the Christians in 
Gallia, and it states that while the persecution 
was going on, Attalus a Christian and a Roman 
citizen was loudly demanded by the populace and 
brought into the amphitheatre, but the governor 
ordered him to be reserved with the rest who 
were in prison, until he had received instructions 
from the emperor. It is not clear who the " rest " 
were who are mentioned in the letter. Many had 
been tortured before the governor thought of ap- 
plying to the emperor. The imperial rescript, 
says the letter, was that the Christians should be 
punished, but if they would deny their faith, they 
must be released. On this the work began again. 



14 M. A U RE LI US. 

The Christians who were Roman citizens were 
beheaded : the rest were exposed to the wild 
beasts in the amphitheatre. Some modern writers 
on ecclesiastical history, when they use this letter, 
say nothing of the wonderful stories of the mar- 
tyrs' sufferings. Sanctus, as the letter says, was 
burnt with plates of hot iron till his body was one 
sore and had lost all human form, but on being 
put to the rack he recovered his former appear- 
ance under the torture, which was thus a cure 
instead of a punishment. He was afterwards 
torn by beasts, and placed on an iron chair and 
roasted. He died at last. 

The letter is one piece of evidence. The 
writer, whoever he was that wrote in the name 
of the Gallic Christians, is our evidence both for 
the ordinary and the extraordinary circumstances 
of the story, and we cannot accept his evidence 
for one part and reject the other. We often re- 
ceive small evidence as proof of a thing which 
we believe to be within the limits of probability 
or possibility, and we reject exactly the same evi- 
dence, when the thing to which it refers, appears 
very improbable or impossible. But this is a false 
method of inquiry, though it is followed by some 
modern writers, who select what they like from a 
story and reject the rest of the evidence ; or if 
they do not reject it, they dishonestly suppress it. 
A man can only act consistently by accepting ali 
this letter or rejecting it all, and we cannot blame 
him for either. But he who rejects it may still 
admit that such a letter may be founded on real 



ANTONINUS. 15 

facts ; and he would make this admission as the 
most probable way of accounting for the existence 
of the letter : but if, as he would suppose, the 
writer has stated some things falsely, he cannot 
tell what part of his story is worthy of credit. 

The war on the northern frontier appears to 
have been uninterrupted during the visit of Anto- 
ninus to the East, and on his return the emperor 
again left Rome to oppose the barbarians. The 
Germanic people were defeated in a great battle 
a. d. 179. During this campaign the emperor 
was seized with some contagious malady, of which 
he died in the camp at Sirmium (Mitrovitz) on 
the Save in Lower Pannonia, but at Vindebona 
(Vienna) according to other authorities, on the 
17th of March a. d. 180, in the fifty-ninth year 
of his age. His son Commodus was with him. 
His body, or the ashes probably, was carried to 
Rome, and he received the honor of deification. 
Those who could afford it had his statue or bust, 
and when Capitolinus wrote, many people still 
had statues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates 
or household deities. He was in a manner made 
a saint. His son Commodus erected to his mem- 
ory the Antonine column which is now in the 
Piazza Colonna at Rome. The bassi rilievi 
which are placed in a spiral line round the shaft 
commemorate his father's victories over the Marco- 
manni and the Quadi, and the miraculous shower 
of rain which refreshed the Roman soldiers and 
discomfited then* enemies. The statue of Antoni- 
nus was placed on the column, but it was removed 



16 M. A URELIUS 

at some time unknown, and a bronze statue of St. 
Paul was put in its place by Pope Sixtus the fifth. 

The historical evidence for the times of Anto- 
ninus is very defective, and some of that which 
remains is not credible. The most curious is the 
story about the miracle which happened in A. d. 
174 during the war with the Quadi. The Roman 
army was in danger of perishing by thirst, but a 
sudden storm drenched them with rain, while it 
discharged fire and hail on their enemies, and -the 
Romans gamed a great victory. All the authori- 
ties which speak of the battle speak also of the 
miracle. The Gentile writers assign it to their 
gods, and the Christians to the intercession of the 
Christian legion in the emperor's army. To con- 
firm the Christian statement it is added that the 
emperor gave the title of Thundering to this legion ; 
but Dacier and others who maintain the Christian 
report of the miracle, admit that this title of Thun- 
dering or Lightning was not given to this legion 
because the Quadi were struck with lightning, but 
because there was a figure of lightning on their 
shields, and that this title of the legion existed in 
he time of Augustus. 

Scaliger also had observed that the legion was 
called Thundering (/<epawo/3oAos, or Kepawo<f>6pos) 
before the reign of Antoninus. We learn this 
from Dion Cassius (Lib. 55, c. 23, and the note 
of Reimarus) who enumerates all the legions of 
Augustus' time. The name Thundering or Light- 
ning also occurs on an inscription of the reign of 
Trajan, which was found at Trieste. Eusebius 



ANTONINUS. U 

(v. 5) when he relates the miracle, quotes Apoli- 
narius, bishop of Hierapolis, as authority for this 
name being given to the legion Melitene by the 
emperor in consequence of the success which he 
obtained through their prayers ; from which we 
may estimate the value of Apolinarius' testimony. 
Eusebius does not say in what book of Apolina- 
rius the statement occurs. Dion says that the 
Thundering legion was stationed in Cappadocia 
in the time of Augustus. Valesius also observes 
that in the Notitia of the Imperium Romanian 
there is mentioned under the commander of Ar- 
menia the Praefectura of the tAvelfth legion named 
" Thundering Melitene ; " and this position in 
Armenia Avill agree with what Dion says of its 
position in Cappadocia. Accordingly Valesius 
concludes that Melitene was not the name of the 
legion, but of the town in which it was stationed. 
The legions did not, he says, take their name from 
the place where they were on duty, but from the 
country in which they were raised, and therefore, 
what Eusebius says about the Melitene does not 
seem probable to him. Yet Valesius on the au- 
thority of Apolinarius and Tertullian believed that 
the miracle was worked through the prayers of 
the Christian soldiers in the emperor's army. 
Rufinus does not give the name of Melitene to 
this legion, says Valesius, and probably he pur- 
posely omitted it, because he knew that Melitene 
was the name of a town in Armenia Minor, where 
the legion was stationed in his time. 

The emperor, it is said, made a report of his 
2 



18 M. A URELIUS 

victory to the Senate, which we may believe, for 
such was the practice ; but we do not know what 
he said in his letter, for it is not extant. Dacier 
assumes that the emperor's letter was purposely 
destroyed by the Senate or the enemies of Chris- 
tianity, that so honorable a testimony to the 
Christians and their religion might not be perpet- 
uated. The critic has however not seen that he 
contradicts himself when he tells us the purport 
of the letter, for he says that it was destroyed, 
and even Eusebius could not find it. But there 
does exist a letter in Greek addressed by Anto- 
ninus to the Roman Senate after this memorable 
victory. It is sometimes printed after Justin's 
second Apology, though it is totally unconnected 
with the apologies. This letter is one of the 
most stupid forgeries of the many which exist, 
and it cannot be possibly founded even on the 
genuine report of Antoninus to the Senate. If 
it were genuine, it would free the emperor from 
the charge of persecuting men because they were 
Christians, for he says in this false letter that if 
a man accuse another only of being a Christian 
and the accused confess and there is nothing else 
against him, he must be set free ; with this mon- 
strous addition made by a man inconceivably ig- 
norant, that the informer must"' be burnt alive. 1 

1 Eusebius (v. 5) quotes Tertullian's Apology to the 
Roman Senate in confirmation of the story. Tertullian, 
he says, writes that letters of the emperor were extant, 
in which he declares that his army was saved by the 
prayers of the Christians ; and that he " threatened to 
punish with death those who ventured to accuse us." 



ANTONINUS. 19 

During the time of Antoninus Pius and Mar- 
cus Antoninus there appeared the first Apology 
of Justinus, and under M. Antoninus the Oration 
of Tatian against the Greeks, which was a fierce 
attack on the established religions, the addi-ess of 
Athenagoras to M. Antoninus on behalf of the 
Christians, and the Apology of Melito, bishop of 
Sardes, also addressed to the emperor, and that 
of Apolinarius. The first Apology of Justinus is 
addressed to Antoninus Pius and his two adopted 
sons M. Antoninus and L. Verus ; but we do not • 
know whether they read it. The second Apology 
of Justinus is addressed to the Roman Senate, 
but there is nothing in it which shows its date. 
In one passage where he is speaking of the perse- 
cution of the Christians, Justinus says that even 
men who followed the Stoic doctrines, when they 
ordered their lives according to ethical reason, 
were hated and murdered, such as Heraclitus, 
Musonius in his own times and others ; for all 
those Avho in any way labored to live according 
to reason and avoided wickedness were always 
hated ; and this was the effect of the work of 
daemons. 

Justinus himself is said to have been put to 
death at Rome, because he refused to sacrifice to 
the gods ; but the circumstances of Ins death are 
doubtful, and the time is uncertain. It cannot 

It is possible that the forged letter which is now extant 
may be one of those which Tertullian had seen, for he 
uses the plural number "letters." A great deal has 
been written about this miracle of the Thundering 
Legion, and more than is worth reading. 



20 M. A U RE LI US 

have been in the reign of Hadrian, as one author- 
ity states ; nor in the time of Antoninus Pius, 
if the second Apology was written in the time of 
M. Antoninus. 

The persecution in which Polycarp suffered at 
Smyrna belongs to the time of M. Antoninus. 
The evidence for it is the letter of the church 
of Smyrna to the chinches of Philomelium and 
the other Christian churches, and it is preserved 
by Eusebius (E. H. iv. 15). But the critics do 
not agree about the time of Polycarp's death, 
differing in the two extremes to the amount of 
twelve years. The circumstances of Polycarp's 
martyrdom were accompanied by miracles, one of 
which Eusebius (iv. 15) has omitted, but it ap- 
pears in the oldest Lathi version of the letter, 
which Usher published, and it is supposed that 
this version was made not long after the time of 
Eusebius. The notice at the end of the letter 
states that it was transcribed by Caius from the 
copy of trenaeus, the disciple of Polycarp, then 
transcribed by Socrates at Corinth ; " after which 
I Pionius again wrote it out from the copy above 
mentioned, having searched it out by the revela- 
tion of Polycarp, who directed me to it," &c. The 
story of Polycarp's martyrdom is embellished with 
miraculous circumstances which some modern 
writers on ecclesiastical history take the liberty 
of omitting. 2 

2 Conyers Middleton, An Inquiry into the Mirac- 
ulous Powers, &c. p. 126. Middleton says that Eusebius 
omitted to mention the dove, which flew out of Poly- 



ANTONINUS. 21 

In order to form a proper notion of the con- 
dition of the Christians under M. Antoninus 
we must go back to Trajan's time. When the 
younger Pliny was governor of Bithynia, the 
Christians were numerous in those parts, and the 
worshippers of the old religion were falling off. 
The temples were deserted, the festivals neglected, 
and there were no purchasers of victims for sacri- 
fice. Those who were interested hi the mainte- 
nance of the old religion thus found that their 
profits were in danger. Christians of both sexes 
and of all ages were brought before the governor, 
who did not know what to do with them. He 
could come to no other conclusion than this, that 
those who confessed to be Christians and per- 
severed in their religiou ought to be punished ; 
if for nothing else, for their invincible obstinacy. 
He found no crimes proved against the Christians, 
and he could only characterize then religion as 
a depraved and extravagant superstition, which 
might be stopped, if the people were allowed the 
opportunity of recanting. Pliny wrote this hi a 
letter to Trajan (Plinius, Ep. x. 97). He asked 
for the emperor's directions, because he did not 
know what to do : He remarks that he had 
never been engaged in judicial inquiries about 

carp's body, and Dodwell and Archbishop Wake have 
done the same. Wake says, " I am so little a friend to 
such miracles that I thought it better with Eusebius to 
omit that circumstance than to mention it from Bishop 
Usher's Manuscript," which manuscript however, says 
Middleton, he afterwards declares to be so well attested 
that we need not any further assurance of the truth of 
it. 



22 M. A URELIUS 

the Christians, and that accordingly he did not 
know what or how far to inquire and punish. 
This proves that it was not a new thing to inquire 
into a man's profession of Christianity and to 
punish him for it. Trajan's Rescript is extant. 
Pie approved of the governor's judgment in the 
matter ; but he said that no search must be made 
after the Christians ; if a man was charged with 
the new religion and convicted, he must not be 
punished, if he affirmed that he was not a Chris- 
tian and confirmed his denial by showing his rev- 
erence to the heathen gods. He added that no 
notice must be taken of anonymous informations, 
for such things were of bad example. Trajan 
was a mild and sensible man, and both motives 
of mercy and policy probably also induced him to 
take as little notice of the Christians as he could ; 
to let them live in quiet, if it were possible. 
Trajan's Rescript is the first legislative act of the 
head of the Roman state with reference to Chris- 
tianity, which is known to us. It does not appear 
that the Christians were further disturbed under 
his reign. The martyrdom of Ignatius by the 
order of Trajan himself is not universally ad- 
mitted to be an historical fact. 

In the time of Hadrian it was no longer possi- 
ble for the Roman government to overlook the 
great increase of the Christians and the hostility 
of the common sort to them. If the governors 
in the provinces wished to let them alone, they 
could not resist the fanaticism of the heathen 
community, who looked on the Christians as athe- 



ANTONINUS. 28 

ists. The Jews too who were settled all over the 
Roman Empire were as hostile to the Christians 
as the Gentiles were. With the time of Hadrian 
begin the Christian Apologies, which show plainly 
what the popular feeling towards the Christians 
then Avas. A rescript of Hadrian to the Pro- 
consul of Asia, which stands at the end of Jus- 
tin's first apology, instructs the governor that 
innocent people must not be troubled and false 
accusers must not be allowed to extort money 
from them ; the charges against the Christians 
must be made in due form and no attention must 
be paid to popular clamors ; when Christians 
were regularly prosecuted and convicted of any 
illegal act, they must be punished according to 
their deserts ; and false accusers also must be pun- 
ished. Antoninus Pius is said to have published 
Rescripts to the same effect. The terms of Ha- 
drian's Rescript seem very favorable to the 
Christians, but if we understand it in this sense, 
that they were only to be punished like other 
people for illegal acts, it would have had no mean- 
ing, for that could have been done without asking 
the emperor's advice. The real purpose of the 
Rescript is that Christians must be punished if 
they persisted in then belief, and would not prove 
their renunciation of it by acknowledging the 
heathen religion. This was Trajan's rule, and we 
have no reason for supposing that Hadrian granted 
more to the Christians than Trajan did. There 
is printed at the end of Justin's Apology a Re- 
script of Antoninus Pius to the Commune of Asia 



24 M. A URE LI US 

(to koivov rrjs "Acrtas) , and it is also in Eusebius 8 
(E. H. iv. 13). The Rescript declares that 
the Christians, for they are meant, though the 
name Christians does not occur in the Rescript, 
were not to be disturbed, unless they were attempt- 
ing something against the Roman rule, and no 
man was to be pumshed simply for being a Chris- 
tian. But this Rescript is spurious. Any man 
moderalely acquainted with Roman history will 
see at once from the style and tenor that it is a 
clumsy forgery. 

In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition 
between the old and the new belief was still 
stronger, and the adherents of the heathen re- 
ligion urged those in authority to a more regular 
resistance to the invasions of the Christian faith. 
Melito in his apology to M. Antoninus represents 
the Christians of Asia as persecuted under new 
imperial orders. Shameless informers, he says, 
men who were greedy after the property of others, 
used these orders as a means of robbing those who 

3 In Eusebius the name at the beginning of the Re- 
script is that of M. Antoninus ; and so we cannot tell to 
which of the two emperors the forger assigned the Re- 
script. There are also a few verbal differences. 

The author of the Alexandrine Chronicum says that 
Marcus being moved by the entreaties of Melito and 
other heads of the church wrote an Epistle to the Com- 
mune of Asia in which he forbade the Christians to be 
troubled on account of their religion. Valesius sup- 
poses this to be the letter which is contained in Eusebius 
(iv. 13), and to be the answer to the apology of Melito 
of which I shall soon give the substance. But Marcus 
certainly did not write this letter which is in Eusebius, 
and we know not what answer he made to Melito. 



ANTONINUS.- 25 

were doing no harm. He doubts if a just em- 
peror could have ordered anything so unjust ; and 
if the last order was really not from the emperor, 
the Christians entreat him not to give them up to 
their enemies.* We conclude from this that there 

4 Eusebius, iv. 26 ; and Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. 
i. and the notes. The interpretation of this Fragment 
is not easy. Mosheim misunderstood one passage so far 
as to affirm that Marcus promised rewards to those who 
denounced the Christians ; an interpretation which is 
entirely false. Melito calls the Christian religion " our 
philosophy," which began among barbarians (the Jews), 
and flourished among the Roman subjects in the time 
of Augustus, to the great advantage of the empire, for 
from that time the power of the Romans grew great and 
glorious. He sajs that the emperor has and will have 
as the successor to Augustus' power the good wishes of 
men, if he will protect that philosophy which grew up 
with the empire and began with Augustus, which phi- 
losophy the predecessors of Antoninus honored in addi- 
tion to the other religions. He further says that the 
Christian religion had suffered no harm since the time 
of Augustus, but on the contrary had enjoyed all honor 
and respect that any man could desire. Nero and Domi- 
tian, he says, were alone persuaded by some malicious 
men to calumniate the Christian religion, and this was 
the origin of the false charges against the Christians. 
But this was corrected by the emperors who immediately 
preceded Antoninus, who often by their Rescripts re- 
proved those who attempted to trouble the Christians. 
Hadrian, Antoninus' grandfather, wrote to many, and 
among them to the governor of Asia. Antoninus Pius 
when Marcus was associated with him in the empire 
wrote to the cities, that they must not trouble the Chris- 
tians ; among others to the people of Larissa, Thessa- 
lonica, the Athenians and all the Greeks. Melito con- 
cluded thus : We are persuaded that thou who hast 
about these things the same mind that they had, nay 
rather one much more humane and philosophical, wilt 
do all that we ask thee. — This Apology was written 
after a. d. 16.), the year in which Verus died, for it speak3 



26 M. A URELI US 

were at least imperial Rescripts or Constitutions 
of M. Antoninus, which were made the founda- 
tion of these persecutions. The fact of being a 
Christian was now a crime and punished, unless 
the accused denied their religion. Then come 
the persecutions at Smyrna, which some modem 
critics place in A. D. 167, ten years before the 
persecution of Lyon. The governors of the prov- 
inces under M. Antoninus might have found 
enough even in Trajan's Rescript to warrant them 
in punishing Christians, and the fanaticism of the 
people would drive them to persecution, even if 
they were unwilling. But besides the fact of the 
Christians rejecting all the heathen ceremonies, 
Ave must not forget that they plainly maintained 
that all the heathen religions were false. The 
Christians thus declared war against the heathen 
rites, and it is hardly necessary to obseive that 
this was a declaration of hostility against the 
Roman government, which tolerated all the vari- 
ous forms of superstition that existed in the empire, 
and could not consistently tolerate another religion, 
which declared that all the rest were false, and all 

of Marcus only and his son Commodus. According; to 
Melito's testimony, Christians had only been punished 
for their religion in the time of Nero and Domitian, and 
the persecutions began again in the time of M. Anto- 
ninus and were founded on his orders, which were abused 
as he seems to mean. He distinctly affirms '■ that the 
race of the godly is now persecuted and harrassed by 
fresh imperial orders in Asia, a thing which had never 
happened before." But we know that all this is not 
true, and that Christians had been punished in Trajan's 
time. 



ANTONINUS. 27 

the splendid ceremonies of the empire only a wor- 
ship of devils. 

If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should 
know how the Roman emperors attempted to check 
the new religion, how they enforced their princi- 
ple of finally punishing Christians, simply as Chris- 
tians, which Justin in his Apology affirms that they 
did, and I have no doubt that he tells the truth ; 
how far popular clamor and riots went in this 
matter, and how far many fanatical and ignorant 
Christians, for there were many such, contributed 
to excite the fanaticism on the other side and to em- 
bitter the quarrel between the Roman government 
and the new religion. Our extant ecclesiastical 
histories are manifestly falsified, and what truth 
they contain is grossly exaggerated ; but the fact is 
certain that in the time of M. Antoninus the hea- 
then populations were in open hostility to the 
Christians, and that under Antoninus' rule men 
were put to death because they were Christians. 
Eusebius in the preface to his fifth book remarks 
that in the seventeenth year of Antoninus' reign, 
in some parts of the world the persecution of the 
Christians became more violent, and that it pro- 
ceeded from the populace in the cities ; and he 
adds in his usual style of exaggeration, that we 
may infer from what took place in a single 
nation that myriads of martyrs were made hi the 
habitable earth. The nation which he alludes to 
is Gallia ; and he then proceeds to give the letter 
of the churches of Viemia and Lugdunum. It 
is probable that lie lias assigned the true cause of 



28 M. AURELIUb 

the persecutions, the fanaticism of the populace, 
and that both governors and emperor had a great 
deal of trouble with these disturbances. How 
far Marcus was cognizant of these cruel proceed- 
ings we do not know, for the historical records of 
his reign are very defective. He did not make 
the rule against the Christians, for Trajan did 
that ; and if we admit that he would have been 
willing to let the Christians alone, we cannot 
affirm that it was in his power, for it would be a 
great mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the 
unlimited authority, which some modern sovereigns 
have had. His power was limited by certain con- 
stitutional forms, by the Senate, and by the prece- 
dents of his predecessors. We cannot admit that 
such a man was an active persecutor, for there is 
no evidence that he was, though it is certain that 
he had no good opinion of the Christians, as ap- 
pears from his own words. 5 But he knew nothing 

5 See xi. 3. The emperor probably speaks of such 
fanatics as Clemens (quoted by Gataker on this passage) 
mentions. The rational Christians admitted no fellow- 
ship with them. " Some of these heretics," says Clemens, 
" show fheir impiety and cowardice by loving their lives, 
saying that the knowledge of the really existing God is 
true testimony (martyrdom), but that a man is a self- 
murderer who bears witness by his death. We also blame 
those who rush to death, for there are some, not of us, 
but only bearing the same name who give themselves 
up. We say of them that they die without being martyrs, 
even if they are publicly punished ; and they give them- 
selves up to a death which avails nothing, as the Indian 
Gymnosophists give themselves up foolishly to fire." 
Cave in his Primitive Christianity (n. c. 7) says of the 
Christians : " They did flock to the place of torment 



ANTONINUS. 2» 

of them except their hostility to the Roman relig- 
ion, and" he probably thought that they were 
dangerous to the state, notwithstanding the pro- 
fessions false or true of some of the Apologists. 
So much I have said, because it would be unfair 
not to state all that can be urged against a man 
whom his contemporaries and subsequent ages 
venerated as a model of virtue and benevolence. 
If I admitted the genuineness of some documents, 
he would be altogether clear from the charge of 
even allowing any persecutions ; but as I seek the 
truth and am sure that they are false, I leave him 
to bear whatever blame is his due. I add that it 
is quite certain that Antoninus did not derive any 
of his Ethical principles from a religion of which 
he knew nothing. 6 

faster than droves of beasts that are driven to the sham- 
bles. They even longed to be in the arms of suffering. 
Ignatius, though then in his journey to Rome in order 
to his execution, yet by the way as he went could not 
but vent his passionate desire of it : O that I might 
come to those wild beasts, that are prepared for me ; I 
heartily wish that I may presently meet with them ; I 
would invite and. encourage them speedily to devour me, 
and not be afraid to set upon me as they have- been to 
others ; nay should they refuse it, I would even force 
them to it ;" and more to the same purpose from Eusebius. 
Cave, an honest and good man, says all this in praise of 
the Christians ; but I think that he mistook the matter 
We admire a man who holds to his principles even to 
death ; but these fanatical Christians are the Gymnoso- 
phists whom Clemens treats with disdain. 

6 Dr F. C. Baur in his work entitled Das Christenthum 
und die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte, 
&c. has examined this question with great good sense 
and fairness, and I believe he has stated the truth as near 
as our authorities enable us to reach it. 



30 M. A URELIUS 

There is no doubt that the Emperor's Reflec« 
tions or liis Meditations, as they are generally 
named, is a genuine work. In the first book he 
speaks of himself, his family, and his teachers ; 
and in other books he mentions himself. Suidas 
(v. MapKos) notices a work of Antoninus in twelve 
books, which he names the " conduct of his own 
life ; " and he cites the book under several words 
in his Dictionary, giving the emperor's name, but 
not the title of the work. There are also passages 
cited by Suidas from Antoninus without mention 
of the emperor's name. The true title of the 
work is unknown. Xylander who published the 
first edition of this book (Zurich, 1558, 8vo., with a 
Latin version) used a manuscript, Avhich contained 
the twelve books, but it is not known where the 
manuscript is now. The only other complete 
manuscript which is known to exist is in the Vati- 
can library, but it has no title and no inscriptions 
of the several books : the eleventh only has the 
inscription MdpKov auro/cparopos marked with an 
asterisk. The other Vatican manuscripts and the 
three Florentine contain only excerpts from the 
emperor's book. All the titles of the excerpts 
nearly agree with that which Xylander prefixed 
to his edition, M.dpKOv 'Avtwvlvov AvroKparopos rwv 
eh lavTov /3i/3A.ia ifB. This title has been used by 
all subsequent editors. We cannot tell whether 
Antoninus divided his work into books or some- 
body else did it. If the inscriptions at the end of 
the first and second books are genuine, he may 
have made the division himself. 



ANTONINUS. 81 

It is plain that the emperor wrote down his 
thoughts or reflections as the occasions arose ; and 
since they were intended for his own use, it is no 
improbable conjecture that he left a complete copy 
behind him written with his own hand ; for it is 
not likely -that so diligent a man would use the 
labor of a transcriber for such a purpose, and 
expose his most secret thoughts to any other eye. 
He may have also intended the book for his son 
Commodus, who however had no taste for his 
father's philosophy. Some careful hand preserved 
the precious volume ; and a work by Antoninus 
is mentioned by other late writers besides Suidas. 

Many critics have labored on the text of Anto- 
ninus. The most complete edition is that by 
Thomas Gataker, 1652, 4to. The second edition 
of Gataker was superintended by George Stan- 
hope, 1697, 4to. There is also an edition of 1704. 
Gataker made and suggested many good correc- 
tions, and he also made a new Latin version, which 
is not a very good specimen of Latin, but it 
generally expresses the sense of the original and 
often better than some of the more recent trans- 
lations. He added in the margin opposite to each 
paragraph references to the other parallel passages ; 
and he wrote a commentary, one of the most com- 
plete that has been written on any ancient author. 
This commentary contains the editor's exposition 
of the more difficult passages, and quotations from 
all the Greek and Roman writers for the illustra- 
tion of the text. It is a wonderful monument of 
learning and labor, and certainly no Englishman 



32 M. A URELIUS 

has yet done anything like it. At the end of his 
preface the editor says that he wrote it at Rother- 
hithe near London in a severe winter, when he 
was in the seventy-eighth year of his age, 1G51, 
a time when Milton, Selden and other great men 
of the Commonwealth time were living ; and the 
great French scholar Sanmaise (Salmasius), with 
whom Gataker corresponded and received help 
from him for his edition of Antoninus. The 
Greek text has also been edited by J. M. Schultz, 
Leipzig, 1802, 8vo. ; and by the learned Greek 
Adamantius Coral's, Paris, 1816, 8vo. The text 
of Schultz was republished by Tauchnitz, 1821. 

There are English, French, Italian and Spanish 
translations of M. Antoninus, and there may be 
others. I have not seen all the English transla- 
tions. There is one by Jeremy Collier, 1702, 8vo. 
a most coarse and vulgar copy of the original. 
The latest French translation by Alexis Pierron 
in the collection of Charpentier is better than 
Dacier's, which has been honored with an Italian 
version (Udine, 1772). There is an Italian ver- 
sion (1675) which I have not seen. It is by a 
cardinal. " A man illustrious in the church, the 
Cardinal Francis Barberini the elder, nephew of 
Pope Urban VIII, occupied the last years of his 
life in translating into his native language the 
thoughts, of the Roman emperor, in order to 
diffuse among the faithful the fertilizing and vivi- 
fying seeds. He dedicated this translation to his 
soul, to make it, as he says in his energetic style, 
redder than his purple at the sight of the virtues 



ANTONINUS. 33 

of this Gentile " (Pierron, Preface). I have made 
this translation at intervals after having used the 
book for many years. It is made from the Greek, 
but I have not always followed one text. I have 
occasionally compared other versions. I made 
this translation for my own use, because I found 
that it was worth the labor. It may be useful 
to others also and at last I have determined to 
print it, though, as the original is both very difficult 
to understand and still more difficult to translate, 
it is not possible that I have always avoided error. 
But I believe that I have not often missed the 
meaning, and those who will take the trouble to 
compare the translation with the original should 
not hastily conclude that I am wrong, if they do 
not agree with me. Some passages do give the 
meaning, though at first sight they may not appear 
to do so ; and when I differ from the translators, 
I think that in some places they are wrong, and in 
other places I am sure that they are. I. have 
placed a t in some passages, which indicates cor- 
ruption in the text or great uncertainty in the 
meaning. I could have made the language more 
easy and Mowing, but I have preferred a somewhat 
ruder style as being better suited to express the 
character of the original ; and sometimes the ob- 
scurity which may appear in the version is a fair 
copy of the obscurity of the Greek. If I should 
ever revise this version, I would gladly make use 
of any corrections which may be suggested. I 
have added an index of some of the Greek terms 
with the corresponding English. If I have not 



34 M. A U RE LI US 

given the best words for the Greek, I have done the 
best that I could ; and in the text I have always 
given the same translation of the same word. 

The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that 
I have observed is in Simplicius' Commentary on 
the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was not 
a Christian, and such a man was not likely to be 
converted at a time when Christianity was grossly 
corrupted. But he was a really religious man, 
and he concludes his commentary with a prayer 
to the Deity which no Christian could improve. 
From the time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period of 
about nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy 
formed the characters of some of the best and 
greatest men. Finally it became' extinct, and we 
hear no more of it till the revival of letters in 
Italy. Angelo Poliziano met with two very inac- 
curate and incomplete manuscripts of Epictetus' 
Enchiridion, which he translated into Latin and 
dedicated to his great patron Lorenzo de' Medici 
in whose collection he had found the book. Poli- 
ziano's version was printed in the first Bale edition 
of the Enchiridion, A. d. 1531 (apud And. Cra- 
tandrum). Poliziano recommends the Enchiridion 
to Lorenzo as a work well suited to his temper, 
and useful in the difficulties by Avhich he was sur- 
rounded. 

Epictetus and Antoninus have had readers ever 
since they were first printed. The little book of 
Antoninus has been the companion of some great 
men. Machiavelli's Art of War and Marcus 
Antoninus were the two books which were used 



ANTONINUS. 35 

when he was a young man by Captain John 
Smith, and he could not have found two writers 
better fitted to form the character of a soldier 
and a man. Smith is almost unknown and for- 
gotten in England his native country, but not in 
America where he saved the young colony of Vir- 
ginia. He was great in his heroic mind and his 
deeds in arms, but greater still in the nobleness of 
his character. For a man's greatness lies not in 
wealth and station, as the vulgar believe, nor yet 
in his intellectual capacity, which is often asso- 
ciated with the meanest moral character, the most 
abject servility to those in high places and arro- 
gance to the poor and lowly ; but a man's time 
greatness lies in the consciousness of an honest 
purpose in life, founded on a just estimate of him- 
self and everything else, on frequent self-exami- 
nation, and a steady obedience to the rule which 
he knows to be right, without troubling himself, 
as the emperor says he should not, about what 
others may think or say, or whether they do or do 
not do that which he thinks and says and does. 




THE 



PHILOSOPHY OF ANTONINUS. 




|T lias been said that the Stoic phi- 
losophy first showed its real value 
when it passed from Greece to Rome. 
X W The doctrines of Zeno and his suc- 
cessors were well suited to the gravity and practi- 
cal good sense of the Romans ; and even in the 
Republican period we have an example of a man, 
M. Cato Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic 
and died consistently with the opinions winch he 
professed. He was a man, says Cicero, who em- 
braced the Stoic philosophy from conviction ; not 
for the purpose of vain discussion, as most did, bul 
in order to make his life conformable to its pre- 
cepts. In the wretched times from the death of 
Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there was 
nothing but the Stoic philosophy which could con- 
sole and support the followers of the old religion 
under imperial tyranny and amidst universal cor- 
ruption. There were even then noble minds that 
could dare and endure, sustained by a good con- 
science and an elevated idea of the purposes of 
man's existence. Such were Paetus Thrasea, 



PHILOSOPHY OF ANTONINUS. 3' 

Helvidius Priscus, Cornutus, C. Musonius Rufus, 1 
and the poets Persius and Juvenal, whose ener- 
getic language and manly thoughts may be as in- 
structive to us now as they might have been to 
their contemporaries. Persius died under Nero's 
bloody reign, but Juvenal had the good fortune to 
survive the tyrant Domitian and to see the better 
times of Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian. His best 
precepts are derived from the Stoic school, and 
they are enforced in his finest verses by the un- 
rivalled vigor of the Latin language. 

The two best expounders of the later Stoical 
philosophy were a Greek slave and a Roman em- 
peror. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought 
to Rome, we know not how, but he was there the 
slave and afterwards the freedman of an unworthy 
master, Epaphroditus by name, himself a freed- 
man and a favorite of Nero. Epictetus may have 
been a hearer of C. Musonius Rufus, while he 
was still a slave, but he can hardly have been a 
teacher before he was made free. He was one of 
the philosophers whom Domitian's order banished 
from Rome. He retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, 
and he may have died there. Like other great 
teachers he wrote nothing, and we are indebted to 
his grateful pupil Arrian for what we have of 

1 I have omitted Seneca, Nero's preceptor. He was 
in a sense a Stoic and he has said many good things in 
a very fine way. There is a judgment of Gellius (xn. 
2) on Seneca, or rather a statement of what some peo- 
ple thought of his philosophy, and it is not favorable. 
His writings and his life must be taken together, and I 
have nothing more to say of him here. 



38 THE PHILOSOPHY 

Epictetus' discourses. Arrian wrote eight books 
of the discourses of Epictetus, of which only four 
remain and some fragments. We have' also from 
Arrian's hand the small Enchiridion or Manual 
of the chief precepts of Epictetus. There is a 
valuable commentary on the Enchiridion by Sim- 
plicius, who lived ha the time of the emperor Jus- 
tinian. 2 

Antoninus in his first book (i. 7), in which he 
gratefully commemorates his obligations to his 
teachers, says that he was made acquainted by 
Junius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, 
whom he mentions also in other passages (iv. 41 ; 
xi. 33. 36). Indeed, the doctrines of Epictetus 
and Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the 
best authority for the explanation of the philo- 
sophical language of Antoninus and the exposi- 
tion of his opinions. But the method of the 
two philosophers is entirely different. Epictetus 
addressed himself to his hearers in a continuous 
discourse and in a familiar and simple manner. 
Antoninus wrote down his reflections for his own 
use only, in short unconnected paragraphs, which 
are often obscure. 

The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy, 
Physic (4>v(jlk6v), Ethic (?7#tKoi ), and Logic (Xoyt- 
koi ). This division, we are told by Diogenes, was 
made by Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic 

2 There is a complete edition of Arrian's Epictetus 
with the commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweighaeu- 
ser, 6 vols. 8vo. 1799, 1800. There is also an English 
translation of Epictetus by Mrs. Carter. 



OF A NT ON I N US. 39 

sect and by Chrysippus ; but these philosophers 
placed the ttiree divisions in the following order, 
Logic, Physic, Ethic. It appears however that 
this division was made before Zeno's time and 
acknowledged by Plato, as Cicero remarks (Acad. 
Post. i. 5). Logic is not synonymous with our 
term Logic in the narrower sense of that word. 

Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divis- 
ions, and made six : Dialectic and Rhetoric, com- 
prised in Logic ; Ethic and Politic ; Physic and 
Theology. This division was merely for practi- 
cal use, for all Philosophy is one. Even among 
the earliest Stoics Logic or Dialectic does not oc- 
cupy the same place as in Plato : it is considered 
only as an instrument which is to be used for the 
other divisions of Philosophy. An exposition of 
the earlier Stoic doctrines and of their modifica- 
tions woidd require a volume. My object is to 
explain only the opinions of Antoninus, so far as 
they can be collected from Ms book. 

According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, 
Physic and Theology go together, or the study 
of the nature of Things, and the study of the 
nature of the Deity, so far as man can under- 
stand the Deity, and of his government of the 
universe. This division or subdivision is not 
formally adopted by Antoninus, for as already ob- 
served, there is no method in his book ; but it is 
virtually contained in it. 

Cleanthes also connects .Ethic and Politic, or 
the study of the principles of morals and the study 
of the constitution of civil society ; and undoubt- 



40 THE PHILOSOPHY 

edly he did well in subdividing Ethic into two 
parts, Ethic in the narrower sense and Politic, for 
though the two are intimately connected, they are 
also very distinct, and many questions can only be 
properly discussed by carefully observing the dis- 
tinction. Antoninus does not treat of Politic. 
His subject is Ethic, and Ethic in its practical 
application to his own conduct in life as a man 
and as a governor. His Ethic is founded on his 
doctrines about man's nature, the Universal Na- 
ture, and the relation of every man to everything 
else. It is therefore intimately and inseparably 
connected with Physic or the nature of Things 
and with Theology or the nature of the Deity. 
He advises us to examine well all the impres- 
sions on our minds (^avrao-ta/) and to form a 
right judgment of them, to make just conclusions, 
and to inquire into the meanings of Avords, and 
so far to apply Dialectic, but he has no attempt 
at any exposition of Dialectic, and his philosophy 
is in substance purely moral and practical. He 
says (vin. 13), " Constantly and, if it be possible, 
on the occasion of every impression on the soul, 3 

3 The original is em ndor]<; fyavraaiaq. We have no 
word which expresses (bavraoia, tor it is not only the sen- 
suous appearance which comes from an external object, 
which object is called to davraarov, but it is also the 
thought or feeling or opinion which is produced even 
when there is no corresponding external object before us. 
Accordingly everything which moves the soul is ipavraa- 
tov and produces a tpavraoia. 

In this extract Antoninus says <t>vaio\<r)'elv, irad-oloyelv, 
6i.a?ieKTiKtveo$ai. I have translated na^oTioyelv by usir g 
the word Moral (Ethic), and that is the meaning here. 



OF ANTONINUS. 41 

apply to it the principles of Physic, of Moral and 
of Dialectic : " which is only another way of tell- 
ing us to examine the impression in every possi- 
ble way. In another passage (in. 11) he says, 
" To the aids which have been mentioned let this 
one still be added : make for thyself a definition 
or description of the object (to ^aiTaa-rov) which 
is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what 
kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, 
in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper 
name, and the names of the things of which it 
has been compounded, and into which it will be 
resolved." Such an examination implies a use 
of Dialectic, which Antoninus accordingly em- 
ployed as a means towards establishing his Physi- 
cal, Theological and Ethical principles. 

There are several expositions of the Physical, 
Theological, and Ethical principles, which are 
contained in the work of Antoninus ; and more 
expositions than I have read. Putter (Geschichte 
der Philosophic, iv. 241) after explaining the 
doctrines of Epictetus, treats very briefly and in- 
sufficiently those of Antoninus. But he refers to 
a short essay, in which the work is done better.^ 
There is also an essay on the Philosophical Prin- 
ciples of M. Aurelius Antoninus by J. M. Schultz, 
placed at the end of his German translation of 
Antoninus (Schleswig, 1799). With the assistance 
of these two useful essays and his own diligent 

4 De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius Commen- 
tariis. Scriptio Philologica. Instituit Nicolaus Bachius, 
Lipsiae, 18"26. 



42 THE PHILOSOPHY 

study a man may form a sufficient notion of the 
principles of Antoninus ; but he will find it more 
difficult to expound them to others. Besides the 
want of arrangement in the original and of con- 
nection among the numerous paragraphs, the cor- 
ruption of the text, the obscurity of the language 
and the style, and sometimes perhaps the confu- 
sion in the writer's own ideas, — besides all this 
there is occasionally an apparent contradiction in 
the emperor's thoughts, as if his principles were 
sometimes unsettled, as if doubt sometimes 
clouded his mind. A man who leads a life of 
tranquillity and reflection, who is not disturbed 
at home and meddles not with the affairs of the 
world, may keep his mind at ease and his thoughts 
in one even course. But such a man has not 
been tried. All his Ethical philosophy and his 
passive virtue might turn out to be idle words, if 
he were once exposed to the rude realities of hu- 
man existence. Fine thoughts and moral disser- 
tations from men who have not worked and suf- 
fered may be read, but they will be forgotten. 
No religion, no Ethical philosophy is worth any- 
thing, if the teacher has not lived the " life of an 
apostle," and been ready to die " the death of a 
martyr." " Not in passivity (the passive affects) 
but in activity lie the evil and the good of the 
rational social animal, just as his virtue and his 
vice lie not in passivity, but in activity " (ix. 16). 
The emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. 
From his youth he followed a laborious discipline, 
and though his high station placed him above all 



OF A NT ONI N US. 43 

want or the fear of it, he lived as frugally and 
temperately as the poorest philosopher. Epictetus 
wanted little, and it seems that he always had 
the little that he wanted ; and he was content with 
it, as he had been with his servile station. But 
Antoninus after his accession to the empire sat on 
an uneasy seat. He had the administration of an 
empire which extended from the Euphrates to the 
Atlantic, from the cold mountains of Scotland to 
the hot sands of Africa ; and we may imagine, 
though we cannot know it by experience, what 
must be the trials, the troubles, the anxiety and 
the sorrows of him who has the world's business 
on his hands with the wish to do the best that he 
can, and the certain knowledge that he can do 
very little of the good which he wishes. 

In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, gen- 
eral corruption and with the weight of so un- 
wieldy an empire upon him, we may easily com- 
prehend that Antoninus often had need of all his 
fortitude to support him. The best and the bravest 
men have moments of doubt and of weakness, but 
if they are the best and the bravest, they rise again 
from their depression by recurring to first principles, 
as Antoninus does. The emperor says that life 
is smoke, a vapor, and St. James in his Epistle 
is of the same mind ; that the world is full of en- 
vious, jealous, malignant people, and a man might 
be well content to get out of it. He has doubts 
perhaps sometimes even about that to which he 
holds most firmly. There are only a few passages 
of this kind, but they are evidence of the struggles 



44 THE P HILOSOPHY 

which even the noblest of the sons of men had to 
maintain against the hard realities of his daily life. 
A poor remark it is which I have seen somewhere, 
and made in a disparaging way, that the emperor's 
reflections show that he had need of consolation 
and comfort in life, and even to prepare him to 
meet his death. True that he did need comfort 
and support, and we see how he found it. He 
constantly recurs to his fundamental principle that 
the universe is wisely ordered, that every man is 
a part of it and must conform to that order which 
he cannot change, that whatever the Deity has 
done is good, that all mankind are a man's brethren, 
that he must love and cherish them and try to 
make them better, even those who would do him 
harm. This is his conclusion (11. 17): "What 
then is that which is able to conduct a man ? One 
thing and only one, Philosophy. But this consists 
in keeping the divinity within a man free from 
violence and unharmed, superior to pains and 
pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose nor 
yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need 
of another man's doing or not doing anything ; 
and besides, accepting all that happens and all that 
is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, 
from whence he himself came ; and finally waiting 
for death with a cheerful mind as being nothing 
else than a dissolution of the elements, of which 
every living being is compounded. But if there 
is no harm to the elements themselves in each 
continually changing into another, why should a 
man have any apprehension about the change and 



OF ANTONINUS. 45 

dissolution of all the elements [himself]? for it is 
according to nature ; and nothing is evil that is 
according to nature." 

The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of 
the Nature of the Universe, of its government, 
and of the relation of man's nature to both. He 
names the universe (fj rw> ok<ov ovaia, vi. I), 5 "the 
universal substance," and he adds that " reason," 
(Aoyos) governs the universe. He also (vi. 9) 
uses the terms " universal nature " or " nature of 
the universe." He (vi. 25) calls the universe 
" the one and all, which we name Cosmus or Order " 
(koct/xos). If he ever seems to use these general 
terms as significant of the All, of all that man can 
in any way conceive to exist, he still on other oc- 
casions plainly distinguishes between Matter, Ma- 
terial things (yXrj, vXlkov), and Cause, Origin, 

5 As to the word ovaia, the reader may see the Index. 
I add here a few examples of the use of the word ; Anto- 
ninus has (v. 24), tj av/inaaa obala, "the universal sub- 
stance." He says (xii. 30), "there is one common" sub- 
stance {ovaia), distributed among countless bodies ; and 
(iv. 40). In Stobaeus (torn. i. lib. 1, tit. 14) there is this 
definition, ovaiav 6s 6aauv tUv ovtuv uttuvtuv ttjv Kpurrjv 
vfa]v. (In viii. 11), Antoninus speaks of to oiiaitjdec nai 
vIlkov, "the substantial and the material ; " and (vn. 10) 
lie says that " everything material''' (evvlov) disappears 
in the substance of the whole (r>) tuv o\m ovaia). The 
ovaia is the generic name of that existence, which we as- 
sume as the highest or ultimate, because we conceive no 
existence which can be coordinated with it and none above 
it. It is the philosopher's " substance : " it is the ultimate 
expression for that which we conceive or suppose to be the 
basis, the being of a thing. " From the Divine, which is 
substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all and 
everything that is created exists." (Swedenborg ) 



46 THE PHILOSOPHY 

Reason (atYi'a, airiwSes, Ao'yos). 6 This is conform- 
able to Zeno's doctrine that there are two original 
principles (ap^at) of all things, that which acts 
(to 7roLovi) and that which is acted upon (to 
7rd(rxov). That which is acted on is the formless 
matter (vXrj) : that which acts is the reason (Adyo?) 
in it, God, for he is eternal and operates through 
all matter, and produces all things. So Anto- 
ninus (v. 32) speaks of the reason (A.dyos) which 
pervades all substance (cnWa), and through all 
time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers 
the universe (rd ttclv). God is eternal, and Mat- 
ter is eternal. It is God who gives to matter its 



6 I remark, in order to anticipate any misapprehension, 
that all these general terms involve a contradiction. The 
"one and all," and the like, and "the whole," imply 
limitation. "One" is limited; "all" is limited; the 
" whole " is limited. We cannot help it. We cannot find 
words to express that which we cannot fully conceive. 
The addition of " absolute " or any other such word does 
not mend the matter. Even God is used by most people, 
often unconsciously, in such a way that limitation is im- 
plied, and yet at the same time words are added which are 
intended to deny limitation. A Christian martyr, when 
he was asked what God was, is said to have answered that 
God has no name like a man ; and Justin says the same 
( Apol. ii. 6). We can conceive the existence of a thing, 
or rather we may have the idea of an existence, without 
an adequate notion of it, " adequate " meaning coexten- 
sive and coequal with the thing. We have a notion of 
limited space derived from the dimensions of what we 
call a material thing, though of space absolute, if I may 
use the term, we have no notion at all ; and of infinite 
space the notion is the same, no notion at all ; and yet 
we conceive it in a sense, though I know not how, and 
we believe that space is infinite, and we cannot conceive 
it to be finite. - - 



OF A XT ON IN US. 47 

form, but he is not said to have created matter. 
According to this view, which is as old as Anax- 
agoras, God and matter exist independently, but 
God governs matter. This doctrine is simply the 
expression of the fact of the existence both of 
matter and of God. The Stoics did not perplex 
themselves with the insoluble question of the origin 
and nature of matter. 7 Antoninus also assumes a 
beginning of things, as we now know them ; but 
his language is sometimes very obscure. I have 
endeavored to explain the meaning of one difficult 
passage, (vn. 75, and the note.) 

Matter consists of elemental parts (o-Toixeia) 
of which all material objects are made. But 
nothing is permanent in form. The nature of 
the universe, according to Antoninus' expression 
(iv. 36), "loves nothing so much as to change 
the things which are, and to make new things 
like them. For everything that exists is in a 
manner the seed of that which will be. But thou 
art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the 

7 The notions of matter and of space are inseparable. 
We derive the notion of space from matter and form. But 
we have no adequate conception either of matter or of 
space. Matter in its ultimate resolution is as unintelligible 
as what men call mind, spirit, or by whatever other name 
they may express the power which makes itself known by 
its-acts. Anaxagoras laid down the distinction between 
intelligence [vovq) and matter, and he said that intelli- 
gence impressed motion on matter and so separated the 
elements of matter and gave them order ; but he probably 
only assumed a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a 
foundation of his philosophical teaching. 

The common Greek word which we translate " matter " 
is vlrj. It is the stuff that things are made of. 



48 THE PHILOSOPHY 

earth or into a womb : but this is a very vulgar 
notion." All things then are in a constant flux 
and change : some things are dissolved into the 
elements, others come in their places ; and so the 
" whole universe continues ever young and per- 
fect." (xn. 23.) 

Antoninus has some obscure expressions about 
what he calls " seminal principles " (<nrepjj.aTiKol 
Ao'yoi) . He opposes them to the Epicurean atoms 
(vi. 24), and consequently his " seminal principles " 
are not material atoms which wander about at 
hazard, and combine nobody knows how. In one 
passage (iv. 21) he speaks of living principles, 
souls (ibvxa) after the dissolution of their bodies 
being received into the " seminal principle of the 
universe." Schultz thinks that by " seminal prin- 
ciples Antoninus means the relations of the various 
elemental principles, which relations are deter- 
mined by the Deity and by Avhich alone the pro- 
duction of organized beings is possible." This 
may be the meaning, but if it is, nothing of any 
% T alue can be derived from it. 8 Antoninus often 
uses the word "Nature" (<£i'o-i?), and we must 
attempt to fix its meaning. The simple etymo- 
logical sense of cpvcns is " production," the birth of 

8 Justin ( Apol. ii. 8) has the expression Kara anepfiaTLKov 
?Myov iitpoQ, where he is speaking of the Stoics. The 
early Christian writers were familiar with the Stoic terms, 
and their writings show that the contest was begun be- 
tween the Christian expositors and the Greek philosophy. 
Even in the second Epistle of St. Peter (n. 1, v. 4) we find 
a Stoic expression, Iva Sea tovtuv yevqa&e -&elac Koivuva 
(pvaecoq. 



OF ANTONINUS. 49 

what we call Things. The Romans used Natura, 
which also means " birth " originally. But neither 
the Greeks nor the Romans stuck to this simple 
meaning, nor do we. Antoninus says (x. 6) : 
" Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms 
or Nature [is a system], let this first be estab- 
lished that I am a part of the whole which is 
governed by nature." Here it might seem as if 
nature were personified and viewed as an active, 
efficient power, as something which, if not inde- 
pendent of the Deity, acts by a power which is 
given to it by the Deity. Such, if I understand 
the expression right, is the way in which the word 
Nature is often used now, "though it is plain that 
many writers use the word without fixing any 
exatc meaning to it. It is the same with the 
expression Laws of Nature, which some writers 
may use in an intelligible sense, but others as 
clearly use in no definite sense at all. There is 
no meaning in this word Nature, except that which 
Bishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, " The 
only distinct meaning of that word Natural is 
Stated, Fixed or Settled ; since what is natural as 
much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent 
to render it so, i. e. to effect it continually or at 
stated times, as what is supernatural or rniraculous 
does to effect it at once." This is Plato's meaning 
(De Leg. it.), when he says, that God holds the 
beginning and end and middle of all that exists, 
and proceeds straight on his course, making Ms 
circuit according to nature (that is, by a fixed 
order) ; and he is continually accompanied by jus- 
4 



50 THE PHILOSOPHY 

tice who punishes those who deviate from the 
divine law, that is, from the order or course which 
God observes. 

When we look at the motions of the planets, the 
action of what we call gravitation, the elemental 
combination of unorganized bodies and their reso- 
lution, the production of plants and of living 
bodies, their generation, growth, and their disso- 
lution, which we call their death, we observe a 
regular sequence of phaenomena, which within the 
limits of experience present and past, so far as we 
know the past, is fixed and invariable. But if 
this is not so, if the order and sequence of phae- 
nomena, as known to us, are subject to change in 
the course of an infinite progression, — and such 
change is conceivable, — we have not discovered, 
nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order 
and sequence of phaenomena, in which sequence 
there may be involved according to its very nature, 
that is, according to its fixed order, some varia- 
tion of what we now call the Order or Nature of 
Things. It is also conceivable that such changes 
have taken place, changes in the order of things, 
as we are compelled by the imperfection of lan- 
guage to call them, but which are no changes ; 
and further it is certain, that our knowledge of 
the true sequence of all actual phaenomena, as for 
instance, the phaenomena of generation, growth, 
and dissolution, is and ever must be imperfect. 

We do not fare much better when we speak of 
Causes and Effects than when we speak of Nature. 
For the practical purposes of life we may use the 



OF ANTONINUS.. 51 

terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may 
fix a distinct meaning to them, distinct enough at 
least to prevent all misunderstanding. But the 
case is different when we speak of causes and 
effects as of Things. All that we know is phae- 
nomena, as the Greeks called them, or appearances 
which follow one another in a regular order, as 
we conceive it, so that if some one phaenomenon 
should fail in the series, we conceive that there 
must either be an interruption of the series, or 
that something else will appear after the phae- 
nomenon which has failed to appear, and will 
occupy the vacant place ; and so the series in its 
progression may be modified or totally changed. 
Cause and effect then mean nothing in the se- 
quence of natural phaenomena beyond Avhat I have 
said ; and the real cause, or the transcendent cause, 
as some would call it, of each successive phaenome- 
non is in that which is the cause of all things 
which are, which have been, and which will be 
forever. Thus the word Creation may have a 
real sense if we consider it as the first, if we can 
conceive a first, in the present order of natural 
phaenomena ; but in the vulgar sense a creation 
of all things at a certain time, followed by a 
quiescence of the first cause and an abandonment 
of all sequences of Phaenomena to the Laws of 
Nature, or to any other words that people may 
use, is absolutely absurd. 9 

9 Time and space are the conditions of our thought ; 
but time infinite and space infinite cannot be objects of 
thought, except in a very imperfect way. Time and space 



52 THE PHILOSOPHY 

Now, though there is great difficulty in under- 
standing all the passages of Antoninus, in which 
he speaks of Nature, of the changes of things and 
of the economy of the universe, I am convinced 
that his sense of Nature and Natural is the same 
as that which I have stated ; and as he was a man 
who knew how to use words in a clear way and 
with strict consistency, we ought to assume, even 
if his meaning in some passages is doubtful, that 
his view of Nature was in harmony with his fixed 
belief in the all-pervading, ever-present, and ever- 
active energy of God. (iv. 40 ; x. 1 ; VI. 40 ; and 
other passages.) 

There is much in Antoninus that is hard to 
understand, and it might be said that he did not 
fully comprehend all that he Avrote ; Avhich would 
however be in no way remarkable, for it happens 
now that a man may write what neither he nor 
anybody can understand. Antoninus tells us 
(xn. 10) to look at things and see what they are, 
resolving them into the material (y^yj), the causal 
(alrtov), and the relation (aixufcopa), or the pur- 
pose, by which he seems to mean something in the 

must not in any way be thought of, when we think of the 
Deity. Swedenborg says, " The natural man may beliei r e 
that he would have no thought, if the ideas of time, of 
space, and of things material were taken away ; for upon 
those is founded all the thought that man has. But let 
him know that the thoughts are limited and confined in 
proportion as they partake of time, of space, and of what 
is material ; and that they are not limited and are extend- 
ed, in proportion as they do not partake of those things ; 
since the mind is so far elevated above the things corpo- 
real and worldly." (Concerning Heaven and Hell, 169.) 



OF ANTONINUS. 53 

nature of what we call effect, or end. The word 
cause (atria) is the difficulty. There is the same 
word in the Sanscrit (hetu) ; and the subtle phi- 
losophers of India and of Greece, and the less 
subtle philosophers of modern times have all used 
this word, or an equivalent word, in a vague way. 
Yet the confusion sometimes may be in the in- 
evitable ambiguity of language rather than in the 
mind of the writer, for I cannot think that some 
of the wisest of men did not know what they in- 
tended to say. When Antoninus says (iv. 36), 
" that everything that exists is in a manner the 
seed of that which will be," he might be supposed 
to say what some of the Indian philosophers have 
said, and thus a profound truth might be converted 
into a gross absurdity. But he says, " in a man- 
ner," and in a manner he said true ; and in 
another manner, if you mistake his meaning, he 
said false. When Plato said, " Nothing ever is, 
but is always becoming" (dei yiyverai), he deliv- 
ered a text, out of which we may derive some- 
thing ; for he destroys by it not all practical, but 
all speculative notions of cause and effect. The 
whole series of things, as they appear to us, must 
be contemplated in time, that is in succession, and 
we conceive or suppose intervals between one state 
of things and another state of things, so that there 
is priority and sequence, and interval, and Being, 
and a ceasing to Be, and beginning and ending. 
But there is nothing of the kind in the Nature of 
Things. It is an everlasting continuity, (iv. 45 ; 
fii. 75.) When Antoninus speaks o£ generation 



64 THE PHILOSOPHY 

(x. 26), he speaks of one cause (ourta) acting, 
and then another cause taking up the work, which 
the former left in a certain state, and so on ; and 
we might perhaps conceive that he had some no- 
tion like what has been called "the self-evolving 
power of nature ; " a fine phrase indeed, the full 
import of which I believe that the writer of it 
did not see, and thus he laid himself open to the 
imputation of being a follower of one of the 
Hindu sects, which makes all things come by 
evolution out of nature or matter, or out of some- 
thing which takes the place of deity, but is not 
deity. I would have all men think as they please 
or as they can, and I only claim the same free- 
dom, which I give. When a man writes any- 
thing, we may fairly try to find out all that his 
words must mean, even if the result is that they 
mean what lie did not mean ; and if we find this 
contradiction, it is not our fault, but his misfor- 
tune. Now Antoninus is perhaps somewhat in 
this condition in what he says (x. 26), though he 
speaks at the end of the paragraph of the power 
which acts, unseen by the eyes, but still no less 
clearly. But whether in this passage (x. 26) he 
means that the power is conceived to be in the 
different successive causes (curi'ai), or in some- 
thing else, nobody can tell. From other passages 
however I do collect that his notion of the phae- 
nomena of the universe -is what I have stated. 
Ihe deity works unseen, if we may use such lan- 
guage, and perhaps I may, as Job did, or he who 
wrote the book of Job. " In him we live and 



OF ANTONINUS. 55 

move and are," said St. Paul to the Athenians, 
and to show his hearers that this was no new 
doctrine, he quoted the Greek poets. One of 
these poets was the Stoic Cleanthes whose noble 
hymn to Zeus or God is an elevated expression 
of devotion and philosophy. It deprives Nature 
of her power and puts her under the immediate 
government of the deity. 

" Thee all this heaven, which whirls around the earth, 
Obeys and willing follows where thou leadest. — 
Without thee, God, nothing is done on earth, 
Nor in the sethereal realms, nor in the sea, 
Save what the wicked do through their own folly." 

Antoninus' conviction of the existence of a 
divine power and government was founded on his 
perception of the order of the universe. Like 
Socrates (Xen. Mem. iv. 3), he says that though 
we cannot see the forms of divine powers, we 
know that they exist because Ave see their works. 

" To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the 
gods, or how dost thou comprehend that they ex- 
ist and so worshipest them ? I answer, in the first 
place, that they may be seen even -with the eyes ; 
in the second place, neither have I seen my own 
soid and yet I honor it. Thus then with respect 
to the gods, from what I constantly experience of 
their power, from this I comprehend that they 
exist and I venerate them." (xn. 28. Comp. 
Xen. Mem. i. 4, 9 ; St. Paul's Epistle to the Ro- 
mans, i. 19, 20 ; and Montaigne's Apology for 
Raimond de Sebonde, n. c. 12.) This is a very 
old argument which has always had great weight 



56 THE PHILOSOPHY 

with most people and has appeared sufficient. It 
does not acquire the least additional strength by 
being developed in a learned treatise. It is as 
intelligible in its simple enunciation as it can be 
made. If it is rejected, there is no arguing with 
him who rejects it : and if it is worked out into 
innumerable particulars, the value of the evi- 
dence runs the risk of being buried under a mass 
of words. 

Man being conscious that he is a spiritual power 
or an intellectual power, or that he has such a 
power, in whatever way he conceives that he has 
it — for I wish simply to state a fact — from this 
power which he has in himself, he is led, as An- 
toninus says, to believe that there is a greater 
power, which as the old Stoics tell us, pervades 
the Avhole universe as the intellect 10 (Vo£>s) per- 

10 I have always translated the word vovc, " intelli- 
gence " or " intellect." It appears to be the word used by 
the oldest Greek philosophers to express the notion of 
" intelligence " as opposed to the notion of " matter." I 
have always translated the word A.6yoQ by "reason,'' and 
TioyMOQ by the word "rational," or perhaps sometimes 
" reasonable," as I have translated voepog by the word 
"intellectual." Every man who has thought and has 
read any philosophical writings knows the difficulty of 
finding words to express certain notions, how imperfectly 
words express these notions, and how carelessly the words 
are often used. The various senses of the word ~Aoyo<; are 
enough to perplex any man. Our translators of the New 
Testament (St. John, c. i.) have simply translated 6 Aoyoc 
by "the woi'd," as the Germans translated it by "das 
Wort ; " but in their theological writings they sometimes 
retain the original term Logos. The Germans have a 
term Vernunft, which seems to ceme nearest to our word 
Reason, or the necessary and absolute truths which we 



OF ANTONINUS.. 57 

rades man. (Compare Epictetus' Discourses, I. 
14 ; and Voltaire a Mad e . Necker, vol. lxvii. p. 
278.) 

God exists then, but what do we know of his 
Nature ? Antoninus says that the soul of man is 
an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies 
like animals, but we have reason, intelligence as 
the gods. Animals have life (i/^x 7 ?)' an< ^ w ^ at 
we call instincts or natural principles of action : 
but the rational animal man alone has a rational, 
intelligent soul (i/^r/ XoyiKT), voepd). Antoninus 
insists on this continually : God is in man, 11 and 
so we must constantly attend to the divinity 
within us, for it is only in this way that we can 
have any knowledge of the nature of God. The 
human soul is in a sense a portion of the divinity, 
and the soul alone has any communication with 

cannot conceive as being other than what they are. Such 
are what some people have called the laws of thought, 
the conceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first 
principles, which need no proof and cannot be proved or 
denied. Accordingly the Germans can say " Gott ist die 
hochste Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans 
have also a word Verstand. which seems to represent our 
word " understanding," " intelligence," " intellect," not 
as a thing absolute which exists by itself, but as a thing 
connected with an individual being, as a man. Accord- 
ingly it is the capacity of receiving impressions ( Vorstel- 
lungen, fpavraijiai) , and forming from them distinct ideas, 
(Begriffe), and perceiving differences. I do not think 
that these remarks will help the reader to the understand- 
ing of Antoninus, or his use of the words vovg and "kb-yoq. 
The Emperor's meaning must be got from his own words, 
and if it does not agree altogether with modern notions, 
it is not our business to force it into agreement, but sim- 
ply to find out what his meaning is, if we can. 
n Comp. Ep. to the Corinthians, i. 3. 17. 



58 THE PHILOSOPHY 

the Deity, for as he says (xn. 2) : " With his 
intellectual part alone God touches the intelli- 
gence only which has flowed and been derived 
from himself into these bodies." In fact he says 
that which is hidden within a man is life, that is 
the man himself. All the rest is vesture, cover- 
ing, organs, instrument, which the living man, the 
real 12 man, uses for the purposes of his present 
existence. The ah is universally diffused for him 
who is able to respire, and so for him who is will- 

12 This is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the soul. " As 
to what concerns the soul, of which it is said that it shall 
live after death, it is nothing else but the man himself, 
who lives in the body, that is, the interior man, who by 
the bod} r acts in the world and from whom the body itself 
lives " (quoted by Clissold.p. 456 of " The Practical Na- 
ture of the Theological Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, 
in a letter to the Archbishop of Dublin," second edition, 
1859 ; a book which theologians might read with profit). 
This is an old doctrine of the soul, which has been often 
proclaimed, but never better expressed than by the 
" Auctor de Mundo," c. 6, quoted by Gataker in his 
" Antoninus," p. 43ti. " The soul by which we live and 
have cities and houses is invisible, but it is seen by its- 
works ; for the whole method of'life has been devised by 
it and ordered, and by it is held together. In like manner 
we must think also about the Deity, who in power is 
most mighty, in beauty most comely, in life immortal, 
and in virtue supreme : wherefore though he is invisible 
to human nature, he is seen by his very works." Other 
passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker, 
(p. 382.) Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul: 
" Upon the whole then our organs of sense and our limbs 
are certainly instruments, which the living persons, our- 
selves, make use of to perceive and move with." If this 
is not plain enough, he also says : "It follows that our 
organized bodies are no more ourselves, or part of our- 
selves, than any other matter around us." (Compare 
Anton, x. 38.) 



OF ANTONINUS. 59 

Lag to partake of it the intelligent power which 
holds within it all things is diffused as wide and 
free as the ah. (viii. 54.) It is by living a 
divine life that man approaches to a knowledge 
of the divinity. 13 It is by following the divinity 
within, Saifjiwv or 0e6% as Antoninus calls it, that 
man comes nearest to the Deity, the supreme good, 
for man can never attain to perfect agreement 
with his internal guide (to Tjye/jLoviKov) • " Live 
with the gods. And he does live with the gods 
who constantly shows to them that his own soul is 
satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and 
that it does all the daemon (8aCfuav ) wishes, which 
Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian 
and guide, a portion of himself. And this daemon 
is every man's understanding and reason." (v. 27.) 
There is in man, that is in the reason, the in- 
telligence, a superior faculty which if it is exer- 
cised rules all the rest. This is the ruling faculty 
(to rjyefiLoviKov), which Cicero (De Natura Deo- 
rum, II. 11) renders by the Latin word Principatus, 
" to which nothing can or ought to be superior." 

13 The reader may consult Discourse V. "Of the ex- 
istence and nature of God," in John Smith's " Select 
Discourses." He has prefixed as a text to this Discourse, 
the striking passage of Agapetus, Paraenes. § 3 : " He 
who knows himself will know God ; and he who knows 
God will be made like to God ; and he will be made like 
to God, who has become worthy of God ; and lie becomes 
worthy of God, who does nothing unworthy of God, but 
thinks the things that are his, and speaks what he thinks, 
and does what he speaks." I suppose that the old say- 
ing, " Know thyself," which is attributed to Socrates and 
others, had a larger meaning than the narrow sense which 
is generally given to it. 



60 THE PHILOSOPHY 

Antoninus often uses this term, and others which 
are equivalent. He names it (vn. 64) " the 
governing intelligence." The governing faculty 
is the master of the soul. (v. 26.) A man must 
reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity 
within him. As we must reverence that which 
is supreme in the universe, so we must reverence 
that which is supreme in ourselves, and this is 
that which is of like kind with that which is 
supreme in the universe, (v. 21.) So, as Plotinus 
says, the soul of man can only know the divine, 
so far as it knows itself. In one passage (xi. 19) 
Antoninus speaks of a man's condemnation of 
himself, when the diviner part within him has 
been overpowered and yields to the less honorable 
and to the perishable part, the body, and its gross 
pleasures. In a Avord, the views of Antoninus on 
this matter, however his expressions may vary, 
are exactly what Bishop Butler expresses, when 
he speaks of " the natural supremacy of reflection 
or conscience," of the faculty " which, surveys, ap- 
proves or disapproves the several affections of our 
mind and actions of our lives." 

Much matter might be collected from Anto- 
ninus on the notion of the Universe being one 
animated Being. But all that he says amounts 
to no more, as Schultz remarks, than this : the 
soul of man is most intimately united to his body 
and together they make one animal, which we 
call man ; so the Deity is most intimately united 
to the world or the material universe, and together 
they fbrm^one whole. But Antoninus did not 



OF ANTONINUS. 61 

view God and the material universe as the same, 
any more than he viewed the body and soul of 
man as one. Antoninus has no speculations on 
the absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his 
fashion to waste his time on what man cannot 
understand. He was satisfied that God exists, 
that he governs all things, that man can only have 
an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he must 
attain this imperfect knowledge by reverencing 
the divinity which is within him, and keeping it 
pure. 

From all that has been said it follows that the 
universe is administered by the Providence of God 
(■n-povoia), and that all things are wisely ordered. 
There are passages in which Antoninus expresses 
doubts, or states diffei^ent possible theories of the 
constitution and government of the Universe, but 
he always recurs to Ms fundamental principle, that 
if we admit the existence of a Deity, we must 
also admit that he orders all things wisely and 
well. (iv. 27 ; vi. 1 ; ix. 28 ; xn. 5, and many 
other passages.) Epictetus says (i. 6) that we 
can discern the providence which rules the world, 
if we possess two things, the power of seeing all 
that happens with respect to each thing, and a 
grateful disposition. 

But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the 
world so full of what we call evil, physical and 
moral ? If instead of saying that there is evil in 
the world, we use the expression which I have 
used, " what we call evil," we have partly antici- 
pated the Emperor's answer. We see and fee] 



62 THE PHILOSOPHY 

and know imperfectly very few things in the few 
years that we live, and all the knowledge and all 
the experience of all the human race is positive 
ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now 
as our reason teaches us that everything is in some 
way related to and connected with every other 
thing, all notion of evil as being in the universe 
of things is a contradiction, for if the whole comes 
from and is governed by an intelligent being, it 
is impossible to conceive anything in it which tends 
to the evil or destruction of the whole, (vm. 55 ; 
x. 6.) Everything is in constant mutation, and 
yet the whole subsists. We might imagine the 
solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and 
yet the whole would still subsist " ever young and 
perfect." 

All things, all forms, are dissolved and new 
forms appear. All living things undergo the 
■change which we call death. If we call death an 
evil, then all change is an evil. Living beings 
also suffer pain, and man suffers most of all, for 
he suffers both in and by his body and by his 
intelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, 
and perhaps the largest part of human suffering 
comes to man from those whom he calls his broth- 
ers. Antoninus says (vm. 55), " Generally, 
wickedness does no harm at all to the universe ; 
and particularly, the wickedness [of one man] does 
no harm to another. It is only harmful to him 
who has it in his power to be released from it, as 
soon as he shall choose." The first part of this 
is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the 



OF ANTONINUS. 63 

whole can sustain no evil or harm. The second 
part must be explained by the Stoic principle that 
there is no evil in anything which is not in our 
power. What wrong we suffer from another is 
his evil, not ours. But this is an admission that 
there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does 
evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there 
is evil in the wrongdoer. Antoninus (xi. 18) 
gives many excellent precepts with respect to 
wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are practical. 
He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and 
his lessons may be just as useful to him who 
denies the being and the government of God as 
to him who believes in both. There is no direct 
answer in Antoninus to the objections which may 
be made to the existence and providence of God 
because of the moral disorder and suffering which 
are in the world, except this answer which he 
makes in reply to the supposition that even the 
best men may be extinguished by death. He 
says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought 
to have been otherwise, the gods would have 
ordered it otherwise, (xn. 5.) His conviction of 
the wisdom which we may observe in the govern- 
ment of the world is too strong to be disturbed by 
any apparent irregularities in the order of things. 
That these disorders exist is a fact, and those who 
would conclude from them against the being and 
government of God conclude too hastily. We all 
admit that there is an order in the material world, 
a Nature, in the sense in which that word has 
been explained, a constitution (Karao-Keu??,) what 



64 THE PHILOSOPHY 

we call a system, a relation of parts to one another 
and a fitness of the whole for something. So in 
the constitution of plants and of animals there is 
an order, a fitness for some end. Sometimes the 
order, as we conceive it, is interrupted and the 
end, as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, 
the plant or the animal sometimes perishes before 
it has passed through all its changes and done all 
its uses. It is according to Nature, that is a fixed 
order, for some to perish early and for others to 
do all their uses and leave successors to take their 
place. So man has a corporeal and intellectual 
and moral constitution fit for certain uses, and 
on the whole man performs these uses, dies and 
leaves other men in his place. So society exists, 
and a social state is manifestly the Natural State 
of man, the state for which his Nature fits him ; 
and society amidst innumerable irregularities and 
disorders still subsists ; and perhaps we may say 
that the history of the past and our present knowl- 
edge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders 
will diminish, and that order, its governing prin- 
ciple, may be more firmly established. As order 
then, a fixed order, we may say, subject to devia- 
tions real or apparent, must be admitted to exist 
in the whole Nature of things, that which we call 
disorder or evil as it seems to us, does not in any 
way alter the fact of the general constitution of 
things having, a Nature or fixed order. Nobody 
will conclude from the existence of disorder that 
order is not the rule, for the existence of order 
both physical and moral is proved by daily ex- 



OF ANTONINUS. 65 

perience and all past experience. We cannot 
conceive how the order of the universe is main- 
tained: we cannot even conceive how our own 
life from day to day is continued, nor how we 
perform the simplest movements of the body, nor 
how we grow and think and act, though we know 
many of the conditions which are necessary for 
all these functions. Knowing nothing then of 
the unseen power which acts in ourselves except 
by what is done, we know nothing of the power 
which acts through what we call all time and all 
space ; but seeing that there is a Nature or fixed 
order in all things known to us, it is conformable 
to the nature of our minds to believe that this 
universal Nature has a cause which operates con- 
tinually, and that we are totally unable to specu- 
late on the reason of any of those disorders or 
evils which we perceive. This I believe is the 
answer which may be collected from all that An- 
toninus has said. 14 

The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles 
tells Priam (Iliad, 24, 527) that Zeus has two casks, 
one filled with good tilings, and the other with 
bad, and that he gives to men out of each accord- 
ing to his pleasure ; and so we must be content, 
for we cannot alter the will of Zeus. One of the 
Greek commentators asks how must we reconcile 
this doctrine with what we find in the first book 
of the Odyssey, where the king of the gods says, 

14 Cleanthes says in his Hymn : 
" For all things good and bad to One thou forme9t, 
So that One everlasting reason governs all." 

5 



66 THE PHILOSOPHY 

Men say that evil comes to them from us, but they 
bring it on themselves through their own folly. 
The answer is plain enough even to the Greek 
commentator. The poets make both Achilles and 
Zeus speak appropriately to their several charac- 
ters. Indeed Zeus says plainly that men do attrib- 
ute their sufferings to the gods, but they do it 
falsely, for they are the cause of their own sorrows. 

Epictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes short 
work of the question of evil. He says, " As a 
mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, 
so neither does the nature of evil exist in the 
Universe." This will appear obscure enough to 
those who are not acquainted with Epictetus, but 
he always knows what he is talking about. We 
do not set up a mark in order to miss it, though 
we may miss it. God, whose existence Epictetus 
assumes, has not ordered all things so that his pur- 
pose shall fail. Whatever there may be of what 
we call evil, the Nature of evil, as he expresses it, 
does not exist ; that is, evil is not a part of the 
constitution or nature of Things. If there were 
a principle of evil (apxy) m ^ ne constitution of 
things, evil would no longer be evil, as Simplicius 
argues, but evil would be good. Simplicius (c. 34, 
[27]) has a long and curious discourse on this text 
of Epictetus, and it is amusing and instructive. 

One passage more will conclude this matter. It 
contains all that the emperor could say (n. 11) : 
" To go from among men, if there are gods, is not 
a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not in- 
volve thee in evil ; but if indeed they do not 



OF ANTONINUS. 67 

exist, or if they have no concern about human 
affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid 
of gods or devoid of providence ? But in truth 
they do exist, and they do care for human things, 
and they have put all the means in man's power 
to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as 
to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would 
have provided for this also, that it should be al- 
together in a man's power not to fall into it. But 
that which does not make a man worse, how can 
it make a man's life worse ? But neither through 
ignorance, nor having the knowledge, but not the 
power to guard against or correct these things, is 
it possible that the nature of the Universe has 
overlooked them ; nor is it possible that it has 
made so great a mistake, either through want of 
power or want of skill, that good and evil should 
happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. 
But death certainly and life, honor and dishonor, 
pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen 
to good and bad men, being things which make 
us neither better nor worse. Therefore they are 
neither good nor evil." 

The Ethical part of Antoninus' Philosophy fol- 
lows from his general principles. The end of all 
his philosophy is to live conformably to Nature, 
both a man's own nature and the nature of the 
Universe. Bishop Butler has explained what the 
Greek philosophers meant when they spoke of 
living according to Nature, and he says that when 
it is explained, as he has explained it and as they 
understood it, it is " a manner of speaking not loose 



68 THE PHILOSOPHY 

and undetercninate, but clear and distinct, strictly 
just and true." To live according to Nature is to 
live according to a man's whole nature, not accord- 
ing to a part of it, and to reverence the divinity 
within him as the governor of all his actions. " To 
the rational animal the same act is according to 
nature and according to reason." 15 (vn. 11.) That 
which is done contrary to reason is also an act 
contrary to nature, to the whole nature, though it 
is certainly conformable to some part of man's 
nature,- or it could not be done. Man is made for 
action, not for idleness or pleasure. As plants 
and animals do the uses of their nature, so man 
must do his. (v. 1.) 

Man must also live conformably to the universal 
nature, conformably to the nature of all things of 
Avhich he is one ; and as a citizen of a political 
community he must direct his life and actions with 
reference to those among whom, and for whom, 
among other purposes, he lives. A man must not 
retire into solitude and cut himself off from his 
fellow men. He must be ever active to do his 
part in the great whole. All men are his kin, not 
only in blood, but still more by participating in 
the same intelligence and by being a portion of 
the same divinity. A man cannot really be in- 
jured by his brethren, for no act of theirs can 
make him bad, and he must not be angry with 
them nor hate them : " For we are made for co- 

15 This is what Juvenal means when he says (xiv. 
321) — 
Nunquaiu aliud Natura aliud Sapentia dieit 



OF ANTONINUS. 69 

operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like 
the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act 
against one another then is contrary to nature ; 
and it is acting against one another to be vexed 
and to turn away." (n. 1.) 

Further he says : " Take pleasure in one thing 
and rest hi it, in passing from one social act to 
another social act, thinking of God." (vi. 7.) 
Again: " Love mankind. Follow God." (vn. 31.) 
It is the characteristic of the rational soul for a 
man to love his neighbor, (xi. 1.) Antoninus 
teaches in various passages the forgiveness of in- 
juries, and we know that he also practised what 
he taught. Bishop Butler remarks that " this 
divine precept to forgive injuries and to love our 
enemies, though to be met with in Gentile moral- 
ists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept of Chris- 
tianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it 
than on any other single virtue." The practice of 
this precept is the most difficult of all virtues. 
Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid 
towards following it. "When we are injured, we 
feel anger and resentment, and the feeling is 
natural, just and useful for the conservation of 
society. It is useful that wrong doers should feel 
the natural consequences of their actions, among 
which is the disapprobation of society and the re- 
sentment of him who is wronged. But revenge 
in the proper sense of that word, must not be prac- 
tised. " The best way of avenging thyself," says 
the emperor, " is not to become like the wrong 
doer." It is plain by this that he does not mean 



70 THE PHILOSOPHY 

that we should in any case practise revenge ; but 
he says to those who talk of revenging wrongs, 
Be not like him who has done the wrong. - Soc- 
rates in the Crito (c. 10) says the same in other 
words, and St. Paul (Ep. to the Romans, ~K.il. 17.) 
" When a man has done thee any wrong, imme- 
diately consider with what opinion about good or 
evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast 
seen this, thou wilt pity him and wilt neither 
wonder nor be angry." (vn. 26.) Antoninus 
would not deny that wrong naturally produces the 
feeling of anger and resentment, for this is implied 
in the recommendation to reflect on the nature of 
the man's mind who has done the wrong, and then 
you will have pity instead of resentment : and so 
it comes to the same as St. Paul's advice to be 
angry and sin not ; which, as Butler well explains 
it, is not a recommendation to be angry, which 
nobody needs, for anger is a natural passion, but 
it is a warning against allowing anger to lead us 
into sin. In short the emperor's doctrine about 
wrongful acts is this : Avrong doers do not know 
what good and bad are : they offend out of igno- 
rance, and in the sense of the Stoics this is true. 
Though this kind of ignorance will never be ad- 
mitted as >■ a legal excuse, and ought not to be 
admitted as a full excuse in any way by society, 
there may be grievous injuries, such as it is in a 
man's power to forgive without harm to society ; 
and if he forgives because he sees that his enemies 
know not what they do, he is acting in the spirit 
of the sublime prayer, " Father, forgive them, for 
they know not what they do." 



OF ANTONINUS. 71 

The emperor's moral philosophy was not a feeble, 
narrow system, which teaches a man to look di- 
rectly to his own happiness, though a man's hap- 
piness or tranquillity is indirectly promoted by 
living as he ought to do. A man must live con- 
formably to the universal nature, which means, as 
the emperor explains it in many passages, that a 
man's actions must be conformable to his true re- 
lations to all other human beings, both as a citizen 
of a political community and as a member of the 
whole human family. This implies, and he often 
expresses it in the most forcible language, that a 
man's words and actions, so far as they affect 
others, must be measured by a fixed rule, which 
is their consistency with the conservation and the 
interests of the particular society of which he is a 
member, and of the whole human race. To live 
conformably to such a rule, a man must use his 
rational faculties in order to discern clearly the 
consequences and full effect of all his actions and 
of the actions of others : he must not live a life of 
contemplation and reflection only, though he must 
often retire within himself to calm and purify his 
soul by thought, but he must mingle in the work of 
man and be a fellow laborer for the general good. 

A man should have an object or purpose in life, 
that he may direct all his energies to it ; of course 
a good object, (n. 7.) He who has not one object 
or purpose of life, cannot be one and the same all 
through his life. (xi. 21.) Bacon has a remark to 
the same effect, on the best means of " reducing 
of the mind unto virtue and good estate ; which 



72 THE PHILOSOPHY 

is, the electing and propounding unto a man's self 
good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be 
in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain." 
He is a happy man who has been wise enough 
to do this when he was young and has had the 
opportunities ; but the emperor seeing well that a 
man cannot always be so wise in his youth, en- 
courages himself to do it when he can, and not to 
let life slip away before he has begun. He who 
can propose to himself good and virtuous ends of 
life, and be true to them, cannot fail to live con- 
formably to his own interest and the universal in- 
terest, for in the nature of things they are one. 
If a thing is not good for the hive, it is not good 
for the bee. (vi. 54.) 

One passage may end this matter. " If the gods 
have determined about me and about the things 
which must happen to me, they have determined 
well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity 
without forethought ; and as to doing me harm, 
why should they have any desire towards that ? 
For what advantage would result to them from 
this or to the whole, which is the special object of 
their providence ? But if they have not deter- 
mined about me individually, they have certainly 
determined about the whole at least ; and the 
things which happen by way of sequence in this 
general arrangement I ought to accept with pleas- 
ure and to be content with them. But if they 
determine about nothing — which it is wicked to 
believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacri- 
fice nor pray nor swear by them nor do anything 



OF ANTONINUS. 78 

else which we do as if the gods were present and 
lived with us — but if however the gods determine 
about none of the things which concern us, I am 
able to determine about myself, and I can inquire 
about that which is useful ; and that is useful to 
every man which is conformable to his own con- 
stitution (KOLTao-Kevy]) and nature. But my nature 
is rational and social ; and my city and country, 
so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome ; but so far as 
I am a man, it is the world. The things then 
which are useful to these cities are alone useful 
to me." (vi. 44.) 

It would be tedious, and it is not necessary to 
state the emperor's opinions on all the ways in 
which a man may profitably use his understanding 
towards perfecting himself in practical virtue. 
The passages to this purpose are in all parts of 
his book, but as they are in no order or connec- 
tion, a man must use the book a long time before 
he will find out all that is in it. A few words 
may be added here. If we analyse all other 
things, we find how insufficient they are for human 
life, and how truly worthless many of them are. 
Virtue alone is indivisible, one, and perfectly satis- 
fying. The notion of Virtue cannot be considered 
vague or unsettled, because a man may find it 
difficult to explain the notion fully to himself or 
to expound it to others in such a way as to prevent 
cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more consists 
of parts than man's intelligence does, and yet we 
speak of various intellectual faculties as a conven- 
ient way of expressing the various powers which 



74 THE PHILOSOPHY 

man's intellect shows by its works. In the same 
'way we may speak of various virtues or parts of 
virtue, in a practical sense, for the purpose of 
showing what particular virtues we ought to prac- 
tise in order to the exercise of the whole of virtue, 
that is, as much as man's nature is capable of. 

The prime principle in man's constitution is 
social. The next in order is not to yield to the per- 
suasions of the body, when they are not conformable 
to the rational principle, which must govern. The 
third is freedom from error and from deception. 
"Let then the ruling principle holding fast to 
these things go straight on and it has what is its 
own." (vu. 55.) The emperor selects justice as 
the virtue which is the basis of all the rest (x. 11), 
and this had been said long before his time. 

It is true that all people have some notion of 
what is meant by justice as a disposition of the 
mind, and some notion about acting in conformity 
to this disposition ; but experience shows that 
men's notions about justice are as confused as their 
actions are inconsistent with the true notion of 
justice. The emperor's notion of justice is clear 
enough, but not practical enough for all mankind. 
" Let there be freedom from perturbations with 
respect to the things which come from the exter- 
nal cause ; and let there be justice in the things 
done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let 
there be movement and action terminating in this, 
in social acts, for this is according to thy nature." 
(ix. 31.) In another place (ix. 1) he says that 
"he who acts unjustly acts impiously," which fol- 



OF ANTONINUS. 75 

lows of course from all that he says in various 
places. He insists on the practice of truth as a 
virtue and as a means to virtue, which no doubt 
it is : for lying even in indifferent things weakens 
the understanding ; and lying maliciously is as 
great a moral offence as a man can be guilty of, 
viewed both as showing an habitual disposition, 
and viewed with respect to its consequences. He 
couples the notion of justice with action. A man 
must not pride himself on having some fine notion 
of justice in his head, but he must exhibit his 
justice in act, like St. James's notion of faith. 
But this is enough. 

The Stoics and Antoninus among them call some 
things beautiful (koAci) and some ugly (oucrxpu), 
and as they are beautiful so they are good, and as 
they are ugly so they are evil or bad. (n. 1.) All 
these things good and evil are in our power, 
absolutely some of the stricter Stoics would say ; 
in a manner only, as those who would not depart 
altogether from common sense would say ; practi- 
cally they are to a great degree in the power of 
some persons and in some circumstances, but in a 
small degree only in other persons and in other 
circumstances. The Stoics maintain man's free 
will as to the things which are in his power ; for 
as to the things which are out of his power, free 
will terminating in action is of course excluded 
by the very terms of the expression. I hardly 
know if we can discover exactly Antoninus' notion 
of the free will of man, nor is the question worth 
the inquiry. "What he does mean and does say is 



76 THE PHILOSOPHY 

intelligible. All the things which are not in 
our power (dTrpoatpera) are indifferent : they are 
neither good nor bad, morally. Such are life, 
health, wealth, power, disease, poverty and death. 
Life and death are all men's portion. Health, 
wealth, power, disease and poverty happen to men 
indifferently to the good and to the bad ; to those 
who live according to nature and to those who do 
not. " Life," says the emperor, " is a warfare and 
a stranger's sojourn, and after fame is oblivion." 
(n. 17.) After speaking of those men who have 
disturbed the world and then died, and of the 
death of philosophers such as Heraclitus and De- 
mocritus who was destroyed by lice, and of Soc- 
rates whom other lice (his enemies) destroyed, he 
says : " What means all this ? Thou hast embarked, 
thou hast made the voyage, thou art come to shore ; 
get out. If indeed to another life, there is no 
want of gods, not even there. But if to a state 
without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by 
pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel 
which is as much inferior as that which serves it 
is superior : for the one is intelligence and deity ; 
the other is earth and corruption." (m. 3.) It is 
not death that a man should fear, but he should 
fear never beginning to live according to nature, 
(xn. 1.) Every man should live in such a way 
as to discharge his duty, and to trouble himself 
about nothing else. He should live such a life 
that he shall always be ready for death, and shall 
depart content when the summons comes. For 
what is death ? "A cessation of the impressions 



OF ANTONINUS. 77 

through the senses, and of the pulling of the strings 
which move the appetites and of the discursive 
movements of the thoughts, and of the service to 
the flesh." (vi. 28.) Death is such as generation 
is, a mystery of nature, (iv. 5.) In another 
passage, the exact meaning of which is perhaps 
doubtful (ix. 3), he speaks of the child which 
leaves the womb, and so he says the soul at death 
leaves its envelope. As the child is born or comes 
into life by leaving the womb, so the soul may on 
leaving the body pass into another existence which 
is perfect. I am not sure if this is the emperor's 
meaning. Butler compares it with a passage in 
Strabo about the Brahmins' notion of death being 
the birth into real life and a happy life to those 
who have philosophized ; and he thinks that An- 
toninus may allude to this opinion. 16 

Antoninus' opinion of a future life is nowhere 
clearly expressed. His doctrine of the nature of 
the soul of necessity implies that it does not perish 
absolutely, for a portion of the divinity cannot 
perish. The opinion is at least as old as the time 
of Epicharmus and Euripides ; what comes from 
earth goes back to earth, and what comes from 
heaven, the divinity, returns to him who gave it. 
But I find nothing clear in Antoninus as to the 

16 Seneca (Ep. 102) has the same, whether an expres- 
sion of his own opinion, or merely a fine saying of others 
employed to embellish his writings, I know not.- After 
speaking of the child being prepared in the womb to live 
this lite, he adds, " Sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia 
patet in senectutem, in alium naturae sumimur partum. 
Alia origo nos expectat, alius rerurn status." 



78 THE PHILOSOPHY 

notion of the man existing after death so as to be 
conscious of his sameness with that soul which 
occupied his vessel of clay. He seems to be 
perplexed on this matter, and finally to have rested 
in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is 
best and consistent with the university of things. 

Nor I think does he speak conclusively on 
another Stoic doctrine, which some Stoics prac- 
tised, the anticipating the regular course of nature 
by a man's own act. The reader will find some 
passages in which this is touched on, and he may 
make of them what he can. But there are pas- 
sages in which the emperor encourages himself to 
wait for the end patiently and with tranquillity ; 
and certainly it is consistent with all his best 
teaching that a man should bear all that falls to 
his lot and do useful acts as long as he lives. He 
should not therefore abridge the time of his use- 
fulness by his own act. Whether he contemplates 
any possible cases in which a man should die by 
his own hand, I cannot tell, and the matter is not 
worth a curious inquiry, for I believe it would not 
lead to any certain result as to his opinion on this 
point. I do not think that Antoninus, who never 
mentions Seneca, though he must have known all 
about him, would have agreed with Seneca when 
he gives as a reason for suicide, that the eternal 
law, whatever he means, has made nothing better 
for us than this, that it has given us only one way 
of entering into life and many ways of going out 
of it. The ways of going out indeed are many, 
and that is a good reason for a man taking care 
of himself. 



OF ANTONINUS. 7S 

Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic's 
life. There is no rule of life contained in the 
precept that a man should pursue his own hap- 
piness. Many men think that they are seeking 
happiness when they are only seeking the gratifi- 
cation of some particular passion, the strongest 
that they have. The end of a man is, as already 
explained, to live conformably to nature, and he 
will thus obtain happiness, tranquillity of mind and 
contentment, (in. 12 ; viii. 1, and other places.) 
As a means of living conformably to nature he 
must study the four chief virtues, each of which 
lias its proper sphere : wisdom or the knowledge 
of good and evil ; justice, or the giving to every 
man his due ; fortitude, or the enduring of labor 
and pain ; and temperance, which is moderation 
in all things. By thus living conformably to 
nature, the Stoic obtained all that he wished or 
expected. His reward was in his virtuous life, 
and he was satisfied with that. Some Greek poet 
long ago wrote : — 

For virtue only of all human things 

Takes her reward not from the hands of others. 

Virtue herself rewards the toils of virtue. 

Some of the Stoics indeed expressed themselves 
in very arrogant, absurd terms, about the wise 
man's self sufficiency ; they elevated him to the 
rank of a deity. 17 But these were only talkers 

17 J. Smith in his Select Discourses on " the Excellency 
and Nobleness of true religion " (c. vi.) has remarked on 
this Stoical arrogance. He finds it in Seneca and others. 
In Seneca certainly, and perhaps something of it in 
Epictetus ; but it is not in Antoninus. 



80 ANTONINUS. 

and lecturers, such as those in all ages who utter 
fine words, know little of human affairs, and care 
only for notoriety. Epictetus and Antoninus both 
by precept and example labored to improve them- 
selves and others ; and if we discover imperfec- 
tions in their teaching, we must still honor these 
great men who attempted to show that there is in 
man's nature and in the constitution of things 
sufficient reason for living a virtuous life. It is 
difficult enough to live as we ought to live, diffi- 
cult even for any man to live in such a way as to 
satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moderate 
degree the power of reflecting upon and reviewing 
Ins own conduct ; and if all men cannot be brought 
to the same opinions in morals and religion, it is 
at least worth while to give them good reasons for 
as much as they can be persuaded to accept. 





M. ANTONINUS 




T. 

ROM my grandfather Verus 1 [I 
learned] good morals and the gov- 
ernment of my temper. 

2. From the reputation and re- 
membrance of my father, 2 modesty and a manly 
character. 

1 Annius Verus was his grandfather's name. There is 
no verb in this section connected with the word " from," 
nor in the following sections of this book ; and it is not 
quite certain what verb should be supplied. What I 
have added may express the meaning here, though 
there are sections which it will not fit. If he does not 
mean to say that he learned all these good things from 
the several persons whom he mentions, he means that 
he observed certain good qualities in them, or received 
certain benefits from them, and it is implied that he was 
the better for it, or at least might have been ; for it 
would be a mistake to understand Marcus as saying that 
he possessed all the virtues which he observed in his 
kinsmen and teachers. 

2 His father's name was Annius Verus. 



82 M. ANTONINUS. I. 

3. From my mother, 3 piety and beneficence, and 
abstinence, not only from evil deeds, but even 
from evil thoughts ; and further, simplicity in my 
way of living, far removed from the habits of the 
rich. 

4. From my great-grandfather, 4 not to have 
frequented public schools, and to have had good 
teachers at home, and to know that on such things 
a man should spend liberally. 

o. From my governor, to be neither of the 
green nor of the blue party at the games in the 
Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius 
or the Scutarius at the gladiators' fights ; from 
him too I learned endurance of labor, and to 
want little, and to work with my own hands, and 
not to meddle with other people's affairs, and not 
to be ready to listen to slander. 

6. From Diognetus, not to busy myself about 
trifling things, and not to give credit to what was 
said by miracle-workers and jugglers about incan- 
tations and the driving away of daemons and such 
things ; and not to breed quails [for fighting], nor 
to give myself up passionately to such things ; and 
to endure freedom of speech ; and to have become 

8 His mother was Doraitia Cal villa, named also Lucilla., 
* Perhaps his mother's grandfather, Catilius Severus. 



M. ANTONINUS. I. 83 

intimate with philosophy ; and to have been a 
hearer, first of Bacchius, then of Tandasis and 
Marcianus ; and to have written dialogues in my 
youth ; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, 
and whatever else of the kind belongs to the Gre- 
cian discipline. 

7. From Rusticus 5 I received the impression 
that my character required improvement and dis- 
cipline ; and from him I learned not to be led 
astray to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on 
speculative matters, nor to delivering little horta- 
tory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man 
who practises much discipline, or does benevolent 
acts in order to make a display; and to abstain 
from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine writing ; and 
not to walk about in the house in my outdoor 
dress, nor to do other things of the kind ; and to 
write my letters with simplicity, like the letter 

5 Q. Junius Rusticus was a Stoic philosopher, whom 
Antoninus valued highly, and often took his advice. 
(Capitol. M. Antonin. iii.) 

Antoninus says, role ''E-aLHTTirelotg VKOjivrjfiaauv, which 
must not be translated, " the writings of Epictetus," for 
Epictetus wrote nothing. His pupil Arrian, who has 
preserved for us all that we know of Epictetus, says, 
ravra eireipa&riv VTZouvTjfxaTa k/xavrC) iia^vka^ai rfjg eiceivov 
diavoiag. (Ep. ad Gell.) 



84 31. ANTONINUS. I. 

which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my moth 
er ; and with respect to those who have offended 
me hy words, or done me wrong, to be easily dis- 
posed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they 
have shown a readiness to be reconciled ; and to 
read carefully, and not to be satisfied with a su- 
perficial understanding of a book ; nor hastily to 
give my assent to those who talk over-much ; and 
I am indebted to him for being acquainted with 
the discourses of Epictetus, which he communi- 
cated to me out of his own collection. 

8. From Apollonius 6 I learned freedom of will 
and undeviating steadiness of purpose ; and to 
look to nothing else, not even for a moment, ex- 
cept to reason ; and to be always the same, in 
sharp pains, on the occasion of the loss of a child, 
and in long illness ; and to see clearly in a living 
example that the same man can be both most res- 
olute and yielding, and not peevish in giving his 
instruction ; and to have had before my eyes a 
man who clearly considered his experience and his 
skill in expounding philosophical principles as the 
smallest of his merits ; and from him I learned 
how to receive from friends what are esteemed 

6 Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time of 
Pius to be Marcus' preceptor. He was a rigid Stoic. 



M. ANTONINUS. I. 85 

favors, without being either humbled by them or 
letting them pass unnoticed. 

9. From Sextus, 7 a benevolent disposition, and 
the example of a family governed in a fatherly man- 
ner, and the idea of living conformably to nature ; 
and gravity without affectation, and to look care- 
fully after the interests of friends, and to tolerate 
ignorant persons, and those who form opinions 
without consideration f : he had the power of read- 
ily accommodating himself to all, so that inter- 
course with him was more agreeable than any 
flattery ; and at the same time he was most highly 
venerated by those who associated with him : and 
he had the faculty both of discovering and order- 
ing, in an intelligent and methodical way, the prin- 
ciples necessary for life ; and he never showed an- 
ger or any other passion, but w r as entirely free from 
passion, and also most affectionate ; and he could 
express approbation without noisy display, and he 
possessed much knowledge without ostentation. 

10. From Alexander 8 the grammarian, to re- 
frain from fault-finding, and not in a reproachful 

7 Sextus of Chseronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or 
nephew, as some say ; but more probably a grandson. 

3 Alexander was a Grammaticus, a native of Phrygia. 
He wrote a commentary on Homer ; and the rhetorician 



86 M. ANTONINUS. I. 

way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or 
solecistic or strange-sounding expression ; but dex- 
terously to introduce the very expression which 
ought to have beep used, and in the way of answer 
or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry 
about the thing itself, not about the word, or by 
some other fit suggestion. 

Co 

11. From Fronto 9 I learned to observe what 
envy, and duplicity, and hypocrisy are in a tyrant, 
and that generally those among us who are called 
Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection. 

12. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequent- 
ly nor without necessity to say to any one, or to 
write in a letter, that I have no leisure ; nor con- 
tinually to excuse the neglect of duties required 
by our relation to those with whom we live, by 
alleging urgent occupations. 

13. From Catulus, 10 not to be indifferent when 
a friend finds fault, even if he should find fault 
without reason, but to try to restore him to his 
usual disposition ;' and to be ready to speak well 

Aristides wrote a panegyric on Alexander in a funeral 
oration. 

9 Cornelius Fronto was a rhetorician, and in great 
favor with Marcus. There are extant various letters 
between Marcus and Fronto. 

10 Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher. 



M. ANTONINUS. I. 8? 

of teachers, as it is reported of Domitius and 
Athenodotus ; and to love my children truly. 

14. From my brother 11 Severus, to love my 
kin, and to love truth, and to love justice ; and 
through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvid- 
ius, Cato, Dion, Brutus ; 12 and from him I receiv- 
ed the idea of a polity in which there is the same 
law for all, a polity administered with regard to 
equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the 
idea of a kingly government which respects most 
of all the freedom of the governed ; I learned from 
him also f consistency and undeviating steadiness 
in my regard for philosophy ; and a disposition to 
do good, and to give to others readily, and to cher- 
ish good hopes, and to believe that I am loved by 
my friends ; and in him I observed no conceal- 
ment of his opinions with respect to those whom 

11 The word brother may not be genuine. Antoninus 
had no brother. It has been supposed that he may 
mean some cousin. Schultz omk^ " brother," and says 
that this Severus is probably Claudius Severus, a peri- 
patetic. 

12 We know, from Tacitus {Annal. xiii., xvi. 21 ; and 
other passages), who Thrasea and Helvidius were. Plu- 
tarch has written the lives of the two Catos, and of 
Dion and Brutus. Antoninus probably alludes to Cato 
of Utica, who was a Stoic. 



88 M. ANTONINUS. I. 

he condemned, and that his friends had no need 
to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, 
but it was quite plain. 

1 5. From Maximus V6 1 learned self-government, 
and not to be led aside by anything ; and cheer- 
fulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness ; 
and a just admixture in the moral character of 
sweetness and dignity, and to do what was set 
before me without complaining. I observed that 
everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, 
and that in all that he did he never had any bad 
intention ; and he never showed amazement and 
surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put 
off doing a thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, 
nor did he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, 
on the other hand, was he ever passionate or sus- 
picious. He was accustomed to do acts of benefi- 
cence, and was ready to forgive, and was free from 
all falsehood ; and he presented the appearance 
of a man who could not be diverted from right 
rather than of a man who had been improved. I 
observed, too, that no man could ever think that 

13 Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who 
iras highly esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' 
predecessor. The character of Maximus is that of a 
perfect man. (See viii. 25.) 



M. ANTONINUS. I. 89 

he was despised by Maximus, or ever venture to 
think himself a better man. He had also the art 
of being humorous in an agreeable way.f 

16. In my father 14 I observed mildness of 
temper, and unchangeable resolution in the things 
which he had determined after due deliberation ; 
and no vainglory in those things which men call 
honors ; and a love of labor and perseverance ; 
and a readiness to listen to those who had any- 
thing to propose for the common weal ; and un- 
deviating firmness in giving to every man accord- 
ing to his deserts ; and a knowledge derived from 
experience of the occasions for vigorous action and 
for remission. And I observed that he had overcome 
all passion for boys ; and he considered himself no 
more than any other citizen ; and he released his 
friends from all obligation to sup with him or to 
attend him of necessity when he went abroad, and 
those who had failed to accompany him, by reason 
of any urgent circumstances, always found him the 
same. I observed too his habit of careful inquiry 
in all matters of deliberation, and his persistency, 
and that he never stopped his investigation through 
being satisfied with appearances which first present 

14 He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the 
Emperor Antoninus Pius. 



90 M. ANTONINUS. I. 

themselves ; and that his disposition was to keep 
his friends, and not to be soon tired of them, nor 
yet to be extravagant in his affection ; and to be 
satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful ; and to 
foresee things a long way off, and to provide for the 
smallest without display ; and to check immediately 
popular applause and all flattery ; and to be ever 
watcliful over the things which were necessary for 
the administration of the empire, and to be a good 
manager of the expenditure, and patiently to en- 
dure the blame which he got for such conduct; 
and he was neither superstitious with respect to 
the gods, nor did he court men by gifts or by try- 
ing to please them, or by flattering the populace ; 
but he showed sobriety in all things and firmness, 
and never any mean thoughts or action, nor love 
of novelty. And the things which conduce in any 
way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune 
gives an abundant supply, he used without arro- 
gance and without excusing himself ; so that when 
he had them, he enjoyed them without affectation, 
and when he had them not, he did not want them. 
No one could ever say of him that he was either a 
sophist or a [home-bred] flippant slave or a pedant ; 
but every one acknowledged him to be a man ripe, 
perfect, above flattery, able to manage his own and 
other men's affairs. Besides this, he honored 



M. ANTONINUS. 1. 91 

those who were true philosophers,, and he did not 
reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, 
nor yet was he easily led by them. He was also 
easy in conversation, and he made himself agree- 
able without any offensive affectation. He took a 
reasonable care of his body's health, not as one who 
was greatly attached to life, nor out of regard to 
personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but 
so that, through his own attention, he very seldom 
stood in need of the physician's art or of medi- 
cine or external applications. He was most ready 
to give way without envy to those who possessed 
any particular faculty, such as that of eloquence or 
knowledge of the law or of morals, or of anything 
else ; and he gave them his help, that each might 
enjoy reputation according to his deserts ; and he 
always acted conformably to the institutions of his 
country, without showing any affectation of doing 
so. Further, he was not fond of change nor un- 
steady, but he loved to stay in the same places, and 
to employ himself about the same things ; and 
after his paroxysms of headache he came imme- 
diately fresh and vigorous to his usual occupa- 
tions. His secrets were not many, but very few 
and very rare, and these only about public mat- 
ters ; and he showed prudence and economy in the 
exhibition of the public spectacles and the con- 



92 M. ANTONINUS. I. 

struction of public buildings, his donations to the 
people, and in such things, for he was a man who 
looked to what ought to be done, not to the repu- 
tation which is got by a man's acts. He did not 
take the bath at unseasonable hours ; he was not 
fond of building houses, nor curious about what he 
ate, nor about the texture and color of his clothes, 
nor about the beauty of his slaves. 15 His dress 
came from Lorium, his villa on the coast, and from 
Lanuvium generally. 16 We know how he behaved 
to the toll-collector in Tusculum who asked his 
pardon ; and such was all his behavior. There 
was in him nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor 
violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to 
the sweating point ; but he examined all things 
severally, as if he had abundance of time, and with- 
out confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and 
consistently. And that might be applied to him 
which is recorded of Socrates, 17 that he was able 
both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those things 
which many are too weak to abstain from, and 

15 This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is 
uncertain. 

1S Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and 
there Antoninus was brought up, and he died there. This 
also is corrupt. 

^ Xenophon, Memorab. i. 3. 15. 



M. ANTONINUS. I. 93 

cannot enjoy without excess. But to be strong 
enough both to bear the one and to be sober in the 
other is the mark of a man who has a perfect and 
invincible soul, such as he showed in the illness 
of Maximus. 

17. To the gods I am indebted for having good 
grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good 
teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and 
friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe 
it to the gods that I was not hurried into any 
offence against any of them, though I had a dis- 
position which, if opportunity had offered, might 
have led me to do something of this kind ; but, 
through their favor, there never was such a con- 
currence of circumstances as put me to the trial. 
Further, I am thankful to the gods that I was 
not longer brought up with my grandfather's con- 
cubine, and that I preserved the flower of my 
youth, and that I did not make proof of my 
virility before the proper season, but even de- 
ferred the time ; that I was subjected to a ruler 
and a father who was able to take away all pride 
from me, and to bring me to the knowledge that 
it is possible for a man to live in a palace without 
wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or 
torches and statues, and such-like show ; but that 
it is in such a man's power to bring himself very 



94 . M. ANTONINUS. I. 

near to the fashion of a private person, without 
being for this reason either meaner in thought, or 
more remiss in action, with respect to the things 
which must be clone for the public interest in a 
manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for 
giving me such a brother, 18 who was able by his 
moral character to rouse me to vigilance over 
myself, and who, at the same time, pleased me by 
his respect and affection ; that my children have 
not been stupid nor deformed in body ; that I did 
not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and 
the other studies, -in which I should perhaps have 
been completely engaged, if I had seen that I was 
making progress in them ; that I made haste to 
place those who brought me up in the station of 
honor, which they seemed to desire, without put- 
ting them off with hope of my doing it some time 
after, because they were then still young ; that I 
knew Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus ; that I re- 
ceived clear and frequent impressions about living 
according to nature, and what kind of a life that 
is, so that, so far as depended on the gods, and 
their gifts, and help, and inspirations, nothing hin- 
dered me from forthwith living according to na- 
ture, though I still fall short of it through my own 

18 The emptor had no brother, except L. Verus, his 
brother by adoption. 



M. ANTONINUS. I. i?5 

fault, and through not observing the admonitions 
of the gods, and, I may almost say, their direct 
instructions ; that my body has held out so long 
in such a kind of life ; that I never touched either 
Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, after having 
fallen into amatory passions, I was cured ; and, 
though I was often out of humor with Rusticus, I 
never did anything of which I had occasion to re- 
pent ; that, though it was my mother's fate to die 
young, she spent the last years of her life with 
me ; that, whenever I wished to help any man in 
his need, or on any other occasion, I was never 
told that I had not the means of doing it ; and 
that to myself the same necessity never happened, 
to receive anything from another ; that I have 
such a wife, 19 so obedient, and so affectionate, and 
so simple ; that I had abundance of good masters 
for my children ; and that remedies have been 
shown to me by dreams, both others, and against 

bloodspitting and giddiness 20 ; and that, 

when I had an inclination to philosophy, I did not 
fall into the hands of any sophist, and that I did 
not waste my time on writers [of histories], or in 
the resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself 
about the investigation of appearances in the 

19 See the Life of Antoninus. 

20 This is corrupt. 



96 M. ANTONINUS. I. 

heavens ; for all these things require the help 
of the gods and fortune. 

Among the Quadi at the Granua. 21 

21 The Quadi lived in the southern part of Bohemia 
and Moravia; and Antoninus made a campaign against 
them. (See the Life.) Granua is probably the river 
Graan, which flows into the Danube. 

If these words are genuine, Antoninus may have writ- 
ten this first book during the war with the Quadi. In 
the first edition of Antoninus, and in the older editions, 
the first three sections of the second book make the con- 
clusion of the first book. Gataker placed them at the 
beginning of the second book. 




n. 




lEGIN the morning by saying to thy- 
self, I shall meet with the busybody, 
the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, 
envious, unsocial. All these things 
happen to them by reason of their ignorance of 
what is good and evil. But I who have seen the 
nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of 
the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him 
who does wrong, that it is akin to me, not [only] 
of the same blood or seed, but that it participates 
in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion 
of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of 
them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor 
can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. 
For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like 
hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and 
lower teeth. To act against one another then is 
contrary to nature ; and it is acting against one 
another to be vexed and to turn away. 

2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh 
r 



98 M. ANTONINUS. II. 

and breath, and the ruling part. Throw away thy 
books ; no longer distract thyself : it is not allowed ; 
but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh : 
it is blood and bones and a network, a contexture 
of nerves, veins, and arteries. See the breath also, 
what kind of a thing it is, air, and not always the 
same, but every moment sent out and again sucked 
in. The third then is the ruling part : consider 
thus : Thou art an old man ; no longer let this be 
a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings like a 
puppet to unsocial movements, no longer be either 
dissatisfied with thy present lot, or shrink from 
the future. 

3. All that is from the gods is full of providence. 
That which is from fortune is not separated from 
nature or without an interweaving and involution 
with the things which are ordered by providence. 
From thence all things flow ; and there is besides 
necessity, and that which is for the advantage of 
the whole universe, of which thou art a part. 
But that is good for every part of nature which 
the nature of the whole brings, and what serves to 
maintain this nature. Now the universe is pre- 
served, as by the changes of the elements so by the 
changes of things compounded. Let these prin- 
ciples be enough for thee, let them always be 
fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after 



M. ANTONINUS. II. 99 

books, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but 
cheerfully, truly, and from thy heart thankful to 
the gods. 

4. Remember how long thou hast been putting 
off these things, and how often thou hast received 
an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not use 
it. Thou must now at last perceive of what uni- 
verse thou art a part, and of what administrator 
of the universe thy existence is an efflux, and that 
a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost 
not use for clearing away the clouds from thy 
mind, it will go and thou wilt go, and it will never 
return. 

5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman 
and a man, to do what thou hast in hand with 
perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, 
and freedom, and justice ; and to give thyself 
relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt 
give thyself relief, if thou doest every act of thy 
life as if it were the last, laying aside all careless- 
ness and passionate aversion from the commands 
of reason, and all hypocrisy, and self-love, and dis- 
content with the portion which has been given to 
thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the 
which if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a 
life which flows in quiet, and is like the exist- 
ence of the gods ; for the gods on their part 



100 M. ANTONINUS. II. 

will require nothing more from him who observes I 
these things. 

6. Do wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my 
soul ; but thou wilt no longer have the opportunity 
of honoring thyself. Every man's life is sufficient, f 
But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul rev- 
erences not itself, but places thy felicity in the 
souls of others. 

7. Do the things external which fall upon thee 
distract thee ? Give thyself time to learn some- 
thing new and good, and cease to be whirled 
around. But then thou must also avoid being 
carried about the other way. For those too are 
triflers who have wearied themselves in life by 
their activity, and yet have no object to which to 
direct every movement, and, in a word, all their 
thoughts. 

8. Through not observing what is in the mind 
of another a man has seldom been seen to be un- 
happy ; but those who do not observe the move- 
ments of their own minds must of necessity be 
unhappy. 

9. This thou must always bear in mind, what 
is the nature of the whole, and what is my nature, 
and how this is related to that, and what kind of 
a part it is of what kind of a whole ; and that 
there is no one who hinders thee from always 



M. ANTONINUS. II. 101 

doing and saying the things which are according 
to the nature of which thou art a part. 

10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts 
— such a comparison as one would make in accord- 
ance with the common notions of mankind — says, 
like a true philosopher, that the offences which are 
committed through desire are more blamable than 
those which are committed through anger. For he 
who is excited by anger seems to turn away from 
reason with a certain pain and unconscious con- 
traction ; but he who offends through desire, being 
overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a man- 
ner more intemperate and more womanish in his 
offences. Rightly then, and in a way worthy of 
philosophy, he said that the offence which is com- 
mitted with pleasure is more blamable than that 
which is committed with pain ; and on the whole 
the one is more like a person who has been first 
wronged and through pain is compelled to be 
angry ; but the other is moved by his own impulse 
to do wrong, being carried towards doing some- 
thing by desire. 

11. (Since it is possible that thou mayest depart 
from life this very moment, regulate every act and 
thought accordingly.) But to go away from among 
men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid 
of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil ; but 



102 M. ANTONINUS. II. 

if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no 
concern about human affairs, what is it to me to 
live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of 
providence ? But in truth they do exist, and they 
do care for human things, and -they have put all 
the means in man's power to enable him not to 
fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there 
was anything evil, they would have provided for 
this also, that it should be altogether in a man's 
power not to fall into it. Now that which does 
not make a man worse, how can it make a man's 
life worse ? But neither through ignorance, nor 
having the knowledge, but not the power to guard 
against or correct these things, is it possible that 
the nature of the universe has overlooked them ; 
nor is it possible that it has made so great a mis- 
take, either through want of power or want of 
skill, that good and evil should happen indiscrim- 
inately to the good and the bad. But death cer- 
tainly, and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleas- 
ure, all these things equally happen to good men 
and bad, being things which make us neither bet- 
ter nor worse. Therefore they are neither good 
nor evil. 

12. How quickly all things disappear, in the 
universe ? the bodies themselves, but in time the 
remembrance of them ; what is the nature of all 



M. ANTONINUS. II. 10? 

sensible things, and particularly those which 
attract with the bait of pleasure or terrify by 
pain, or are noised abroad by vapory fame ; how 
worthless, and contemptible, and sordid, and per- 
ishable, and dead they are — all this it is the 
part of the intellectual faculty to observe. To 
observe too who these are whose opinions and 
voices give reputation; what death is, and the 
fact that, if a man looks at it in itself, and by 
the abstractive power of reflection resolves into 
their parts all the things which present them- 
selves to the imagination in it, he will then con- 
sider it to be nothing else than an operation of 
nature ; and if any one is afraid of an opera- 
tion of nature, he is a child. This, however, is 
not only an operation of nature, but it is also a 
thing which conduces to the purposes of nature. 
To observe too how man comes near to the deity, 
and by what part of him, and when this part of 
man is so disposed.f 

13. Nothing is more Avretched than a man who 
traverses everything in a round, and pries into the 
things beneath the earth, as the poet says, and 
seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his 
neighbors, without perceiving that it is sufficient 
to attend to the daemon within him, and to 
reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the 



104 M. ANTONINUS. II. 

daemon consists in keeping it pure from passion 
and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction with what 
comes from gods and men. For the things from 
the gods merit veneration for their excellence ; 
and the things from men should be clear to us by 
reason of kinship ; and sometimes even, in a man- 
ner, they move our pity by reason of men's igno- 
rance of good and bad ; this defect being not less 
than that which deprives us of the power of dis 
tinofuishino- things that are white and black. 

14. Though thou shouldest be going to live 
three thousand years, and as many times ten 
thousand years, still remember that no man loses 
any other life than this which he now lives, nor 
lives any other than this which he now loses. 
The longest and shortest are thus brought to 
the same. For the present is the same to all, 
though that which is past is not the same ; and 
so that which is lost appears to be a mere mo- 
ment. For a man cannot lose either the past 
or the future : for what a man has not, how can 
any one take this from him ? These two things 
then thou must bear in mind ; the one, that all 
things from eternity are of like forms and come 
round in a circle, and that it makes no difference 
whether a man shall see the same things during 
a hundred years or two hundred, or an infinite 



M. ANTONINUS. II. 105 

time ; and the second, that the longest liver and 
he who will die soonest lose just the same. For 
the present is the only thing of which a man 
can be deprived, if it is true that this is the only 
thing which he has, and that a man cannot lose 
a thing if he has it not. 

15. Remember that all is opinion. For what 
was said by the Cynic Monimus is manifest : and 
manifest too is the use of what was said, if a 
man receives what may be got out of it as far 
as it is true. 

1 6. The soul of man does violence to itself, first 
of all, when it becomes an abscess and. as it were, 
a tumor on the universe, so far as it can. For to 
be vexed at anything which happens is a separa- 
tion of ourselves from nature, in some part of 
which the natures of all other things are con- 
tained. In the next place, the soul does vio- 
lence to itself when it turns away from any man, 
or even moves towards him with the intention 
of injuring, such as are the souls of those who 
are angry. In the third place, the soul does 
violence to itself when it is overpowered by 
pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays 
a part, and does or says anything insincerely 
and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows any act 
of its own and any movement to be without an 



106 M. ANTONINUS. I J. 

aim, and does anything thoughtlessly and with- 
out considering what it is, it being right that 
even the smallest things be done with reference 
to an end ; and the end of rational animals is to 
follow the reason and the law of the most an- 
cient city and polity. 

17. Of human life the time is a point, and the 
substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, 
and the composition of the whole body subject 
to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and for- 
tune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of 
judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything 
which belongs to the body is a stream, and what 
belongs to the soul is a dream and vapor, and life 
is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and after- 
fame is oblivion. What then is that which is 
able to conduct a man ? One thing and only 
one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping 
the daemon within a man free from violence 
and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, 
doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely 
and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of an- 
other man's doing or not doing anything ; and 
besides, accepting all that happens, and all that 
is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it 
is, from whence he himself came ; and, finally, 
waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as be- 



M. ANTONINUS. II. 107 

ing nothing else than a dissolution of the ele- ( 
ments of which every living being is compounded. 
But if there is no harm to the elements them- 
selves in each continually changing into another, 
why should a man have any apprehension about 
the change and dissolution of all the elements ? 
For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil 
which is according to nature. 
This in Carnuntum. 1 

1 Carnuntum was a town of Pannonia, on the south 
side of the Danube, about thirtj' miles east of Vindo- 
bona (Vienna). Orosius (vii. 15.) and Eutropius (viii. 
13.) say that Antoninus remained three years at Car- 
nuntum during his war with the Marcomanni. 




in. 




IE ought to consider not only that 
our life is daily wasting away and 
a smaller part of it is left, but an- 
other thing also must be taken into 
the account, that if a man should live longer, 
it is quite uncertain whether the understanding 
will still continue sufficient for the comprehension 
of things, and retain the power of contemplation 
which strives to acquire the knowledge of the 
divine and the human. For if he shall begin to 
fall into dotage, perspiration, and nutrition, and 
imagination, and appetite, and whatever else 
there is of the kind, will not fail ; but the 
power of making use of ourselves, and filling 
up the measure of our duty, and clearly sepa- 
rating all appearances, and considering whether 
a man should now depart from life, and what- 
ever else of the kind absolutely requires a dis- 
ciplined reason, all this is already extinguished. 



M. ANTONINUS. III. 103 

We must make haste then, not only because we 
are daily nearer to death, but also because the 
conception of things and the understanding of 
them cease first. 

2. We ought to observe also that even the 
things which follow after the things which are 
produced according to nature contain something 
pleasing and attractive. For instance, when 
bread is baked some parts are split at the sur- 
face, and these parts which thus open, and have 
a certain fashion contrary to the purpose of the 
baker's art, are beautiful in a manner, and in a 
peculiar way excite a desire for eating. And 
again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open ; 
and in the ripe olives the very circumstance of 
their being near to rottenness adds a peculiar 
beauty to the fruit. And the ears of com bend- 
ing down, and the lion's eyebrows, and the 
foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, 
and many other things — though they are far 
from being beautiful, if a man should examine 
them severally, — still, because they are con- 
sequent upon the things which are formed by 
nature, help to adorn them, and they please the 
mind ; so that if a man should have a feeling 
and deeper insight with respect to the thing? 
which are produced in the universe, there is 



i 10 M. A N T ON I N U.S. III. 

hardly one of those which follow by way of con- 
sequence which will not seem to him to be in a 
manner disposed so as to give pleasure. And so 
he will see even the real gaping jaws of wild 
beasts with no less pleasure than those which 
painters and sculptors show by imitation ; and 
in an old woman and an old man he will be 
able to see a certain maturity and comeliness ; 
and the attractive loveliness of young persons, 
he will be able to look on with chaste eyes ; 
and many such things will present themselves, 
not pleasing to every man, but to him only who 
has become truly familiar with nature and her 
works. 

3. Hippocrates after curing many diseases him- 
self fell sick and died. The Chaldaei foretold 
the deaths of many, and then fate caught them 
too. Alexander, and Pompeius, and Caius Cae- 
sar, after so often completely destroying whole 
cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten 
thousands of cavalry and infantry, themselves 
too at last departed from life. Heraclitus, after 
so many speculations on the conflagration of the 
universe, was filled with water internally and 
died smeared all over with mud. And lice de- 
stroyed Democritus ; and other lice killed Soc- 
rates. What means all this ? Thou hast em- 



M. ANTONINUS. III. Ill 

barked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art come 
to shore ; get out. If indeed to another life, there 
is no want of gods, not even there. But if to a 
state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be 
held by pains and pleasures, and to be a slave 
to the vessel, which is as much inferior as that 
which serves it is superior : f for the one is in- 
telligence and deity ; the other is earth and cor- 
ruption. 

4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in 
thoughts about others, when thou dost not refer 
thy thoughts to some object of common utility. 
For thou losest the opportunity of doing some- 
thing else when thou hast such thoughts as these. 
What is such a person doing, and why, and what 
is he saying, and what is he thinking of, and what 
is he contriving, and whatever else of the kind 
makes us wander away from the observation of 
our own ruling power. We ought then to check 
in the series of our thoughts everything that is 
without a purpose and useless, but most of all 
the overcurious feeling and the malignant ; and 
a man should use himself to think of those 
things only about which if one should suddenly 
ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts ? with 
perfect openness thou mightest immediately an- 
swer, This or That ; so that from thy words it 



112 M. ANTONINUS. III. 

should be plain that everything in . thee is sim- 
ple and benevolent, and such as befits a social 
animal, and one that cares not for thoughts about 
pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, or any ri- 
valry or envy and suspicion, or anything else for 
which thou wouldst blush if thou shouldst say 
that thou hadst it in thy mind. For the man 
who is such as no longer to delay being among 
the number of the best, is like a priest and min- 
ister of the gods, using too the [deity] which is 
planted within him, which makes the man un- 
contaminated by pleasure, unharmed by any pain, 
untouched by any insult, feeling no wrong, a 
lighter in the noblest fight, one who cannot be 
overpowered by any passion, dyed deep with jus- 
tice, accepting with all his soul everything which 
happens and'is assigned to him as his portion ; 
and not often, nor yet without great necessity 
and for the general interest, imagining what an- 
other says, or does, or thinks. For it is only 
what belongs to himself that he makes the mat- 
ter for his activity ; and he constantly thinks of 
that which is allotted to himself out of the sum 
total of things, and he makes his own acts fair, 
and he is persuaded that his own portion is good. 
For the lot which is assigned to each man is car- 
ried along with him and carries him along with 



M. ANTONINUS. III. 113 

it.f And he remembers also that every rational 
animal is his kinsman, and that to care for all 
men is according to man's nature ; and a man 
should hold on to the opinion not of all, tait of 
those only who confessedly live according to na- 
ture. But as to those who live not so, he always 
bears in mind what kind of men they are both 
at home and from home, both by night and by 
day, and what they are, and with what men they 
live an impure life. Accordingly, he does not 
value at all the praise which comes from such 
men, since they are not even satisfied with them- 
selves. 

5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard 
to the common interest, nor without due consider- 
ation, nor with distraction ; nor let studied orna- 
ment set off thy thoughts, and be not either a 
man of many words, or busy about too many 
things. And further, let the deity which is in 
thee be the guardian of a living being, manly 
and of ripe age, and engaged in matter political, 
and a Roman, and a ruler, who has taken his 
post like a man waiting for the signal which 
summons him from life, and ready to go, hav- 
ing need neither of oath nor of any man's tes- 
timony. Be cheerful also, and seek not exter- 
nal help nor the tranquillity which others give. 
8 



114 M. ANTONINUS. III. 

A man then must stand erect, not be kept erect 
by others. 

6. If thou findest in human life anything bet- 
ter than justice, truth, temperance, fortitude, and, 
in a word, anything better than thy own mind's 
self-satisfaction in the things which it enables 
thee to do according to right reason, and in the 
condition that is assigned to thee without thy 
own choice ; if, I say, thou seest anything bet- 
ter than this, turn to it with all thy soul, and 
enjoy that which thou hast found to be the best. 
But if nothing appears to be better than the deity 
which is planted in thee, which has subjected to 
itself all thy appetites, and carefully examines 
all the impressions, and, as Socrates said, has 
detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and 
has submitted itself to the gods, and cares for 
mankind ; if thou findest everything else smaller 
and of less value than this, give place to noth- 
ing else, for if thou dost once diverge and in- 
cline to it, thou wilt no longer without distrac- 
tion be able to give the preference to that good 
thing which is thy proper possession and thy 
own ; for it is not right that anything of any 
other kind, such as praise from the many, or 
power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come 
into competition with that which is rationally 



M. A NTO N I N U S .III. 115 

and politically good. All these things, even 
though they may seem to adapt themselves [to 
the better things] in a small degree, obtain the 
superiority all at once, and carry us away. But 
do thou, I say, simply and freely choose the bet- 
ter, and hold to it — But that which is useful 
is the better. — Well then, if it is useful to thee 
as a rational being, keep to it ; but if it is only 
useful to thee as an animal, say so, and main- 
tain thy judgment without arrogance : only take 
care that thou makest the inquiry by a sure 
method. 

7. Never value anything as profitable to thy- 
self which shall compel thee to break thy prom- 
ise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to 
suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire 
anything which needs walls and curtains : for 
he who has preferred to everything else his 
own intelligence, and the daemon [within him] 
and the worship of its excellence, acts no tragic 
part, does not groan, will not need either solitude 
or much company ; and, what is chief of all, he 
will live without either pursuing or flying from 
[life] ; but whether for a longer or a shorter 
time he shall have the soul inclosed in the body, 
he cares not at all: for even if he must depart 
immediately, he will go as readily as if he were 



116 M.ANTONINUS. III. 

going to do anything else which can be done with 
decency and order ; taking care of this only all 
through life, that his thoughts turn not away 
from anything which belongs to an intelligent 
animal and a member of a civil community. 

8. In the mind of one who is chastened and 
purified thou wilt find no corrupt matter, nor im 
purity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his 
life incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one 
may say of an actor who leaves the stage be- 
fore ending and finishing the play. Besides, 
there is in him nothing servile, nor affected, nor 
too closely bound [to other things], nor yet de- 
tached [from other things], nothing worthy of 
blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place. 

9. Reverence the faculty which produces opin- 
ion. On this faculty it entirely depends whether 
there shall exist in thy ruling part any opinion 
inconsistent with nature and the constitution of 
the rational animal. And this faculty promises 
freedom from hasty judgment, and friendship 
towards men, and obedience to the gods. 

10. Throwing away then all things, hold to 
these only which are few ; and besides bear in 
mind that every man lives only this present 
time, which is an indivisible point, and that all 
the rest of his life is either past or it is uncer- 



M. ANTONINUS. III. 117 

tain. Short then is the time which every man 
lives, and small the nook of the earth where 
he lives ; and short too the longest posthumous 
fame, and even this only continued by a suc- 
cession of poor human beings, who will very 
soon die, and who know not even themselves, 
much less him who died long; a°;o. 

11. To the aids which have been mentioned 
let this one still be added : — Make for thyself 
a definition or description of the thing which 
is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what 
kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, 
in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper 
name, and the names of the things of which it 
has been compounded, and into which it will be 
resolved. For nothing is so productive of eleva- 
tion of mind as to be able to examine methodi- 
cally and truly every object which is presented 
to thee in life, and always to look at things so 
as to see at the same time what kind of universe 
this is, and what kind of use everything performs 
in it, and what value everything has with ref- 
erence to the whole, and what with reference to 
man, who is a citizen of the highest city, of 
which all other cities are like families ; what 
each thing is, and of what it is composed, and 
how long it is the nature of this thing to endure 



118 M. ANTONINUS. III. 

which now makes an impression on me, and whal 
virtue I have need of with respect to it, such as 
gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity 
contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on ever) 
-occasion a man should say : this comes from god 
and this is according to the apportionment f and 
spinning of the thread of destiny, and such-like 
coincidence and chance ; and this is from one 
of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, 
one who knows not however what is according 
to his nature. But I know ; for this reason I 
behave towards him according to the natural law 
of fellowship with benevolence and justice. At 
the same time however in things indifferent I. 
attempt to ascertain the . value of each. 

12. If thou workest at that which is before 
thee, following right reason seriously, vigorously, 
calmly, without allowing anything else to distract 
thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou 
shouldest be bound to give it back immediately ; 
if thou holdest to this, expecting nothing, fearing 
nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity ac- 
cording to nature, and with heroic truth in every 
word and sound which thou utterest, thou wilt 
live happy. And there is no man who is able 
to prevent this. 

13. As physicians have always their instru- 



M. ANTONINUS. III. 119 

raents and knives ready for cases which suddenly 
require their skill, so do thou have principles 
ready for the understanding of things divine and 
human, and for doing everything, even the small- 
est, with a recollection of the hond which unites 
the divine and human to one another. For 
neither wilt thou do anything well which per- 
tains to man without at the same time having 
a reference to things divine ; nor the contrary. 

14. No longer wander at hazard ; for neither 
wilt thou read thy own memoirs, nor the acts 
of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the 
selections from books which thou wast reserv- 
ing for thy old age. Hasten then to the end 
which thou hast before thee, and, throwing 
away idle hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou 
carest at all for thyself, while it is in thy power. 

15. They know not how many things are sig- 
nified by the words stealing, sowing, buying, 
keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done ; 
for this is not done by the eyes, but by another 
kind of vision. 

1 6. Body, soul, intelligence : to the body be- 
long sensations, to the soul appetites, to the 
intelligence principles. To receive the impres- 
sions of forms by means of appearances belongs 
even to animals ; to be pulled by the strings of 



120 M.ANTONINUS. III. 

desire belongs both to wild beasts and to men 
who have made themselves mto women, and to a 
Phalaris and a Nero : and to have the intelli- 
gence that guides to the things which appear 
suitable belongs also to those who do not be- 
lieve in the gods, and who betray their country, 
and do their impure deeds when they have shut 
the doors. If then everything else is common 
to all that I have mentioned, there remains that 
which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased 
and content with what happens, and with the 
thread which is spun for him ; and not to de- 
file the divinity which is planted in his breast, 
nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to pre- 
serve it tranquil, following it obediently as a god, 
neither saying anything contrary to the truth, nor 
doing anything contrary to justice. And if all 
men refuse to believe that he lives a simple, 
modest, and contented life, he is neither angry 
with any of them, nor does he deviate from the 
way which leads to the end of life, to which a 
man ought ■to come pure, tranquil, ready to de- 
part, and without any compulsion perfectly rec- 
onciled to his lot. 



IV 




^HAT which rules within, when it is 
according to nature, is so affected 
fiJ)^. with respect to the events which 
happen, that it always easily adapts 
itself to that which is possible and is presented 
to it. For it requires no definite material, but 
it moves towards its purpose, under certain con- 
ditions however ; and it makes a material for 
itself out of that which opposes it, as fire lays 
hold of what falls mto it, by which a small light 
would have been extinguished : but when the 
fire is strong, it soon appropriates to itself the 
matter which is heaped on it, and consumes it, 
and rises higher by means of this very ma- 
terial. 

2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor 
otherwise than according to the perfect principles 
of art. 

3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in 



122- M. ANTONINUS. IV. 

the country, sea-shores, and mountains ; and thou 
too art wont to desire such things very much. 
But this is altogether a mark of the most com- 
mon sort of men, for it is in thy power when- 
ever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. 
For nowhere either with more quiet or more 
freedom from trouble does a man retire than 
into his own soul, particularly when he has 
within him such thoughts that by looking into 
them he is immediately in perfect tranquillity : 
and I affirm that tranquillity is nothing else than 
the good ordering of the mind. Constantly then 
give to thyself this retreat, and renew thyself; 
and let thy principles be brief and fundamental, 
which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will 
be sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and 
to send thee back free from all discontent with 
the things to which thou returnest. For with 
what art thou discontented ? With the badness 
of men ? Recall to thy mind this conclusion, 
that rational animals exist for one another, and 
that to endure is a part of justice, and that men 
do wrong involuntarily : and consider how many 
already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, 
and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced 
to ashes ; and be quiet at last. — But perhaps 
thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned 



M. ANTONINUS. IV. 123 

to thee out of the universe. — Recall to thy recol- 
lection this alternative ; either there is providence 
or atoms [fortuitous concurrence of things] ; or 
remember the arguments by which it has been 
proved that the world is a kind of political com- 
munity [and be quiet at last]. — But pei'haps 
corporeal things will still fasten upon thee. — Con- 
sider then further that the mind mingles not with 
the breath, whether moving gently or violently, 
when it has once drawn itself apart and discov- 
ered its own power, and think also of all that 
thou hast heard and assented to about pain and 
pleasure [and be quiet at last]. — But perhaps 
the desire of the thing called fame will torment 
thee — See how soon everything is forgotten, 
and look at the chaos of infinite time on each 
side of [the present], and the emptiness of ap- 
plause, and the changeableness and want of judg- 
ment in those who pretend to give praise, and 
the narrowness of the space within which it is 
circumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For the 
whole earth is a point, and how small a nook 
in it is this thy dwelling, and how few are there 
in it, and what kind of people are they who will 
praise thee. 

This then remains : Remember to retire into 
this little territory of thy own, and above all do 



124 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 

not distract or strain thyself, but be free, and look 
at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, 
as a mortal. But among the things readiest to 
thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let there be 
these, which are two. One is that things do not 
touch the soul, for they are external and remain 
immovable ; but our perturbations come only from 
the opinion which is within. The other is that 
all these things which thou seest change, immedi- 
ately and will no longer be ; and constantly bear 
in mind how many of these changes thou hast 
already witnessed. The universe is transforma- 
tion : life is opinion. 

4. If our intellectual part is common, the rea- 
son also, in respect of which we are rational be- 
ings, is common : if this is so, common also is the 
reason which commands us what to do, and what 
not to do ; if this is so, there is a common law 
also ; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens ; if this 
is so, we are members of some political commu- 
nity ; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. 
For of what other common political -community 
will any one say that the whole human race are 
members ? And from thence, from this common 
political community comes also our very intellec- 
tual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity 
for law ; or whence do they come ? For as my 



• M. ANTONINUS. IV. 125 

earthly part is a portion given to me from certain 
earth, and that which is watery from another ele- 
ment, and that which is hot and fiery from some 
peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that 
which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non- 
existence), so also the intellectual part comes from 
some source. 

5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of 
nature ; a composition out of the same elements, 
and a decomposition into the same ; and altogether 
not a thing of which any man should be ashamed, 
for it is conformable to [the nature of] a reason- 
able animal, and not contrary to the reason of our 
constitution. 

6. It is natural that these things should be 
done by such persons, it is a matter of neces- 
sity ; and if a man will not have it so, he will 
not allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all 
means bear this in mind, that within a very 
short time both thou and he will be dead ; and 
soon not even your names will be left behind. 

7. Take away thy opinion, and then there 
is taken away the complaint, " I have been 
harmed." Take away the complaint, " I have 
been harmed," and the harm is taken away. 

8. That which does not make a man worse 
than he was, also does not make his life worse, 



i 26 M. A N T A JNUS. I V. 

nor does it harm him either from without or 
from within. 

9. The nature o'f that which is [universally] 
useful has been compelled to do this. 

10. Consider that everything which happens, 
happens justly, and if thou observest carefully, 
thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only 
with respect to the continuity of the series of 
things, but with respect to what is just, and as if 
it were done by one who assigns to each thing 
its value. Observe then as thou hast begun ; 
and whatever thou doest, do it in conjunction 
with this, the being good, and in the sense in 
which a man is properly understood to be good. 
Keep to this in every action. 

11. Do not have such an opinion of things 
as he has who does thee wrong, or such as he 
wishes thee to have, but look at them as they 
are in truth. 

12. A man should always have these two 
rules in readiness ; the one, to do only what- 
ever the reason of the ruling and legislating 
faculty may suggest for the use of men ; the 
other, to change thy opinion, if there is any 
one at hand who sets thee right and moves 
thee from any opinion. But this change of 
opinion must proceed only from a certain per- 



M. ANTONINUS. IV. 127 

suasion, as of what is just or of common advan- 
tage, and the like, not because it appears pleas- 
ant or brings reputation. 

13. Hast thou reason? I have. — Why then 
dost not thou use it? For if this does its own 
work, what else dost thou wish? 

14. Thou existest as a part. Thou shalt dis- 
appear in that which produced thee ; but rather 
thou shalt be received back into its seminal 
principle by transmutation. 

15. Many grains of frankincense on the same 
altar : one falls before, another falls after ; but 
it makes no difference. 

16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to 
those to whom thou art now a beast and an ape, 
if thou wilt return to thy principles and the wor- 
ship of reason. 

17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live 
ten thousand years. Death hangs over thee. 
While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be 
good. 

18. How much trouble he avoids who does not 
look to see what his neighbor says or does or 
thinks, but only to what he does himself, that 
it may be just and pure ; or as Agathon f says, 
'ook not round at the depraved morals of others, 
but run straight along the line without deviating 
from it. 



128 M.ANTONINUS. IV. 

19. He who has a vehement desire for posthu- 
mous fame does not consider that every one of 
those Avho remember him will himself also die 
very soon ; then again also they who have suc- 
ceeded them, until the whole remembrance shall 
have been extinguished as it is transmitted 
through men who foolishly admire and perish. 
But suppose that those who will remember are 
even immortal, and that the remembrance will 
be immortal, what then is this to thee ? And I 
say not what is it to the dead, but what is it to 
the living. What is praise, except f indeed so 
far as it has f a certain utility ? For thou now 
rejectest unseasonably the gift of nature, cling- 
ing to something else . . . f. 

20. Everything which is in any way beautiful 
is beautiful in itself, and terminates in itself, not 
having praise as part of itself. Neither worse 
then nor better is a thing made by being praised. 
1 affirm this also of the things which are called 
beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material 
things and works of art. That which is really 
beautiful has no need of anything ; not more 
than law, not more than truth, not more than 
benevolence or modesty. Which of these things 
is beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by 
beina: blamed ? Is such a thing; as an emerald 



M. ANTONINUS. IV. 129 

raade worse than it was, if it is not praised ? ov 
gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, 
a shrub ? 

21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air 
contain them from eternity ? — But how does the 
earth contain the bodies of those who have been 
buried from time so remote ? For as here the 
mutation of these bodies after a certain continu- 
ance, whatever it may be, and their dissolution 
make room for other dead bodies ; so the souls 
which are removed into the air after subsisting 
for some time are transmuted, and diffused, and 
assume a fiery nature by being received into the 
seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this 
way make room for the fresh souls which come 
to dwell there. And this is the answer which a 
man might give on the hypothesis of souls continu- 
ing to exist. But we must not only think of the 
number of bodies which are thus buried, but also 
of the number of animals which are daily eaten 
by us and the other animals. For what a number 
is consumed, and thus .in a manner buried in the 
bodies of those who feed on them ? And never- 
theless this earth receives them by reason of the 
changes [of these bodies] into blood, and the 
transformations into the aerial or the fiery element. 

What is the investigation into the truth in this 



130 M. ANTONINUS 1 V. 

matter? The division into that which is material 
and that which is the cause of form [the formal] 
(vn. 29.) 

22. Do not be whirled about, but in every 
movement have respect to justice, and on the oc- 
casion of every impression maintain the faculty 
of comprehension [or understanding]. 

28. Everything harmonizes with me, which is 
harmonious to thee, Universe. Nothing for 
me is too early nor too late, which is in clue time 
for thee. Everything is fruit to me "which thy 
seasons bring, Nature : from thee are all things, 
in thee are all things, to thee all things return. 
The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops ; and wilt not 
thou say, Dear city of Zeus ? 

24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the 
philosopher, if thou wouldst be tranquil. — But 
consider if it would not be better to say, Do what 
is necessary, and whatever the reason of the 
animal which is naturally social requires, and as 
it requires. For this brings not only the tran- 
quillity which comes from doing well, but also that 
which comes from doing few things. For the 
greatest part of what we say and do being un- 
necessary, if a man takes this away, he will have 
more leisure and less uneasiness. Accordingly 
on every occasion a man should ask himself, la 



M. A N T XIX US. IV. 131 

this one of the unnecessary things ? Now a man 
should take away not only unnecessary acts, but 
also unnecessary thoughts, for thus superfluous acts 
will not follow after. 

25. Try how the life of the good man suits 
thee, the life of him who is satisfied with his por- 
tion out of the whole, and satisfied with his own 
just acts and benevolent disposition. 

26. Hast thou seen those things? Look also 
at these. Do not disturb thyself. Make thyself 
all simplicity. Does any one do wrong ? It is to 
himself that he does the wrong. Has anything 
happened to thee ? Well ; out of the universe 
from the beginning everything which happens has 
been apportioned and spun out to thee. In a 
word, thy life is short. Thou must turn to profit 
the present by the aid of reason and justice. Be 
sober in thy relaxation. 

27. Either it is a well arranged universe x or a 
chaos huddled together, but still a universe. But 
can a certain order subsist in thee, and disorder 
in the All ? And this too when all things are so 
separated and diffused and sympathetic. 

28. A black character, a womanish character, 

1 Antoninus here uses the word noo/iog both in the 
sense of the Universe and of Order ; and it is difficult 
to express his meaning. 



132 M. ANTONINUS. I V. 

a stubborn character, bestial, childish, animal, 
stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent, tyran- 
nical. 

29. If he is a stranger to the universe who 
does not know what is in it, no less is he a 
stranger who does not know what is going on 
in it. He is a runaway, who flies from social 
reason ; he is blind, who shuts the eyes of the 
understanding ; he is poor, who has need of an- 
other, and has not from himself all things which 
are useful for life. He is an abscess on the 
universe who withdraws and separates himself 
from the reason of our common nature through 
being displeased with the things which happen, 
for the same nature produces this, and has pro- 
duced thee too : he is a piece rent asunder from 
the state, who tears his own soul from that of 
reasonable animals, which is one. 

30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, 
and the other without a book : here is another 
half naked : Bread I have not, he says, and I 
abide by reason — And I do not get the means 
of living out of my learning,! and I abide [by 
my reason]. 

31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which 
thou hast learned, and be content with it ; and 
pass through the rest, of life like one who has in- 



M . ANT N IN US. IV. 133 

trusted to the gods with his whole soul all that he 
has, making thyself neither the tyrant nor the 
slave of any man. 

32. Consider, for example, the times of Ves- 
pasian. Thou wilt see all these things, people 
marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, war- 
ring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, 
flattering, obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plot- 
ting, wishing; for some to die, grumbling about the 
present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring con- 
sulship, kingly power. Well then, that life of 
these people no longer exists at all. Again, re- 
move to the times of Trajan. Again, all is the 
same. Their life too is gone. In like manner 
view also the other epochs of time and of whole 
nations, and see how many after great efforts soon 
fell and were resolved into the elements. But 
chiefly thou shouldst think of those whom thou 
hast thyself known distracting themselves about 
idle things, neglecting to do what was in accord- 
ance with their proper constitution, and to hold 
firmly to this and to be content with it. And 
herein it is necessary to remember that the atten- 
tion given to everything has its proper value and 
proportion. For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, 
if thou appliest thyself to smaller matters no 
further than is fit. 



134 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 

33. The words which were formerly familiar 
are now antiquated : so also the names of those 
who were famed of old, are now in a manner 
antiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, 
and a little after also Scipio and Cato, then 
Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus. 
For all things soon pass away and become a mere 
tale, and complete oblivion soon buries them. 
And I say this of those who have shone in a won- 
drous way. For the rest, as soon as they have 
breathed out their breath, they are gone, and no 
man speaks of them. And, to conclude the mat- 
ter, what is even an eternal remembrance ? A 
mere nothing. What then is that about which 
we ought to employ our serious pains ? This 
one thing, thoughts just, and acts social, and words 
which never lie, and a disposition which gladly 
accepts all that happens, as necessary, as usual, as 
flowing from a principle and source of the same 
kind. 

34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one 
of the fates}, allowing her to spin thy thread t 
into whatever things she pleases. 

35. Everything is only for a day, both that 
which remembers and that which is remembered. 

36. Observe constantly that all things take 
place by change, and accustom thyself to consider 



M. ANTONINUS IV. 135 

that the nature of the Universe loves nothing so 
much as to change the things which are and to 
make new things like them. For everything that 
exists is in a manner the seed of that which will 
be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which 
are cast into the earth or into a womb : but this 
is a very vulgar notion. 

37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not ye,t 
simple, nor free from perturbations, nor without 
suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor 
kindly disposed towards all ; nor dost thou yet 
place wisdom only in acting justly. 

38. Examine men's ruling principles, even 
those of the wise, what kind of things they avoid, 
and what kind they pursue. 

39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in 
the ruling principle of another ; nor yet in any 
turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering. 
Where is it then ? It is in that part of thee in 
which subsists the power of forming opinions 
about evils. Let this power then not form [such] 
opinions, and all is well. And if that which is 
nearest to it, the poor body, is cut, burnt, filled 
with matter and rottenness, nevertheless let the 
part which forms opinions about these things be 
quiet, that is, let it judge that nothing is either 
bad or good which can happen equally to the bad 



136 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 

man and the good. For that which happens 
equally to him who lives contrary to nature and 
to him who lives according to nature, is neither 
according to nature nor contrary to nature. 

40. Constantly regard the universe as one liv- 
ing being, having one substance and one soul ; 
and observe how all things have reference to one 
perception, the perception of this one living being ; 
and how all things act with one movement ; and 
how all things are the co-operating causes of all 
things which exist ; observe too the continuous 
spinning of the thread and the contexture of the 
web. 

41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a 
corpse, as Epictetus used to say. 

42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, 
and no good for things to subsist in consequence 
of change. 

43. Time is like a river made up of the events 
which happen, and a violent stream ; for as soon 
as a thing has been seen, it is carried away, and 
another comes in its place, and this will be car- 
ried away too. 

44. Everything which happens is as familiar 
and well known as the rose in spring and the 
fruit in summer ; for such is disease, and death, 
and calumny, and treachery, and whatever else 
delights fools or vexes them. 



M. ANTONINUS. TV. 137 

45. In the series of things those which follow 
are always aptly fitted to those which have gone 
before ; for this series is not like a mere enumera- 
tion of disjointed things, which has only a neces- 
sary sequence, but it is a rational connection : and 
as all existing things are arranged together har- 
moniously, so the things which come into existence 
exhibit no mere succession, but a certain wonder- 
ful relationship, (vi. 38. vn. 9.) 

46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, 
that the death of earth is to become water, and 
the death of water is to become air, and the death 
of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think 
too of him who forgets whither the way leads, and 
that men quarrel with that with which they are 
most constantly in communion, the reason which 
governs the universe ; and the things which they 
daily meet with seem to them strange : and con- 
sider that we ought not to act and speak as if we 
were asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and 
speak ; and that f we ought not, like children who 
learn from their parents, simply to act and speak 
as we have been taught, f 

47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die 
to-morrow or certainly on the day after to-morrow, 
thou wouldst not care much whether it was on the 
third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in 



138 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 

the highest degree mean-spirited, — for how small 
is the difference ? — so think it no great thing to 
die after as many years as thou canst name rather 
than to-morrow. 

48. Think continually how many physicians are 
dead after often contracting their eyebrows over 
the sick ; and how many astrologers after predict- 
ing with great pretensions the deaths of others ; 
and how many philosophers after endless dis- 
courses on death or immortality ; how many heroes 
after killing thousands ; and how many tyrants 
who have used their power over men's lives with 
terrible insolence as if they were immortal ; and 
how many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, 
Helice and Pompeii and Herclanum, and others 
innumerable. Add to the reckoning all whom 
thou hast known, one after another. One man 
after burying another has been laid out dead, and 
another buries him ; and all this in a short time. 
To conclude, always observe how ephemeral an 
worthless human things are, and what was yester 
day a little mucus, to-morrow will be a mummy 
or ashes. Pass then through this little space of 
time conformably to nature, and end thy journey 
in content, just as an olive falls off when it is ripe, 
blessing nature who produced it, and thanking the 
tree on which it grew. 



M. ANTONINUS. IV. 139 

49. Be like the promontory against which the 
waves continually break, but it stands firm and 
tames the fury of the water around it. 

Unhappy am I, because this has happened to 
me — Not so, but Happy am I, though this has 
happened to me, because I continue free from 
pain, neither crushed by the present nor fearing 
the future. For such a thing as this might have 
happened to every man ; but every man would 
not have continued free from pain on such an 
occasion. Why then is that rather a misfortune 
than this a good fortune ? And dost thou in all 
cases call that a man's misfortune, which is not a 
deviation from man's nature ? And does a thing 
seem to thee to be a deviation from man's nature, 
when it is not contrary to the Avill of man's 
nature ? Well, thou knowest the will of nature. 
Will then this which has happened prevent thee 
from being just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, 
secure against inconsiderate opinions and false- 
hood ; will it prevent thee from having modesty, 
freedom, and everything else, by the presence of 
which man's nature obtains all that is its own ? 
Remember too on every occasion which leads thee 
to vexation to apply this principle : that this is not 
a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good 
fortune. 



140 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 

50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards 
contempt of death, to pass in review those who 
have tenaciously stuck to life. What more then 
have they gained than those who have died early ? 
Certainly they lie in their tombs somewhere at 
last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or 
any one else like them, who have carried out many 
to be buried and then were carried out them- 
selves. Altogether the interval is small [between 
birth and death] ; and consider with how much 
trouble, and in company with what sort of people 
and in what a feeble body this interval is labo- 
riously passed. Do not then consider life a thing 
of any value.f For look to the immensity of 
time behind thee, and to the time which is before 
thee, another boundless space. In this infinity 
then what is the difference between him who 
lives three days and him who lives three genera- 
tions ? 2 

51. Always run to the short way ; and the short 

2 An allusion to Homer's Nestor who was living at the 
war of Troy among the third generation, like old Parr 
with his hundred and fifty two years, and some others in 
modern times who have beaten Parr by twenty or thirty 
years ; and yet they died at last. The word is TpLyeprjviov 
in Antoninus. Nestor is named rpiyepuv by some writers ; 
but here perhaps there is an allusion to Homer's Tepfjvios 
Innora Nearup. 



M. ANTONINUS. IV. 141 

way is the natural : accordingly say and do every- 
thing in conformity with the soundest reason. 
For such a purpose frees a man from trouble,! 
and warfare, and all artifice and ostentatious 
display. 




V. 




,N the morning when thou risest un- 
willingly, let this thought be pres- 
ent — I am rising to the work of a 
human being. Why then am I dis- 
satisfied if I am going to do the things for which 
I exist and for which I was brought into the 
world ? Or have I been made for this, to lie in 
the bedclothes and keep myself warm ? — But 
this is more pleasant — Dost thou exist then to 
take thy pleasure, and not at all for action or 
exertion ? Dost thou not see the little plants, the 
little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working 
together to put in order their several parts of 
the universe ? And art thou unwilling to do the 
work of a human being, and dost thou not make 
haste to do that which is according to thy nature ? 
— But it is necessary to take rest also — It is 
necessary : however nature has fixed bounds to 
this too : she has fixed bounds both to eating and 



M. ANTONINUS. V. 143 

drinking, and yet thou goest beyond these bounds, 
beyond what is sufficient ; yet in thy acts it is not 
so, but thou stoppest short of what thou canst do. 
So thou lovest not thyself, for if thou didst, thou 
wouldst love thy nature and her will. But those 
who love their several arts exhaust themselves in 
working at them, unwashed and without food ; but 
thou valuest thy own nature less than the turner 
values the turning art, or the dancer the dancing 
art, or the lover of money values his money, or 
the vainglorious man his little glory. And such 
men, when they have a violent affection to a thing, 
choose neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to 
perfect the things which they care for. But are 
the acts which concern society more vile in thy 
eyes and less worthy of thy labor ? 

2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away 
every impression which is troublesome or unsuit- 
able, and immediately to be in all tranquillity. 

3. Judge every word and deed which is accord- 
ing to nature to be fit for thee ; and be not diverted 
by the blame which follows from any people nor 
by their words, but if a thing is good to be done 
or said, do not consider it unworthy of thee. For 
those persons have their peculiar leading principle 
and follow their peculiar movement ; which things 
do not thou regard, but go straight on, following 



144 M. ANTONINUS. V. 

thy own nature and the common nature ; and the 
way of both is one. 

4. I go through the things which happen ac- 
cording to nature until I shall fall and rest, 
breathing out my breath into that element out of 
which I daily draw it in, and falling upon that 
earth out of which my father collected the. seed, 
and my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk ; 
out of which during so many years I have been 
supplied with food and drink ; which bears me 
when I tread on it and abuse it for so many pur- 
poses. 

5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharp- 
ness of thy wits — Be it so ; but there are many 
other things of which thou canst not say, I am not 
formed for them by nature. Show those qualities 
then which are altogether in thy power, sincerity, 
gravity, endurance of labor, aversion to pleasure, 
contentment with thy portion and with few things, 
benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, 
freedom from trifling, magnanimity. Dost thou 
not see how many qualities thou art immediately 
able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of nat- 
ural incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still 
remainest voluntarily below the mark ? or art thou 
compelled through being defectively furnished by 
nature to murmur, and to-be stingy, and to flatter, 



M. ANTO N 1 N U S . V. 145 

and to find fault with thy poor body, and to try 
to please men, and to make great display, and to 
be so restless in thy mind ? No by the gods : but 
thou mightest have been delivered from these 
things long ago. Only if in truth thou canst be 
charged with being rather slow and dull of com- 
prehension, thou must exert thyself about this 
also, not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in 
thy dulness. 

6. One man, when he has done a service to 
another, is ready to set it down to his account as 
a favor conferred. Another is not ready to do 
this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the 
man as his debtor, and he knows what he has 
done. A third in a manner does not even know 
what he has done, but he is like a vine which has 
produced grapes, and seeks for nothing more after 
it has once produced its proper fruit. As a horse 
when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the 
game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man 
when he has done a good act, does not call out for 
others to come and see, but he goes on to another 
act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes 
in season — Must a man then be one of these, 
who in a manner act thus without observing it ? — 
Yes — But this very thing is necessary, the ob- 
servation of what a man is doing : for, it may be 
10 



146 M. ANTONINUS. V. 

said, it is characteristic of the social animal to 
perceive that he is working in a social manner, 
and indeed to wish that his social partner also 
should perceive it — It is true what thou sayest, 
but thou dost not rightly understand what is now 
said : and for this reason thou wilt become one of 
those of whom I spoke before, for even they are 
misled by a certain show of reason. But if thou 
wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is 
said, do not fear that for this reason thou wilt 
omit any social act. 

7. A prayer of the Athenians : Rain, rain, 
dear Zeus, down on the ploughed fields of the 
Athenians and on the plains. — In truth we ought 
not to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this sim- 
ple and noble fashion. 

8. Just as we must understand when it is said, 
That Aesculapius prescribed to this man horse-" 
exercise, or bathing in cold water or going with- 
out shoes ; so we must understand it when it is 
said, That the nature of the universe prescribed 
to this man disease or mutilation or loss or any- 
thing else of the kind. For in the first case Pre- 
scribed means something like this : he prescribed 
this for this man as a thing adapted to procure 
health ; and in the second case it means, That 



M. ANTONINUS. V. 147 

which happens ] to [or, suits] every man is fixed 
in a manner for him suitably to his destiny. For 
this is what we mean when we say that things are 
suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared 
stones in walls or the pyramids, that they are 
suitable, when they fit them to one another in 
some kind of connection. For there is altogether 
one fitness [or, harmony]. And as the universe 
is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as 
it is, so out of all existing causes necessity [des- 
tiny] is made up to be such a cause as it is. And 
even those who are completely ignorant under- 
stand what I mean, for they say, It [necessity, 
destiny] brought this to such a person. — This 
then was brought and this was prescribed to 
him. Let us then receive these things, as well as 
those which Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a 
matter of course even among his prescriptions are 
disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope of 
health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment 
of the things which the common nature judges tc 
be good, be judged by thee to be of the same kind 
as thy health. And so accept everything which 
happens, even if it seem disagreeable, because it 
'eads to this, to the health of the universe and to 

1 In this section there is a play on the meaning of 
<Tuu8alveiv. 



148 M. ANTONINUS. V. 

the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. 
For he would not have brought on any man what 
lie has brought, if it were not useful for the 
whole. Neither does the nature of anything, 
whatever it may be, cause anything which is not 
suitable to that which is directed by it. For two 
reasons then it is right to be content with that 
which happens to thee ; the one, because it was 
done for thee and prescribed for thee, and in a 
manner had reference to thee, originally from the 
most ancient causes spun with thy destiny ; and 
the other, because even, that which comes sever- 
ally to every man is to the power which adminis- 
ters the universe a cause of felicity and perfection, 
aay even of its very continuance. For the in- 
tegrity of the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest 
off anything whatever from the conjunction and 
the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. 
And thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, 
when thou art dissatisfied, and in a manner triest 
to put anything out of the way. 

9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dis- 
satisfied, if thou dost not succeed in doing every- 
thing according to right principles ; but when thou 
hast failed, return back again, and be content if 
the greater part of what thou doest is consistent 
with man's nature, and love this to which thou re- 



M. ANTONINUS. V. 149 

turnest ; and do not return to philosophy as if she 
were a master, but act like those who have sore 
eyes and apply a bit of sponge and egg, or as 
another applies a plaister, or drenching with water. 
For thus thou wilt not fail to f obey reason, and 
thou wilt repose in it. And remember that phi- 
losophy requires only the things which thy nature 
requires ; but thou wouldst have something else 
which is not according to nature — It may be ob- 
jected, Why what is more agreeable than this 
[which I am doing] ? — But is not this the very 
reason why pleasure deceives us ? And consider 
if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, aequanimity. 
piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more 
agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest 
of the security and the happy course of all things 
which depend on the faculty of understanding 
and knowledge ? 

10. Things are in such a kind of envelopement 
that they have seemed to philosophers, not a few 
nor those common philosophers, altogether unin- 
telligible ; nay even to the Stoics themselves they 
seem difficult to understand. And all our assent 
is changeable ; for where is the man who never 
changes ? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects 
themselves, and consider how short-lived they are 
and worthless, and that they may be in the pos- 



150 M. ANTONINUS. V. 

session of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber 
Then turn to the morals of those who live with 
thee, and it is hardly possible to endure even the 
most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man 
being hardly able to endure himself. In such 
darkness then and dirt and in so constant a flux 
both of substance and of time, and of motion and 
of things moved, what there is worth being highly 
prized or even an object of serious pursuit, I can- 
not imagine. But on the contrary it is a man's 
duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the 
natural dissolution and not to be vexed at the 
delay, but to rest in these principles only : the one, 
that nothing will happen to me which is not con- 
formable to the nature of the universe ; and the 
other, that it is in my power never to act contrary 
to my god and daemon : for there is no man who 
will compel me to this. 

11. About what am I now employing my own 
soul ? On every occasion I must ask myself this 
question, and inquire, what have I now in this 
part of me which they call the ruling principle ? 
and whose soul have I now ? that of a child, or of 
a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a tyrant, 
or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast ? 

12. What kind of things those are which ap- 
pear good to the many, we may learn from this. 



M. ANTONINUS. V. 151 

For if any man should conceive certain things as 
being really good, such as prudence, temperance, 
justice, fortitude, he would not after having first 
conceived these endure to listen to anything f 
which should not be in harmony with what is 
really good.f But if a man has first conceived 
as good the things which appear to the many to 
be good, he will listen and readily receive as very 
applicable that which was said by the comic 
writer, f Thus even the many perceive the dif- 
ference."!" For were it not so, this saying would 
not offend and would not be rejected [in the first 
case], while we receive it when it is said of 
wealth, and of the means which further luxury 
and fame, as said fitly and wittily. Go on then 
and ask if we should value and think those things 
to be good, to which after their first conception in 
the mind the words of the comic writer might be 
aptly applied — that he who has them, through 
pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in. 
13. I am composed of the formal and the ma- 
terial ; and neither of them will perish into non- 
existence, as neither of them came into existence 
out of non-existence. Every part of me then 
will be reduced by change into some part of the 
universe, and that again will change into another 
part of the universe and so on for ever. And by 



152 M. ANTONINUSi V. 

consequence of such a change I too exist, and 
those who begot me, and so on for ever in the 
other direction. For nothing hinders us from 
saying so, even if the universe is administered 
according to definite periods [of revolution]. 

14. Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] 
are powers which are sufficient for themselves and 
for their own works. They move then from a 
first principle which is their own, and they make 
their way to the end which is proposed to them ; 
find this is the reason why such acts are named 
Catorthoseis or right ac ts, which word signifies 
that they proceed by the right road. 

15. None of these things ought to be called a 
man's, which do not belong to a man, as man. 
They are not required of a man, nor does man's 
nature promise them, nor are they the means of 
man's nature attaining its end. Neither then 
does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet 
that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, 
and that which aids towards this end is that 
which is good. Besides, if any of these things 
did belong to man, it would not be right for a 
man to despise them and to set himself against 
them ; nor would a man be worthy of praise who 
showed that he did not want these things, nor 
would he who stinted himself in any of them be 



M.ANTONINUS. V. 15S 

good, if indeed these things were good. But now 
the more of these things a man deprives himself 
of, or of other things like them, or even when he 
is deprived of any of them, the more patiently 
he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is 
a better man. 

16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such 
also will be the character of thy mind ; for the 
soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a 
continuous series of such thoughts as these : for 
instance, that where a man can live, there he can 
also live well. But he must live in a palace ; 
— well then, he can also live well in a palace. 
And again, consider that for whatever purpose 
each thing has been constituted, for this it has 
been constituted, and towards this it is carried ; 
and its end is in that towards which it is carried ; 
and where the end is, there also is the advantage 
and the good of each thing. Now the good for 
the reasonable animal is society ; for that we are 
made for society has been shown above. Is it not 
plain that the inferior exist for the sake of the 
superior ? but the things which have life are 
superior to those which have not life, and of those 
which have life the superior are those which have 
reason. 

17. To seek what is impossible is madness: 



154 M.ANTONINUS. V. 

and it is impossible that the bad should not do 
something of this kind. 

18. Nothing happens to any man which he is 
not formed by nature to bear. The same things 
happen to another, and either because he does not 
see that they have happened or because he would 
show a great spirit he is firm and remains un- 
harmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and 
conceit should be stronger than wisdom. 

19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not 
in the least degree ; nor have they admission to 
the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul : but 
the soul turns and moves itself alone, and what- 
ever judgments it may think proper to make, such 
it makes for itself the things which present them- 
selves to it. 

20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to 
me, so far as I must do good to men and endure 
them. But so far as some men make themselves 
obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me 
one of the things which are indifferent, no less 
than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it is 
true that these may impede my action, but they 
are no impediments to my affects and disposition, 
which have the power of acting conditionally and 
changing : for the mind converts and changes 
every hindrance to its activity into an aid ; and sc 



M. ANTONINUS. V. 155 

that which is a hindrance is made a furtherance 
to an act ; and that which is an obstacle on the 
road helps us on this road. 

21. Reverence that which is best in the uni- 
verse ; and this is that which makes use of all 
things g^nd directs all things. And in like manner 
also reverence that which is best in thyself; and 
this is of the same kind as that. For in thyself 
also, that which makes use of everything else, is 
this, and thy life is directed by this. 

22. That which does no harm to the state, does 
no harm to the citizen. In the case of every ap- 
pearance of harm apply this rule: if the state is 
not harmed by this, neither am I_ harmed. But 
if the state is harmed, thou must not be angry 
with him who does harm to the state. Show him 
where his error is.f 

23. Often think of the rapidity with which 
things pass by and disappear, both the things 
which are and the things which are produced. 
For substance is like a river in a continual flow, 
and the activities of things are in constant change, 
and the causes work in infinite varieties ; and 
there is hardly anything which stands still. And 
consider this which is near to thee, this boundless 
abyss of the past and of the future in which all 
things disappear. How then is he not a fool who 



156 M. ANTONINUS. V. 

is puffed up with such things or plagued about 
them and makes himself miserable ? for they vex 
him only for a time, and a short time. 

24. Think of the universal substance, of which 
thou hast a very small portion ; and of universal 
time, of which a short and indivisible interval has 
been assigned to thee ; and of that which is fixed 
by destiny, and how small a part of it thou art. 

25. Does another do me wrong ? Let him look 
to it. He has his own disposition, his own ac- 
tivity. I now have what the universal nature 
wills me to have ; and I do what my nature now 
wills me to do. 

26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and 
governs be undisturbed by the movements in the 
flesh whether of pleasure or of pain ; and let it 
not unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself 
and limit those affects to their parts. But when 
these affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that 
other sympathy that naturally exists in a body 
which is all one, then thou must not strive to re- 
sist the sensation, for it is natural ; but let not the 
riding part of itself add to the sensation the 
opinion that it is either good or bad. 

27. Live with the gods. And he does live with 
the gods who constantly shows to them that his 
own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to 



M. ANTONINUS. V. 157 

him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, 
which Zeus hath given to every man for his 
guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And 
this is every man's understanding and reason. 

28. Art thou angry with him whose arm-pits 
stink ? art thou angry with him whose mouth 
smell's foul ? What good will this anger do thee ? 
He has such a mouth, he has such arm-pits : it is 
necessary that such an emanation must come from 
such things — But the man has reason, it will be 
said, and he is able, if he takes pains, to discover 
wherein he offends — I wish thee well of thy dis- 
covery. Well then, and thou hast reason : by thy 
rational faculty stir up his rational faculty ; show 
him his error, admonish him. For if he listens, 
thou wilt cure him, and there is no need of anger. 
[| Neither tragic actor nor whore. t ] 2 

29. As thou intendest to live when thou art 
gone out, . . so it is in thy power to live here. 
But if men do not permit thee, then get away out 

2 This is imperfect or corrupt, or both. There is 
also something wrong or incomplete in the beginning of 
S. 29, where he says «f k&A&uv §jv dcavorj, which 
Gataker translates " as if thou wast about to quit life ; " 
but we cannot translate el-ek&uv in that way. Other 
translations are not much more satisfactory. I have 
translated it literally and left it imperfect. 



158 M. ANTONINUS. V. 

of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. 
The house is smoky, and I quit it. Why dost 
thou think that this is any trouble ? But so long 
as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, 
am free, and no man shall hinder me from doing 
what I choose ; and I choose to do what is ac- 
cording to the nature of the rational and social 
animal. 

30. The intelligence of the universe is social. 
Accordingly it has made the inferior things for 
the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the su- 
perior to one another. Thou seest how it has 
subordinated, co-ordinated and assigned to every- 
thing its proper portion, and has brought together 
into concord with one another the things which 
are the best. 

31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the 
gods, thy parents, brethren, children, teachers, to 
those who looked after thy infancy, to thy friends, 
kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast 
hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this 
may be said of thee : — 

Never has wronged a man in deed or word. 

And call to recollection both how many things 
thou hast passed through, and how many things 
thou hast been able to endure : and that the his- 



M-. ANTONINUS. V. 15& 

tory of thy life is now complete and thy service is 
ended: and how many beautiful things thou hast 
seen : aud how many pleasures and pains thou 
hast despised; and how many things called 
honorable thou hast spurned ; and to how many 
ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposi- 
tion. 

32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls dis- 
turb him who has skill and knowledge ? What 
soul then has skill and knowledge ? That which 
knows beginning and end, and knows the reason 
which pervades all substance and through all time 
by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the 
universe. 

33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a 
skeleton, and either a name or not even a name ; 
but name is sound and echo. And the things 
which are much valued in life are empty and rot- 
ten and trifling, and [like] little dogs biting one 
another, and little children quarrelling, laughing, 
and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and 
modesty and justice and truth are fled 

Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth. 

What then is there which still detains thee here ? 
if the objects of sense are easily changed and 
never stand still, and the organs of i erception are 



160 M. ANTONINUS. V. 

dull and easily receive false impressions ; and the 
poor soul itself is an exhalation from blood. But 
to have good repute amidst such a world as this 
is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait 
in tranquillity for thy end, whether it is extinction 
or removal to another state ? And until that time 
comes, what is sufficient ? Why, what else than 
to venerate the gods and bless them, and to do 
good to men, and to practise tolerance and self- 
restraint ; 3 but as to everything which is beyond 
the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remem- 
ber that this is neither thine nor in thy power. 

34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow 
of happiness, if thou canst go by the right way, 
and think and act in the right way. These two 
things are common both to the soul of god and to 
the soul of man, and to the soul of every rational 
being, not to be hindered by another ; and to hold 
good to consist in the disposition to justice and the 
practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its 
termination. 

35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an 
effect of my own badness, and the common weal is 

3 This is the Stoic precept avexov ml anexov. The 
first part teaches us to he content with men and things 
as they are. The second part teaches us the virtue of 
self-restraint, or the government of our passions. 



M . A NT ONI N US. V. 16? 

not injured, why am I troubled about it ? and 
what is the harm to the common weal ? 

36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by 
the appearance of things, but give help [to all] 
according to thy ability and their fitness ; and if 
they should have sustained loss in matters which 
are indifferent, do not imagine this to be a damage. 
For it is a bad habit. But as the old man when 
he went away asked back his foster-child's top, 
remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this 
case also. 

When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast 
thou forgotten, man, what these things are ? — 
Yes ; but they are objects of great concern to 
these people — Wilt thou too then be made a fool 
for these things ? — I was once a fortunate man, 
but I lost it, I know not how. — But fortunate 
means that a man has assigned to himself a good 
fortune : — and a good fortune is good disposition 
of the soul, good emotions, good actions. 4 

4 This section is unintelligible. Many of the words 
may be corrupt, and the general purport of the section 
cannot be discovered. Perhaps several things have been 
improperly joined in one section. I have translated it 
nearly literally. Different translators give the section 
a different turn, and the critics have tried to mend what 
they cannot understand. 
11 





VI. 

HE substance of the universe is obe- 
dient and compliant ; and the reason 
which governs it has in itself no cause 
for doing evil, for it has no malice, nor 
does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed 
by it. But all things are made and perfected 
according to this reason. 

2. Let it make no difference to thee whether 
thou art cold or warm, if thou art doing thy duty ; 
and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with 
sleep ; and whether ill-spoken of or praised ; and 
whether dying or doing something else. For it is 
one of the acts of life, this act by which we die : 
it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what 
we have in hand. 

3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar 
quality of anything nor its value escape thee. 

4. All existing things soon change, and they 
will either be reduced to vapor, if indeed all sub- 
stance is one, or they will be dispersed. 



M. ANTONINUS. VI. 163 

5. The reason which governs knows what its 
own disposition is, and what it does, and on what 
material it works. 

6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to 
become like the wrong doer. 

7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in 
passing from one social act to another social act, 
thinking of god. 

8. The ruling principle is that which rouses 
and turns itself, and while it makes itself such as 
it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes every- 
thing which happens appear to itself to be such as 
it wills. 

9. In conformity to the nature of the universe 
every single thing is accomplished, for certainly it 
is not in conformity to any other nature that each 
thing is accomplished, either a nature which ex- 
ternally comprehends this, or a nature which is 
comprehended within this nature, or a nature 
external and independent of this. (xi. 1, vi. 40, 
vni. 50.) 

10. The universe is either a confusion, and a 
mutual involution of things, and a dispersion ; or 
it is unity and order and providence. If then it 
is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a for- 
tuitous combination of things and such a disorder ? 
and why do I care about anything else than how I 



164 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 

shall at last become earth ? and why am I dis- 
turbed, for the dispersion of my elements will 
happen whatever I do. But if the other supposi- 
tion is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I trust 
in him who governs. (iy. 27.) 

11. When thou hast been compelled by cir- 
cumstances to be disturbed in a manner, quickly 
return to thyself and do not continue out of tune 
longer than the compulsion lasts ; for thou wirf 
have more mastery over the harmony by continu- 
ally recurring to it. 

12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother 
at the same time, thou wouldst be dutiful to thy 
step-mother, but still thou wouldst constantly re- 
turn to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy 
now be to thee step-mother and mother : return 
to philosophy frequently and repose in her, through 
whom what thou meetest with in the court appears 
to thee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in 
the court. 

13. When we have meat before us and such 
eatables, we receive the impression, that this is 
the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body 
of a bird or of a pig ; and again, that this Faler- 
nian is only a little grape juice, and this purple 
robe some sheeps' wool dyed with the blood of a 
shell-fish : such then are these impressions, and 



M. ANTONINUS, 'vi. 165 



they reach the things themselves and penetrate 
them, and so we see what kind of things they are. 
Just in the same way ought we to act all through 
life, and where there are things which appear 
most worthy of our approbation, we ought to lay 
them bare and look at their worthlessness and 
strip them of all the words by w r hich they are 
exalted. For outward show is a wonderful per- 
verter of the reason, and when thou art most sure 
that thou art employed about things worth thy 
pains, it is then that it cheats thee most. Con- 
sider then what Crates says of Xenocrates himself. 
14. Most of the things which the multitude 
admire are referred to objects of the most general 
kind, those which are held together by cohesion 
or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig- 
trees, vines, olives. But those which are admired 
by men, who are a little more reasonable, are re- 
ferred to the things which are held together by a 
living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which 
are admired by men who are still more instructed 
are the things which are held together by a ra- 
tional soul, not however a universal soul, but ra- 
tional so far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or 
expert in some other way, or simply rational so 
far as the possessing of a number of slaves. But 
he who values a rational soul, a soul universal and 



166 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 

fitted for political life, regards nothing else except 
this ; and above all things he keeps his soul in a 
condition and in an activity conformable to reason 
and social life, and he co-operates to this end with 
those who are of the same kind as himself. 

15. Some things are hurrying into existence, 
and others are hurrying out of it ; and of that 
which is coming into existence part is already ex- 
tinguished. Motions and changes are continually 
renewing the world, just as the uninterrupted 
course of time is always reneAving the infinite du- 
ration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on 
which there is no abiding, what is there of the 
things which hurry by on which a man would set 
a high price ? It would be just as if a man should 
fall in love with one of the sparrows which fly by, 
but it has already past out of sight. Something 
of this kind is the very life of every man, like the 
exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the 
air. For such as it is to have once drawn in the 
air and to have given it back, which we do every 
moment, just the same is it with the whole respi- 
ratory power, which thou didst receive at thy birth 
yesterday and the day before, to give it back to 
the element from which thou didst first draw it. 

16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a 
thing to be valued, nor respiration, as in domesti- 



M. ANTONINUS. VI. 167 

cated animals and wild beasts, nor the receiving 
of impressions by the appearances of things, nor 
being, moved by desires as puppets by strings, nor 
assembling in herds, nor being nourished by food ; 
for this is just like the act of separating and part- 
ing with the useless part of our food. What then 
is worth being valued ? To be received with 
clapping of hands ? No. Neither must we value 
the clapping of tongues, for the praise which 
comes from the many is a clapping of tongues. 
Suppose then that thou hast given up this worth- 
less thing called fame, what remains that is worth 
valuing ? This in my opinion, to move thyself 
and to restrain thyself in conformity to thy proper 
constitution, to which end all employments lead 
and all arts. For every art aims at this, that the 
thing which has been made should be adapted to 
the work for which it has been made ; and both 
the vine-planter who looks after the vine, and the 
horse-breaker, and he who trains the dog, seek 
this end. But the education and the teaching of 
youth aim at something. In this then is the 
value of the education and the teaching. And if 
this is well, thou wilt not seek anything else. 
Wilt thou not cease to value many other things 
too ? Then thou wilt be neither free, nor suffi- 
cient for thy own happiness, nor without passion. 



168 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 

For of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, 
and suspicious of those who can take away those 
things, and plot against those who have that 
which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man 
must be altogether in a state of perturbation who 
wants any of these things : and besides, he must 
often find fault with the gods. But to reverence 
and honor thy own mind will make thee content 
•with thyself, and in harmony with society, and in 
agreement with the gods, that is, praising all that 
they give and have ordered. 

17. Above, below, all around are the movements 
of the elements. But the motion of virtue is in 
none of these : it is something more divine, and 
advancing by a way hardly observed it goes hap- 
pily on its road. 

18. How strangely men act. They will not 
praise those who are living at the same time and 
living with themselves ; but to be themselves 
praised by posterity, by those whom they have 
never seen nor ever will see, this they set much 
value on. But this is very much the same as if 
thou shouldst be grieved because those who have 
lived before thee did not praise thee. 

19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by 
thyself, do not think that it is impossible for a 
man : but if anything is possible for a man and 



M. ANTONINUS. VI. 169 

conformable to his nature, think that this can be 
attained by thyself too. 

20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a 
man has torn thee with his nails, and by dashing 
against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well, we 
neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we 
offended, nor do we suspect him afterwards as a 
treacherous fellow ; and yet we are on our guard 
against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet 
with suspicion, but we quietly get out of his way. 
Something like this let thy behavior be in all the 
other parts of life ; let us overlook many things in 
those who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. 
For it is in our power, as I said, to get out of the 
way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred. 

21. If any man is able to convince me and 
show me that I do not think or act right, I will 
gladly change ; for I seek the truth by which no 
man was ever injured. But he is injured who 
abides in his error and ignorance. 

22. I* do my duty : other things trouble me 
not ; for they are either things without life, or 
things without reason, or things that have rambled 
and know not the way. 

23. As to the animals which have no reason 
and generally all things and objects do thou, since 
thou hast reason and they have none, make use 



170 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 

of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But 
towards human beings, as they have reason, be- 
have in a social spirit. And on all occasions call 
on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the 
length of time in which thou shalt do this ; for 
even three hours so spent are sufficient. 

24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom 
by death were brought to the same state ; for 
either they were received among the same semi- 
nal principles of the universe, or they were alike 
dispersed among the atoms. 

25. Consider how many things in the same in- 
divisible time take place in each of us, things 
which concern the body and things which concern 
the soul : and so thou wilt not wonder if many 
more things, or rather all things which come into 
existence in that which is the one and all, which 
we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time. 

26. If any man should propose to thee the 
question, how the name Antoninus is written, 
wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter 
each letter ? What then if they grow angry, wilt 
thou be angry too ? Wilt thou not go on with 
composure and number every letter? Just so 
then in this life also remember that every duty is 
made up of certain parts. These it is thy duty 
to observe, and without being disturbed or show- 



M. ANTONINUS. VI. 171 

ing anger towards those who are angry with thee 
to go on thy way and finish that which is set be- 
fore thee. 

27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive 
after the things which appear to them to be suit- 
able to their nature and profitable ! And yet in 
a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, 
when thou art vexed because they do wrong. 
For they are certainly moved towards things 
because they suppose them to be suitable to 
their nature and profitable to them — But it is 
not so — Teach them then, and show them with- 
out being angry. 

28. Death is a cessation of the impressions 
through the senses, and of the pulling of the 
strings which move the appetites, and of the 
discursive movements of the thoughts, and of 
the service to the flesh. 

29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to 
give way in this life, when thy body does not 
give way. 

30. Take care that thou art not made into a 
Caesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye ; for 
such things happen. Keep thyself then simple, 
good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend 
of justice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, affec- 
tionate, strenuous in all proper acts. Strive to 



172 M.ANTO NI N U S . VI . 

continue to be such as philosophy wished to make 
thee. Reverence the gods, and help men. Short 
is life. There is only one fruit of this terrene 
life, a pious disposition and social acts. Do 
everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remem- 
ber his constancy in every act which was con- 
formable to reason, and his evenness in all things, 
and his piety, and the serenity of his countenance, 
and his sweetness, and his disregard of empty 
fame, and his efforts to understand things ; and 
how he would never let anything pass without 
having first most carefully examined it and clearly 
understood it ; and how he bore with those who 
blamed him unjustly without blaming them in re- 
turn ; how he did nothing in a hurry ; and how he 
listened not to calumnies, and how exact an exam- 
iner of manners and actions he was ; and not given 
to reproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor 
a sophist ; and with how little he was satisfied, 
such as lodging, bed, dress, food, servants ; and 
how laborious and patient ; and how he was able 
on account of his sparing diet to hold out to the 
evening, not even requiring to relieve himself by 
any evacuations except at the usual hour ; and 
his firmness and uniformity in his friendships ; 
and how he tolerated freedom of speech in those 
who opposed his opinions ; and the pleasure that 



M. ANTONINUS. VI. 173 

he had when any man showed him anything bet- 
ter ; and how pious he was without superstition. 
Imitate all this that thou mayest have as good a 
conscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had. 
(i. 16.) 

31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself 
back ; and when thou hast roused thyself from 
sleep and hast perceived that they were only 
dreams which troubled thee, now in thy waking 
hours look at these [the things about thee] as 
thou didst Jpok at those [the dreams]. 

32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now 
to this little body all things are indifferent, for it 
is not able to perceive differences. But to the 
understanding those things only are indifferent, 
which are not the works of its own activity. But 
whatever things are the works of its own activity, 
all these are in its power. And of these how- 
ever only those which are done with reference to 
the present ; for as to the future and the past 
activities of the mind, even these are for the 
present indifferent. 

33. Neither the labor which the hand does nor 
that of the foot is contrary to nature, so long as 
the foot does the foot's work and the hand the 
hand's. So then neither to a man as a man is his 
labor contrary to nature, so long as it does the 



174 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 

things of a man. But if the labor is not contrary 
to his nature, neither is it an evil to him. 

34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed 
by robbers, patricides, tyrants. 

35. Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen 
accommodate themselves up to a certain point to 
those who are not skilled in their craft, — never- 
theless they cling to the reason [the principles] 
of their art and do not endure to depart from it ? 
Is it not strange if the architect and the physician 
shall have more respect to the reason [the prin- 
ciples] of their own arts than man to his own 
reason, which is common to him and the gods. 

36. Asia, Europe are corners of the universe : 
all the sea a drop in the universe ; Athos a little 
clod of the universe : all the present time is a 
point in eternity. All things are little, change- 
able, perishable. All things come from thence, 
from that universal ruling power either directly 
proceeding or by way of consequence. .And ac- 
cordingly the lion's gaping jaws, and that which 
Is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a thorn, 
as mud, are after-products of the grand and beau- 
tiful. Do not then imagine that they are of an- 
other kind from that which thou dost venerate, 
but form a just opinion of the source of all. 

37. He who has seen present things has seen 



M. ANT ON IN U S. VI. 175 

all, both everything which has taken place frore 
all eternity and everything which will be for time 
without end ; for all are of one kin and of one 
form. 

38. Frequently consider the connection of all 
things in the universe and their relation to one 
another. For in a manner all things are impli- 
cated with one another, and all in this way are 
friendly to one another ; for one thing comes in 
order after another, and this is by virtue of they 
active movement and mutual conspiration and the 
unity of the substance. 

39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy 
lot has been cast : and the men among whom 
thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do 
it truly [sincerely]. 

40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does 
that for which it has been made, is well, and yet 
he who made it is not there. But in the things 
which are held together by nature there is within 
and there abides in them the power which made 
them ; wherefore the more it is fit to reverence 
this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live 
and act according to its will, everything in thee 
is in conformity to intelligence. And thus also in 
the universe, the things which belong to it are in 
conformity to intelligence. 



176 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 

41. Whatever of the things which are not 
within thy power thou shalt suppose to be good 
for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if 
such a bad thing befall thee or the loss of such a 
good thing, thou wilt. blame the gods, and hate 
men too, those who are the cause of the misfor- 
tune or the loss, or those who are suspected of 
being likely to be the cause ; and indeed we do 
much injustice, because we make a difference be- 
tween these things [because we do not regard 
these things as indifferent]. But if we judge 
only those things which are in our power to be 
good or bad, there remains no reason either for 
finding fault with god or standing in a hostile 
attitude to man. 

42. We are all working together to one end, 
some with knowledge and design, and others 
without knowing what they do ; as men also 
when they are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, 
I think, who says that they are laborers and co- 
operators in the things which take place in the 
universe. But men co-operate after different 
fashions : and even those co-operate abundantly, 
who find fault with what happens and those who 
try to oppose it and to hinder it ; for the universe 
had need even of such men as these. It remains 
then for thee to understand among what kind of 



M. ANTONINUS. VI. 177 

workmen thou placest thyself ; ' for he who rules 
all things will certainly make a right use of thee, 
and he will receive thee among some part of the 
co-operators and of those whose labors conduce to 
one end. But be not thou such a part as the 
mean and ridiculous verse in the play, which 
Chrysippus speaks of. 

43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of 
the rain, or Aesculapius the work of the Fruit- 
bearer [the earth] ? And how is it with respect 
to each of the stars, are they not different and yet 
they work together to the same end ? 

44. If the gods have determined about me and 
about the things which must happen to me, they 
have determined well, for it is not easy even to 
imagine a deity without forethought ; and as to 
doing me harm, why should they have any desire 
towards that ? for what advantage would result to 
them from this or to the whole, which is the special 
object of their providence ? But if they have not 
determined about me individually, they have cer- 
tainly determined about the whole at least, and 
the things which happen by way of sequence in 
this general arrangement I ought to accept with 
pleasure and to be content with them. But if 
they determine about nothing — which it is wicked 
to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither 

12 



178 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 

sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do any- 
thing else which we do as if the gods were present 
and lived with us — but if however the gods de- 
termine about none of the things which concern 
us, I am able to determine about myself, and I 
can inquire about that which is useful ; and that 
is useful to every man which is conformable to 
his own constitution and nature. But my nature 
is rational and social ; and my city and country, 
so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far 
as I am a man, it is the world. The things then 
which are useful to these cities are alone useful 
to me. 

45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for 
the interest of the universal : this might be suf- 
ficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as 
a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever 
is profitable to any man is profitable also to other 
men. But let the word profitable be taken here 
in the common sense as said of things of the mid- 
dle kind [neither good nor bad]. 

46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre 
and such places, that the continual sight of the 
same things and the uniformity make the spectacle 
wearisome, so it is in the whole of life ; for all 
things above, below, are the same and from the 
same. How long then ? 



M. ANTONINUS. VI. 179 

47. Think continually that all kinds of men and 
of all kinds of pursuits and of all nations are dead 
so that thy thoughts come down even to Philistion 
and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy 
thoughts to the other kinds [of men]. To that 
place then we must remove, where there are so 
many great orators, and so many noble philoso- 
phers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates ; so many 
heroes of former clays, and so many generals after 
them, and tyrants ; besides these, Eudoxus, Hip- 
parchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute nat- 
ural talents, great minds, lovers of labor, versatile, 
confident, mockers even of the perishable and 
ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as 
are like him. As to all these consider that they 
have long been in the dust. What harm then is 
this to them ; and what to those whose names are 
altogether unknown ? One thing here is worth a 
great deal, to pass thy life in truth and justice, 
with a benevolent disposition even to liars and 
unjust men. 

48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think 
of the virtues of those who live with thee ; for 
instance, the activity of one, and the modesty of 
another, and the liberality of a third, and some 
other good quality of a fourth. For nothing de- 
lights so much as the examples of the virtues, 



180 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 

when they are exhibited in the morals of those 
who live with us and present themselves in abun- 
dance, as far as is possible. Wherefore we must 
keep them before us. 

49. Art thou dissatisfied because thou weighest 
only so many litrae and not three hundred ? Be 
not dissatisfied then that thou must live only 
so many years and not more ; for as thou art 
satisfied with the amount of substance which has 
been assigned to thee, so be content with the 
time. 

50. Let us try to persuade them [men]. But 
act even against their will, when the principles of 
justice lead that way. If however any man by 
using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to 
contentment and tranquillity, and at the same 
time employ the hindrance towards the exercise 
of some other virtue ; and remember that thy 
attempt was with a reservation [conditionally] 
that thou didst not desire to do impossibilities 
What then didst thou desire ? — Some such effort 
as this — But thou attainest thy object, if the 
things to which thou wast moved are [not] ac- 
complished, t 

5 1 . He who loves fame considers another man's 
activity to be his own good ; and he who loves 
pleasure, his own sensations ; but he who has 



M. ANTONINUS. VI. 181 

understanding, considers his own acts to be his 
own good. 

52. It is in our power to have no opinion about 
a thing, and not to be disturbed in our soul ; for 
things themselves have no natural power to form 
our judgments. 

53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to 
what is said by another, and as much as it is pos- 
sible, be in the speaker's mind. 

54. That which is not good for the swarm, 
neither is it good for the bee. 

55. If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick 
the doctor, would they listen to anybody else ; or 
how could the helmsman secure the safety of those 
in the ship or the doctor the health of those whom 
he attends ? 

56. How many together with whom I came 
into the world are already gone out of it. 

57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and 
to those bitten by mad dogs water causes fear ; 
and to little children the ball is a fine thing. 
Why then am I angry ? Dost thou think that a 
false opinion has less power than the bile in the 
jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten by a 
mad dog ? 

58. No man will hinder thee from living ac- 
cording to the reason of thy own nature : nothing 



182 



M. ANTONINUS. VI. 



will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the 
universal nature. 

59. What kind of people are those whom men 
wish to please, and for what objects, and by what 
kind of acts ? How soon will time cover all 
things, and how many it has covered already. 




VII. 



^7jTVEgoHAT is badness? It is that which 

(?\U/ v*)/u t ^ l0U nast °ft en seen. And on the 

(tvry Aft occas i° n °f everything which hap- 

t V / <-, p eng ]j ee p ^jg m m ind, that it is 

that which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up 
and down thou wilt find the same things, with 
which the old histories are filled, those of the 
middle ages and those of our own day ; with which 
cities and houses are filled now. There is noth- 
ing new : all things are both familiar and short- 
lived. 

2. Hoav can our principles become dead, unless 
the impressions [thoughts] which correspond to 
them are extinguished ? But it is in thy power 
continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. 
I can have that opinion about anything, which I 
ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed ? 
The things which are external to my mind have 
no relation at all to my mind. — Let this be the 



184 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 

state of thy affects, and thou standest erect. To 
recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things 
again as thou didst use to look at them ; for in 
this consists the recovery of thy life. 

8. The idle business of show, plays on the 
stage, flocks of sheep, herds, exercises with spears, 
a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread into fish- 
ponds, laborings of ants and burden-carrying, 
runnings about of frightened little mice, puppets 
pulled by strings — [all alike]. It is thy duty 
then in the midst of such things to show good 
humor and not a proud air ; to understand how- 
ever that every man is worth just so much as the 
things are worth about which he busies himself 

4. In discourse thou must attend to what is 
said, and in every movement thou must observe 
what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see 
immediately to what end it refers, but in the 
other watch carefully what is the thing signified. 

5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or 
not ? If it is sufficient, I use it for the work as 
an instrument given by the universal nature. But 
if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the 
work and give way to him who is able to do it 
better, unless there be some reason why I ought 
not to do so ; or I do it as well as I can, taking to 
help me the man wdio with the aid of my ruling 



M. ANTONINUS. VII. 185 

-*■ 
principle can do what is now fit and useful for the 

general good. For whatsoever either by myself 

or with another I can do, ought to be directed to 

this only, to that which is useful and well suited 

to society. 

6. How many after being celebrated by fame 
have been given up to oblivion ; and how many 
who have celebrated the fame of others have long 
been dead. 

7. Be not ashamed to be helped ; for it is thy 
business to do thy duty like a soldier in the assault 
on a town. How then, if being lame thou canst 
not mount up on the battlements alone, but with 
the help of another it is possible ? 

8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou 
wilt come to them, if it shall be necessary, having 
with thee the same reason which now thou usest 
for present tilings. 

9. All things are implicated with one another, 
and the bond is holy ; and there is hardly anything 
unconnected with any other thing. For things 
have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form 
the same universe [order]. For there is one 
universe made up of all things, and one god who 
pervades all things, and one substance, and one 
law, [one] common reason in all intelligent ani- 
mals, and one truth ; if indeed there is also one 



186 M. ANTON IX US. VII. 

perfection for all animals which are of the same 
stock and participate in the same reason. 

1 0. Everything material soon disappears in the 
substance of the whole ; and everything formal 
[causal] is very soon taken back into the universal 
reason ; and the memory of everything is very 
soon overwhelmed in time. 

11. To the rational animal the same act is ac- 
cording to nature and according to reason. 

1 2. Be thou erect, or be made erect, (in. 5.) 

13. Just as it is with the members in those 
bodies which are united in one, so it is with ra- 
tional beings which exist separate, for they have 
been constituted for one co-ope -ation-. And the 
perception of this will be more apparent to thee, 
if thou often sayest to thyself that I am a member 
[/xe'A.05] of the system of rational beings. But if 
[using the letter r] thou sayest that thou art a 
part [(iiepo?], thou dost not yet love men from thy 
heart ; beneficence does not yet delight thee for its 
own sake ; * thou still doest it barely as a thing of 
propriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself. 

14. Let there fall externally what will on the 
parts which can feel the effects of this fall. For 

1 I have used Gataker's conjecture KaraATjKTtKug instead 
of the common reading /caraA^Trn/cif : compare iv. 20; 
ix. 42. 



M. ANTONINUS. VII. 187 

those parts which have felt will complain, if they 
choose. But I, unless I think that what has hap- 
pened is an evil, am not injured. And it is in my 
power not to think so. 

15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be 
good, just as if the gold, or the emerald or the 
purple were always saying this, Whatever any one 
does or says, I must be emerald and keep my 
color. 

16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself, 
I mean, does not frighten itself or cause itself 
pain.f But if any one else can frighten or pain 
it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not 
by its own opinion turn itself into such ways. 
Let the body itself take care, if it can, that it 
suffer nothing, and let it speak,* if it suffers. But 
the soul itself, that which is subject to fear, to 
pain, which has completely the power of forming 
an opinion about these things, will suffer nothing, 
for it will never deviate f into such a judgment. 
The leading principle in itself wants nothing, 
unless it makes a want for itself; and therefore it 
is both free from perturbation and unimpeded, if 
it does not disturb and impede itself. 

17. Euclaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, 
or a good thing. What then art thou doing here, 
imagination ? go away, I intreat thee by the 



188 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 

gods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. 
But thou art come according to thy old fashion 
I am not angry with thee : only go away. 

18. Is any man afraid of change ? Why what 
can take place without change ? What then is 
more pleasing or more suitable to the universal 
nature ? And canst thou take a bath unless the 
wood undergoes a change? and canst thou be 
nourished, unless the food undergoes a change ? 
And can anything else that is useful be accom- 
plished without change ? Dost thou not see then 
that for thyself also to change is just the same, 
and equally necessary for the universal nature ? 

19. Through the universal substance as through 
a furious torrent all bodies are carried, being by 
their nature united with and co-operating with the 
whole, as the parts of our body with one another. 
How many a Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, 
how many an Epictetus has time already swal- 
loAved up ? And let the same thought occur to 
thee with reference to every man and thing. 

20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should 
do something which the constitution of man does 
not allow, or in the way which it does not allow, 
or what it does not allow now. 

2 1 . Near is thy forgetfulness of all things ; 
and near the forgetfulness of thee by all. 



M.ANTONINUS. VII. 189 

22. It is peculiar to man to love even those 
who do wrong. And this happens, if when they 
do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen, 
and that they do wrong through ignorance and 
unintentionally, and that soon both of you will 
die ; and above all, that the wrong doer has done 
thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling fac- 
ulty worse than it was before. 

28. The universal nature out of the universal 
substance, as if it were wax, now moulds a horse, 
and when it has broken this up, it uses the mate- 
rial for a tree, then for a man, then for something 
else ; and each of these things subsists for a very 
short time. But it is no hardship for the vessel to 
be broken up, just as there was none in its being 
fastened together. 

24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural ; 
when it is often assumed, 2 the result is that all 
comeliness dies away, and at last is so completely 
extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at 
all. Try to conclude from this very fact that it 
is contrary to reason. For if even the perception 
of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is there 
for living any longer ? 

25. Nature which governs the whole will soon 
change all things which thou seest, and out of their 

2 This is corrupt. 



190 M . A N TO N I N US'. V [I. 

substance will make other things, and again other 
things from the substance of them, in order that 
the world may be ever new. 

26. When a man has done thee any wrong, 
immediately consider with what opinion) about 
good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou 
hast seen this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither 
wonder nor be angry. For either thou thyself 
thinkest the same thing to be good that he does of 
another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty 
then to pardon him. But if thou dost not think 
such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more 
readily be well disposed to him who is in error. 

27. Think not so much of what thou hast not 
as of what thou hast : but of the things which 
thou hast select the best, and then reflect how 
eagerly they would have been sought, if thou 
hadst them not. At the same time however take 
care that thou dost not through being so pleased 
with them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so 
as to be disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have 
them. 

28. Retire into thyself. The rational principle 
which rules has this nature, that it is content with 
itself when it does what is just, and so secures 
tranquillity. 

29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pull- 



M. ANTONINUS. VII. 191 

ing of the strings. Confine thyself to the pres- 
ent. Understand well what happens either to 
thee or to another. Divide and distribute every 
object into the causal [formal] and the material. 
Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is 
clone by a man stay there where the wrong was 
done. 

30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let 
thy understanding enter into the things that are 
doing and the things which do them. (vu. 4.) 

81. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty 
and with indifference towards the things which 
lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind. 
Follow god. The poet says that Law rules all — 
t And it is enough to remember that law rules 
all.t 3 — 

82. About death : whether it is a dispersion, or 
a resolution into atoms, or annihilation, it is either 
extinction or change. 

33. About pain : the pain which is intolerable 
carries us off; but that which lasts a long time 
is tolerable ; and the mind maintains its own 
tranquillity by retiring into itself,f and the ruling 
faculty is not made worse. But the parts which 
are harmed by pain, let them, if they can, give 
their opinion about it. 

3 The end of this section is unintelligible. 



192 M. ANT ONINU S. VII. 

34. About fame : look at the minds [of those 
who seek fame], observe what they are, and what 
kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things 
they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of 
sand piled on one another hide the former sands, 
so in life the events which go .before are soon 
covered by those which come after. 

35. From Plato : 4 the man who has an elevated 
mind and takes a view of all time and of all sub- 
stance, dost thou suppose it pos-ible for him to 
think that human life is anything great ? it is not 
possible, he said. — Such a man then will think 
that dettth also is no evil — Certainly not. 

36." From Antisthenes : It is royal to do good 
and to be abused. 

37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be 
obedient and to regulate and compose itself as the 
mind commands, and for the mind not to be reg- 
ulated and composed by itself. 

38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, 
For they care nought about it. 5 

39. To the immortal gods and us give joy. 

40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of 

corn : 
One man is born ; another dies. 6 

* Plato, Pol. vi. 486. 

6 From the Bellerophon of Euripides. 

6 From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. 



M. ANTONINUS. VII. 193 

41. If gods care not for me and for my children, 
There is a reason for it. 

42. For the good is with me, and the just. 7 

43. No joining others in their wailing, no 
violent emotion. 

44. From Plato : s But I would make this man 
a sufficient answer, which is this : Thou sayest 
not well, if thou thinkest that a man, who is good 
for anything at all ought to compute the hazard 
of life or death, and should not rather look to this 
only in all that he does, whether he is doing what 
is just or unjust, and the works of a good or a 
bad man. 

45. 8 For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth . 
wherever a man has placed himself thinking it the 
best place for him, or has been placed by a com- 
mander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and 
to abide the hazard, taking nothing into the 
reckoning, either death or anything else, before 
the baseness [of deserting his post]. 

46. But, my good friend, consider whether that 

in. 25.) has translated six lines from Euripides, and 
among them are these two lines : — 

Reddenda terrae est terra : turn vita omnibus 
Metenda ut fruges : Sic jubet necessitas. 

7 See Aristophanes, Acharnenses. 

8 Erom the Apologia. 

13 



194 ill. ANTONINUS. VII. 

which is noble and good is not something different 
from saving and being saved ; for f we must not 
allow that it consists in living such or such a time, 
at least for one who is really a man ; | and he 
should not be fond of life, but entrusting this to 
god and believing what the women say, that no 
man can escape his destiny, he should next in- 
quire how he may best live the time that he has 
to live. 9 

47. Look round at the courses of the stars, as 
if thou wert going along with them; and con- 
stantly consider the changes of the elements into 
one another; for such thoughts purge away the 
filth of the terrene life. 

48. This is a fine saying of Plato : 10 That he 
who is discoursing about men should look also al 
earthly things as if he viewed them from some 
higher place ; should look at them in their as- 
semblies, armies, agricultural labors, marriages, 
treaties, births, deaths, noise of the courts of 
justice, desert places, various nations of barba- 

9 Plato, Gorgias, c. 68. In this passage the text of 
Antoninus has kaTsov, which is perhaps right ; but there 
seems to be something wrong in the text. It is certainly 
difficult to see the exact construction of parts of the 
section. The reading evkteov for eareov does not mend 
the matter. 

10 It is not in the extant writings of Plato. 



M. ANTONINUS. VII. 195 

rians, feasts, lamentations, markets, a mixture of 
all things and an orderly combination of contraries. 

49. Consider the past ; such great changes of 
political supremacies. Thou mayest foresee also 
the things which will be. For they will certainly 
be of like form, and it is not possible that they 
should deviate from the order of the things which 
take place now : accordingly to have contemplated 
human life for forty years is the same as to have 
contemplated it for ten thousand years. For 
what more wilt thou see ? 

50. That which has grown from the earth to 

the earth, 
But that which has sprung from heavenly seed, 
Back to the heavenly realms returns. 11 
This is either a dissolution of the mutual in- 
volution of the atoms, or a similar dispersion of the 
unsentient elements. 

51. With food and drinks and cunning magic 

arts 
Turning the channel's course to 'scape from 
death. 12 
The breeze which heaven has sent 
We must endure, and toil without complaining. 

11 From the Chrysippus of Euripides. 

12 The first two lines are from the Supp. of Eurip- 
ides, v. 1110. 



196 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 

52. Another may be more expert in casting his 
opponent ; but let him not be more social, nor 
more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all 
that happens, nor more considerate with respect 
to the faults of his neighbors. 

53. Where any work can be done conformably 
to the reason which is common to gods and men, 
there we have nothing to fear : for where we are 
able to get profit by means of the activity which 
is successful and proceeds according to our consti- 
tution, there no harm is to be suspected. 

54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy 
power piously to acquiesce in thy present condi- 
tion, and to behave justly to those who are about 
thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present 
thoughts, that nothing shall steal into them with- 
out being well examined. 

55. Do not look around thee to discover other 
men's ruling principles, but look straight to this, 
to what nature leads thee, both the universal 
nature through the things which happen to thee, 
and thy own nature through the acts which must 
be done by thee. But every being ought to do 
that which is according to its constitution ; and 
all other things have been made for the sake of 
rational beings, just as among irrational things 
the inferior for the sake of the superior, but the 
rational for the sake of one another. 



M. ANTONINUS. VII. 197 

The prime principle then in man's constitution 
is the social. And the second is not to yield to 
the persuasions of the body, for it is the peculiar 
office of the rational and intelligent motion to cir- 
cumscribe itself, and never to be overpowered 
either by the motion of the senses or of the ap- 
petites, for both are animal ; but the intelligent 
motion claims superiority and does not permit 
itself to be overpowered by the others. And with 
good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all 
of them. The third thing in the rational consti- 
tution is freedom from error and from deception. 
Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these 
things go straight on, and it has what is its own. 

56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have 
completed thy life up to the present time ; and 
live according to nature the remainder which is 
allowed thee. 

57. Love that only which happens to thee, and 
is spun with the thread of thy destiny. For what 
is more suitable ? 

58. In everything which happens keep before 
thy eyes those to whom the same things hap- 
pened, and how they were vexed, and treated 
them as strange things, and found fault with 
them : and now where are. they ? Nowhere. 
Why then dost thou choose to act in the same 



198 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 

way ? and why dost thou not leave these agita- 
tions which are foreign to nature, to those who 
cause them and those who are moved by them ? 
and why art thou not altogether intent upon the 
right way of making use of the things which hap- 
pen to thee ? for then thou wilt use them well, 
and they will be a material for thee [to work on]. 
Only attend to thyself, and resolve to be a good 
man in every act which thou doest : and remem- 

l-»pv» $£ -& # yfc #13 

59. Look within. Within is the fountain of 
good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever 
dig. 

60. The body ought to be compact, and to show 
no irregularity either in motion or attitude. For 
what the mind shows in the face by maintaining 
in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, 
that ought to be required also in the whole body. 
But all these things should be observed without 
affectation. 

61. The art of life is more like the wrestler's 
art than the dancer's, in respect of this that it 
should stand ready and firm to meet onsets which 
are sudden and unexpected. 

13 This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so 
corrupt that it is impossible to give any probable mean- 
ing to it. It is better to leave it as it is than to patch it 
up, as some critics and translators have done. 



M . AN TO NIN US . ' VII. 199 

62. Constantly observe who those are whose 
approbation thou wishest to have,, and what ruling 
principles they possess. For then thou wilt 
neither blame those who offend involuntarily, not 
wilt thou want their approbation, if thou lookest 
to the sources of their opinions and appetites. 

63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is invol- 
untarily deprived of truth ; consequently in the 
same way it is deprived of justice and temper- 
ance and benevolence and everything of the kind. 
It is most necessary to bear this constantly in 
mind, for thus thou wilt be more gentle towards 
all. 

64. In every pain let this thought be present, 
that there is no dishonor in it, nor does it make 
the governing intelligence worse, for it does not 
damage the intelligence either so far as the intel- 
ligence is rational 14 or so far as it is social. In- 
deed in the ease of most pains let this remark of 
Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable 
nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has 
its limits, and if thou addest nothing to it in imag- 
ination : and remember this too, that we do not 

14 The text has vKikt), which it has been proposed to 
alter to loyiKr], and this change is necessary. We shall 
then have in this section "koyiKT] and kolvuvlkt/ associated, 
as we have in s. 68 XoyiKr/ and tto7iltlktj, and in s. 72. 



200 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 

perceive that many things which are disagreeable 
to us are the same as pain, such as excessive 
drowsiness, and the being scorched by heat, and 
the having no appetite. When then thou art dis- 
contented about any of these things, say to thy- 
self, that thou art yielding to pain. 

65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman, 
as they feel towards men. 15 

66. How do we know if Telauges was not supe- 
rior in character to Socrates ? for it is not enough 
that Socrates died a more noble death, and dis- 
puted more skilfully with the sophists, and passed 
the night in the cold Avith more endurance, and 
that when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis, 
he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he 
walked in a swaggering way in the streets — 
though as to this one may have great doubts if it 
was true. But we ought to inquire, what kind 
of a soul it was that Socrates possessed, and if he 
was able to be content with being just towards 
men and pious towards the gods, neither idly 
vexed on account of men's villany, nor yet mak- 
ing himself a slave to any man's ignorance, nor 
receiving as strange anything that fell to his 

15 I have followed Gataker's conjecture ol anav&puw 
instead of the MSS. reading ol uv&pumot. 



M. ANTONINUS. VII. 201 

6hare out of the universal nor enduring it aa 
intolerable, nor allowing his understanding to 
sympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh 

67. Nature has not so mingled f [the intelli- 
gence] witli the composition of the body, as not 
to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing 
thyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself 
all that is thy own ; for it is very possible to be a 
divine man and to be recognized as such by no 
one. Always bear this in mind ; and another 
thing too, that very little indeed is necessary for 
living a happy life. And because thou hast de- 
spaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in 
the knowledge of nature, do not for this reason 
renounce the hope of being both free and modest 
and social and obedient to god. 

68. It is in thy power to live free from all com- 
pulsion in the greatest tranquillity of mind, even 
if all the world cry out against thee as much as 

hey choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces 
the members of this kneaded matter which has 
grown around thee. For what hinders the mind 
in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in 
tranquillity and in a just judgment of all sur- 
rounding things and in a ready use of the objects 
which are presented to it, so that the judgment 
may say to the thing which falls under its obser- 



202 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 

vation ; This thou art in substance [reality], 
though in men's opinion thou mayst appear to be 
of a different kind ; and the use shall say to that 
which fall? under the hand : Thou art the thing 
that I was seeking ; for to me that which pre- 
sents itself is always a material for virtue both 
rational and political, and in a word for the exer- 
cise of art which belongs to man or god. For 
everything which happens has a relationship 
either to god or man, and is neither new nor 
difficult to handle, but usual and apt matter to 
work on. 

69. The perfection of moral character consists 
in this, in passing every day as the last, and in 
being neither violently excited nor torpid nor 
playing the hypocrite. 

70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed 
because during so long a time they must tolerate 
continually men such as they are and so many of 
them bad ; and besides this they also take care 
of them in all ways. But thou, who art destined 
to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring the 
bad, and this too when thou art one of them ? 

71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly 
from his own badness, winch is indeed possible, 
but to fly from other men's badness, which is im- 
possible. • 



M. ANTONINUS. VII. 203 

72. "Whatever the rational and political [social! 
faculty finds to be neither intelligent nor social, it 
properly judges to be inferior to itself. 

73. When thou hast done a good act and an^ 
other has received it, why dost thou still look for 
a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to 
have the reputation of having done a good act or 
to obtain a return ? 

74. No man is tired of receiving what is use- 
ful. But it is useful to act according to nature. 
Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful 
by doing it to others. 

75. The nature of the All moved to make the 
universe. But now either everything that takes 
place comes by way of consequence [or continu- 
ity] ; or even the chief things towards which the 
ruling power of the universe directs its own move- 
ment are governed by no rational principle. If 
this is remembered it will make thee more tran- 
quil in many things, (ix. 21, vi. 44.) 16 

16 It is not easy to understand this section. It has 
been suggested that there is some error in f/ ukoyiara, &c. 
Some of the translators have made nothing of the pas- 
sage, and they have somewhat perverted the words. 
The first proposition is, that the universe was made by 
some sufficient power. A beginning of the universe is 
assumed, and a power which framed an order. The 



204 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 

next question is, How are things produced now ; or in 
other words, by what power do forms appear in continu- 
ous succession ? The answer, according to Antoninus, 
may be this : It is by virtue of the original constitution 
of things that all change and succession have been 
effected and are effected. And this is intelligible in a 
sense, if we admit that the universe is always one and 
the same, a continuity of identity ; as much one and 
the same as man is one and the same, which he believes 
himself to be, though he also believes and cannot help 
believing that both in his body and in his thoughts there 
is mange and succession. There is no real discontinu- 
ity then in the universe ; and if we say that there was 
an order framed in the beginning and that the things 
which are now produced are a consequence of a pre- 
vious arrangement, we speak of tilings as we are com- 
pelled to view them, as forming a series or succession ; 
just as we speak of the changes in our own bodies and 
the sequence of our own thoughts. But as there are 
no intervals, not even intervals infinitely small, between 
any two supposed states of any one thing, so there are 
no intervals, not even infinitely small, between what we 
call one thing and any other thing which we speak of 
as immediately preceding or following it. What we call 
time is an idea derived from our notion of a succession 
of things or events, an idea which is a part of our con- 
stitution, but not an idea which we can suppose to be- 
long to an infinite intelligence and power. The conclu- 
sion then is certain that the present and the past, the 
production of present things and the supposed original 
order, out of which we say that present things now 
come, are one : and the present productive power and 



M. ANTONINUS. VII. 205 

the so-called past arrangement are only different names 
for one thing. I suppose then that Antoninus wrote 
here as people sometimes talk now, and that his real 
meaning is not exactly expressed by his words. There 
are certainly other passages from which, I think, that 
we may collect that he had notions of production some- 
thing like what I have expressed. 

We now come to the alternative: "or even the chief 

tilings principle." I do not exactly know what 

he means by tu Kvpiurara, "the chief," or, "the most 
excellent," or whatever it is. But as he speaks else- 
where of inferior and superior things, and of the infe- 
rior being for the use of the superior, and of rational 
beings being the highest, he may here mean rational 
beings. He also in this alternative assumes a governing 
power of the universe, and that it acts by directing its 
power towards these chief objects, or making its special, 
proper, motion towards them. And here he uses the 
noun (opfi>i) "movement," which contains the same 
notion as the verb (upjj.7/ce) "moved," which he used at 
the beginning of the paragraph when he was speaking 
of the making of the universe. If we do not accept the 
first hypothesis, he says, we must take the conclusion 
of the second, that the " chief things towards which the 
ruling power of the universe makes a movement are 
directed by uo rational principle." The meaning then 
is, if there is a meaning in it, that though there is a • 
governing power, which strives to give effect to its 
efforts, Ave must conclude that there is no rational direc- 
tion of anything, if the power whicli first made the uni- 
verse does not in some way govern it still. Besides, if 
we assume that anything is now produced or now exists 



206 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 

without the action of the supreme intelligence, and yet 
that this intelligence makes an effort to act, we obtain a 
conclusion which cannot be reconciled with the nature 
of a supreme power, whose existence Antoninus always 
assumes. The tranquillity that a man may gain from 
these reflections must result from his rejecting the sec- 
ond hypothesis, and accepting the first ; whatever may 
be the exact sense in which the emperor understood the 
first. Or, as he says elsewhere, if there is no provi- 
dence which governs the world, man has at least the 
power of governing himself according to the constitu- 
tion of his nature ; and so he may be tranquil, if he 
does the best that he can. 

If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the 
labor to discover the writer's exact meaning ; for I think 
that he had a meaning, though people may not agree 
what it was. (Compare ix. 28.) If I have rightly ex- 
plained the emperor's meaning in this and other pas 
sages, he has touched the solution of a great question. 




VIII. 




HIS reflection also tends to the re- 
moval of the desire of empty fame, 
ft?)>S that it is no longer in thy power to 
have lived the whole of thy life, or 
at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a 
philosopher ; but both to many others and to thy- 
self it is plain that thou art far from philosophy. 
Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is 
no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a 
philosopher ; and thy plan of life also opposes it. 
If then thou hast truly seen where the matter 
lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt 
seem [to others], and be content if thou shalt live 
the rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature 
wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing 
else distract thee ; for thou hast had experience 
of many wanderings without having found happi- 
ness anywhere, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, 
nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. 
Where is it then ? In doing what man's nature 



208 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 

requires. How then shall a man do this ? If he 
has principles from which come his affects and his 
acts. What principles ? Those which relate to 
good and bad : the belief that there is nothing 
good for man, which does not make him just, 
temperate, manly, free ; and that there is nothing 
bad, which does not do the contrary to what has 
been mentioned. 

2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, 
How is this with respect to me ? Shall I repent 
of it ? A little time and I am dead, and all is 
gone. What more do I seek, if what I am now 
doing is the work of an intelligent living being, 
and a social being, and one who is under the same 
law with god ? 

3. Alexander and Caius and Pompeius, what 
are they in comparison with Diogenes and Hera- 
clitus and Socrates ? For they were acquainted 
with things, and their causes [forms], and their 
matter, and the ruling principles of these men 
were the same [or conformable to their pursuits]. 
But as to the others, how many things had they 
to care for, and to how many things were they 
slaves. 

4. [Consider] that men will do the same things 
nevertheless, even though thou shouldst burst. 

5. This is the chief tiling : Be not perturbed, 



M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 209 

for all things are according to the nature of the 
universal ; and in a little time thou wilt be nobody 
and nowhere, like Hadiianus and Augustus. It 
the next place having fixed thy eyes steadily on 
thy business look at it, and at the same time 
remembering that it is thy duty to be a good 
man, and what man's nature demands, do it with- 
out turning aside ; and speak as it seems to thee 
most just, only let it be with good temper and 
with modesty and without hypocrisy. 

6. The nature of the universal has this work 
to do, to remove to that place the things which 
are in this, to change them, to take them away 
here and to carry them there. All things are 
change, yet we need not fear anything new. All 
things are familiar [to us] ; but the distribution 
of them also remains the same. 

7. Every nature is contented with itself when 
it goes on its way well ; and a rational nature 
goes on its way well, when in its thoughts it 
assents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it 
directs its movements to social acts only, and 
when it confines its desires and aversions to the 
things which are in its power, and when it is sat- 
isfied with everything that is assigned to it by the 
common nature. For of this common nature 
every particular nature is a part, as the nature 

14 



210 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 

of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant ; 
except that in the plant the nature of the leaf is 
part of a nature "which has not perception or 
reason, and is subject to be impeded ; but the 
nature of man is part of a nature which is not 
subject to impediments, and is intelligent and 
just, since it gives to everything in equal portions 
and according to its worth times, substance, cause 
[form], activity, and incident. But examine, not 
to discover that any one thing compared with any 
other single thing is equal in all respects, but by 
taking all the parts together of one thing and 
comparing them with all the parts together of 
another. 

8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read 
But thou hast leisure [or ability] to check arro- 
gance : thou hast leisure to be superior to pleasure 
and pain : thou hast leisure to be superior to love 
of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid and un- 
grateful people, nay even to care for them. 

9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding 
fault with the court life or with thy own. (v. 16.) 

10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for 
having neglected something useful ; but that 
which is good must be something useful, and the 
perfect good man should look after it. But no 
such man would ever repent of having refused 



M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 211 

any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither 
good nor useful. 

11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own 
constitution ? What is its substance and mate- 
rial ? And what its causal nature [or form] ? 
And what is it doing in the world ? And how 
long does it subsist ? 

12. When thou risest from sleep with reluc- 
tance, remember that it is according to thy con- 
stitution and according to human nature to per- 
form social acts, but sleeping is common also to 
irrational animals. But that which is according 
to each individual's nature, is also more peculiarly 
its own, and more suitable to its nature, and 
indeed also more agreeable. 

13. Constantly, and, if it be possible, on the 
occasion of every impression on the soul, apply to 
it the principles of Physic, of Moral and of Dia- 
lec^c. 

14. Whatever man thou meetest with, imme- 
diately say to thyself: What opinions has this 
man about good and bad ? For if with respect 
to pleasure and pain and the causes of each, and 
with respect to fame and ignominy, death and 
life he has such and such opinions, it will seem 
nothing' wonderful or strange to me. if he does 
such and such things ; and I shall bear in mind 
that he is compelled to do so. . 



212 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 

15. Remember that as it is a shame to be sur- 
mised if the fig-tree produces figs, so it is to be 
surprised if the world produces such and such 
things of which it is productive ; and for the 
physician and the helmsman it is a shame to be 
surprised, if a man has a fever, or if the wind is 
unfavorable. 

16. Remember that to change thy opinion and 
to follow him who corrects thy error is as consist- 
ent with freedom as it is to persist in thy error. 
For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted 
according to thy own movement and judgment, 
and indeed according to thy own understanding 
too. 

17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost 
thou do it ? but if it is in the power of another, 
whom dost thou blame ? the atoms [chance] or 
the gods ? Both are foolish. Thou must blame 
nobody. For if thou canst, correct [that which is 
the cause] ; but if thou canst not do this, correct 
at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do 
even this, of what use is it to thee to find fault ? 
for nothing should be done without a purpose. 

18. That which has died falls not out of the 
universe. If it stays here, it also changes here, 
and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are 
elements of the universe and of thyself. And 
these too change, and they murmur not. 



M.ANTONINUS. VIII. 213 

19. Everything exists for some end, a horse, a 
vine. Why dost thou wonder ? Even the sun 
will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of 
the gods will say the same. For what purpose 
then art thou ? to enjoy pleasure ? See if com 
mon sense allows this. 

20. Nature has had regard in everything no 
less to the end than to the bejnnnino; and the con- 
tinuance, just like the man who thi'ows up a ball. 
What good is it then for the ball to be thrown 
up, or harm for it to come down, or even to have 
fallen ? and what good is it to the bubble while it 
holds together, or what harm when it is burst ? 
The same may be said of a light also. 

21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see 
what kind of thing it is ; and when it has grown 
old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it is 
diseased. 

Short lived are both the praiser and the 
praised, and the rememberer and the remem- 
bered : and all this in a nook of this part of the 
world ; and not even here do all agree, no not 
any one with himself: and the whole earth too is 
a point. 

22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, 
whether it is an opinion or an act or a word. 

Thou sufferest this justly : for thou choosest 



214 M. ANTONINUS. VI. II. 

rather to become good to-morrow than to be good 
to-day. 

23. Am I doing anything ? I do it with refer- 
ence to the good of manlynd. Does anything 
happen to me ? I receive it and refer it to the 
gods, and the source of all things, from which all 
that happens is derived. 

24. Such as bathing appears to thee — oil, 
sweat, dirt, filthy water, all things disgusting, — 
so is every part of life and everything. 

25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla 
died. Secnnda saw Maximus die, and then Se- 
eunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, 
and then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus saw 
Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. Such is 
everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then 
Celer died. And those sharp-witted men, either 
seers or men inflated with pride, where are they ? 
for instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and 
Demetrius the Platonist and Eudaemon, and any 
one else like them. All ephemeral, dead long 
ago. Some indeed have not been remembered 
even for a short time, and others have become the 
heroes of fables, and again others have disappeared 
even from fables. Remember this then, that this 
little compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, 
or thy poor breath must be extinguished, or be 
removed and placed elsewhere. 



M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 215 

26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper 
works of a man. Now it is a proper work of a 
man to be benevolent to bis own kind, to despise 
the movements of the senses, to form a just judg- 
ment of plausible appearances, and to take a 
survey of the nature of the universe and of the 
things which happen in it. 

27. There are three relations [between thee 
and other things] : the one to the body l which 
surrounds thee ; the second to the divine cause 
from which all things come to all : and the third 
to those who live with thee. 

28. Pain is either an evil to the body — then 
let the body say what it thinks of it — or to the 
soul ; but it is in the power of the soul to main- 
tain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not to 
think that pain is an evil. For every judgment 
and movement and desire and aversion is within, 
and no evil ascends so high. 

29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying 
to thyself: now it is in my power to let no bad- 
ness be in this soul, nor desire nor any perturba- 
tion at all ; but looking at all things I see what is 

1 The text has alnov which in Antoninus means "form," 
" formal." Accordingly Schulze recommends either 
Valkenaer's emendation uyyelov, " body," or Corae's 
suwirwv. Compare xn. 13, x. 38. 



216 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 

their nature, and I use each according to its value. 
— Remember this power which thou hast from 
natui'e. 

30. Speak both in the senate and to every 
man, whoever he may be, appropriately, not with 
any affectation : use plain discourse. 

31. Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descend- 
ants, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, inti- 
mates, friends, Arius, Maecenas, physicians and 
sacrificing priests — the whole court is dead. 
Then turn to the rest, not considering the death 
of a single man, [but of a whole race,] as of the 
Pompeii ; and that which is inscribed on the tombs, 
The last of his race. Consider what trouble those 
before them have had that they might leave a 
successor ; and then, that of necessity some one 
must be the last. Again here consider the death 
of a whole race. 

32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every 
single act ; and if every act does its duty, as far 
as is possible, be content ; and no one is able to 
hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty — 
But something external will stand in the way — 
Nothing will stand in the way of thy acting justly 
and soberly and considerately — But perhaps some 
other active power will be hindered — Well, but by 
acquiescing in the hindrance and by being content 



M.ANTONINUS. VIII. 217 

to transfer thy efforts to that which is allowed, 
another opportunity of action is immediately put 
before thee in place of that which was hindered, 
and one which will adapt itself to this order of 
which we are speaking. 

33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without 
arrogance ; and be ready to let it go. 

34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a 
foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from the 
rest of the body, such does a man make himself, 
as far as he can, who is not content with what 
happens, and separates himself from others, or 
does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast 
detached thyself from the natural unity — for 
thou wast made by nature a part, but now thou 
hast cut thyself off — yet here there is this 
beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to 
unite thyself. God has allowed this to no other 
part, after it has been separated and cut asunder, 
to come together again. But consider the benev- 
olence with which he has distinguished man, for 
he has put it in his power not to be separated at 
all from the universal ; and when he has been 
separated, he has allowed him to return and to be 
united and to resume his place as a part. 

35. As the nature of the universal has given 
to every rational being all the other powers that 



218 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 

it has,f so we have received from it this power 
also. For as the universal nature converts and 
fixes in its predestined place everything which 
stands in its way and opposes it, and makes such 
things a part of itself, so also the rational animal 
is able to make every hindrance its own material, 
and to use it for such purpose as it may have 
designed. 2 

36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the 
whole of thy life. Let not thy thoughts at once 
embrace all the various troubles which thou mayst 
expect to befall thee : but on every occasion ask 
thyself, What is there in this which is intolerable 
and past bearing? for thou wilt be ashamed to 
confess. In the next place remember that neither 
the future nor the past pains thee, but only the 
present. But this is reduced to a very little, if 
thou only circumscribest it, and chidest thy mind, 
if it is unable to hold out against even this. 

37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the 
tomb of Verus ? 3 Does Chaurias or Diotimus sit 

2 The text is corrupt at the beginning of the para- 
graph, but the meaning will appear if the second loyinuv 
is changed into o?mv : though this change alone will not 
establish the grammatical completeness of the text. 

3 « Yerus " is a conjecture of Saumaise, and perhaps 
the true reading. 



M. AX TO XIX US. VIII. 219 

by the tomb of Hadrianus ? That would be ridic- 
ulous. Well, suppose they did sit there, would 
the dead be conscious of it? and if the dead were 
conscious, would they be pleased ? and -if they 
were pleased, would that make them immortal ? 
Was it not in the order of destiny that these per- 
sons too should become old women and old men 
and then die? What then would those do after 
these were dead ? All this is foul smell and 
blood in a bag. 

38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge 
wisely,! sa 7 s the philosopher. 

39. In the constitution of the rational animal I 
see no virtue which is opposed to justice ; but I 
see a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure, 
and that is temperance. 

40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that 
which appears to give thee pain, thou thyself 
standest in perfect security — Who is this ? self — 
The reason — But I am not reason — Be it so. 
Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But 
if any other part of thee suffers, let it have its 
own opinion about itself, (vu. 1G.) 

41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is 
an evil to the animal nature. Hindrance to the 
movements [desires] is equally an evil to the 
animal nature. And something else also is equally 



220 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 

an impediment and an evil tq the constitution of 
plants. So then that which is a hindrance to the 
intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. 
Apply all these things then to thyself. Does pain 
or sensuous pleasure affect thee ? The senses will 
look to that. — Has any obstacle opposed thee in 
thy efforts towards an object ? if indeed thou wast 
making this effort absolutely [unconditionally, or, 
without any reservation], certainly this obstacle is 
an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. 
But if thou takest [into consideration] the usual 
course of things, thou hast not yet been injured 
nor even impeded. The things however which 
are proper to the understanding no one is used to 
impede, for neither fire nor iron nor tyrant nor 
abuse touches it in any way. When it has been 
made a sphere, it continues a sphere, (xi. 12.) 

42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, 
for I have never intentionally given pain even to 
another. 

43. Different things delight different people. 
But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty 
sound without turning away either from any 
man or from any of the things which happen 
to men, but looking at and receiving all with 
welcome eyes and using everything according to 
its value. 



M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 221 

44. See that thou secure this present time to 
thyself: for those who rather pursue posthumous 
fame do not consider that the men of after time 
will be exactly such as these whom they cannot 
bear now ; and both are mortal. And what is it 
in any way to thee if these men of after time utter 
this or that sound or have this or that opinion 
about thee ? 

45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt ; for 
there I shall keep my divine part tranquil, that is, 
content, if it can feel and act conformably to its 
proper constitution. Is this [change of place] 
sufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy 
and worse than it was, depressed, expanded, 
shrinking, affrighted? and what wilt thou find 
which is sufficient reason for this ? 4 

46. Nothing can happen to any man which is 
not a human accident, nor to an ox which is not 
according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine 
which is not according to the nature of a vine, nor 
to a stone which is not proper to a stone. If then 
there happens to each thing both what is usual 
and natural, why shouldst thou complain ? For 

* opryofiivrj in this passage seems to have a passive 
sense. It is difficult to find an apt expression for it and 
some of the other words. A comparison with xi. 12. 
will help to explain the meaning. 



222 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 

the common nature brings nothing which may not 
be borne by thee. 

47. If thou art pained by any external thing, 
it is not this thing that disturbs thee, but thy own 
judgment about it. And it is in thy power to wipe 
out this judgment now. But if anything in thy 
own disposition gives thee pain, who hinders thee 
from correcting thy opinion ? And even if thou 
art pained because thou art not doing some partic- 
ular thing which seems to thee to be right, why 
dost thou not rather act than complain ? — But 
some insuperable obstacle is in the way ? — Do 
not be grieved then, for the cause of its not being 
done depends not on thee — But it is not worth 
while to live, if this cannot be done — Take thy 
departure then from life contentedly, just as he 
dies who is in full activity, and well-pleased too 
with the things which are obstacles. 

48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invin- 
cible, when self-collected it is satisfied with itself, 
if it does nothing which it does not choose to do, 
even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then 
will it be when it forms a judgment about anything 
aided by reason and deliberately? therefore the 
mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for 
man has nothing more secure to which he can fly 
for refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. 



M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 223 

He then who has not seen this is an ignorant man ; 
but he who has seen it and does not fly to this 
refuge is unhappy. 

49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the 
first appearances report. Suppose that it has been 
reported to thee that a certain person speaks ill of 
thee. This has been reported ; but that thou hast 
been injured, that has not been reported. I see 
that my child is sick. I do see ; but that he is in 
danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by 
the first appearances, and add nothing thyself from 
within, and then nothing happens to thee. Or 
rather add something, like a man who knows 
everything that happens in the world. 

50. A cucumber is bitter — Throw it away. — 
There are briers in the road — Turn aside from 
them. — This is enough. Do not add, And why 
were such things made in the world ? For thou 
wilt be ridiculed by a man who is acquainted with 
nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter 
and shoemaker if thou didst find fault because 
thou seest in their workshop shavings and cuttings 
from the things which they make. And yet they 
have places into which they can throw these 
shavings and cuttings ; but the universal nature 
has no external space ; now the wondrous part of 
her art is that though she has circumscribed her- 



224 M. ANTONINUS. VIU. 

self, everything within her which appears to decay 
and to grow old and to be useless she changes into 
herself, and again makes other new things from 
these very same, so that she requires neither sub- 
stance from without nor wants a place into which 
she may cast that which decays. She is content 
then with her own space, and her own matter and 
her own art. 

51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in 
thy conversation without method, nor wandering 
in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul in- 
ward contention nor external effusion, nor in life 
be so busy as to have no leisure. 

Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, 
curse thee. What then can these things do to 
prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise, sober, 
just ? For instance, if a man should stand by a 
limpid pure spring, and curse it, the spring never 
ceases sending up potable water ; and if he should 
cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse 
them and wash them out, and will not be at all 
polluted. How then shalt thou possess a per- 
petual fountain [and not a mere well] ? By 
forming thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with 
benevolence, simplicity, and modesty. 

52. He who does not know what the world is, 
does not know where he is. And he who does 



M ANTONINUS. VIII. 225 

not kno,. - foi what purpose the world exists, does 
not know who he is, nor what the world is. But 
he who has failed in any one of these things could 
not even say for what purpose he exists himself. 
What then dost thou think of him who [avoids or] 
seeks the praise of those who applaud, of men who 
know not either where they are or who they are. 

53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who 
curses himself thrice every hour ? wouldst thou 
wish to please a man who does not please himself ? 
Does a man please himself who repents of nearly 
everything that he does ? 

54. No longer let thy breathing only act in 
concert with the air which surrounds thee, but let 
thy intelligence also now be in harmony with the 
intelligence which embraces all things. For the 
intelligent power is no less diffused in all parts and 
pervades all things for him who is willing to draw 
it to him than the aerial power for him who is able 
to respire it. 

55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all 
to the universe ; and particularly, the wickedness 
[of one man] does no harm to another. It is only 
harmful to him who has it in his power to be re- 
leased from it, as soon as he shall choose. 

56. To my own free will the free will of my 
neighbor is just as indifferent as his breath and 

15 



226 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 

his flesh. For though we are made especially for 
the sake of one another, still the ruling power of 
each of us has its own office, for otherwise my 
neighbor's wickedness would be my harm, which 
god has not willed in order that my uuhappiness 
may not depend on another. 

57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in 
all directions indeed it is diffused, yet it is not ef- 
fused. For this diffusion is extension : Accord- 
ingly its rays are called Extensions [(Wu/es] be- 
cause they are extended [cnro tvov e/cmVecr^cu]. 5 
But one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, 
if he looks at the sun's light passing through a 
narrow opening into a, darkened room, for it is ex- 
tended in a right line, and as it were is divided 
when it meets with a solid body which stands in 
the way and intercepts the air beyond ; but there 
the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall 
off. Such then ought to be the outpouring and 
diffusion of the understanding, and it should in no 
way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should 
make no violent or impetuous collision with the 
obstacles which are in its way ; nor yet fall down, 
but be fixed and enlighten that which receives it. 
For a body will deprive itself of the illumination 
if it does not admit it. 

5 A piece of bad etymology. 



M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 227 

58. He who fears death either fears the loss of 
sensation or a different kind of sensation. But if 
thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt thou feel 
any harm ; and if thou shalt acquire another kind 
of sensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living 
being and thou wilt not cease to live. 

59. Men exist for the sake of one another. 
Teach them then or bear with them. 

60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way 
the mind. The mind indeed, both when it exer- 
cises caution and when it is employed about in- 
quiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to 
its object. 

61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty; and 
also let every other man enter into thine. 




IX. 




L 7 E who acts unjustly acts impiously. 
For since the universal nature has 
made rational animals for the sake 

■^ of one another to help one another 
according to their deserts, but in no way to injure 
one another, he who transgresses her will, is clearly 
guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity. 
And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same 
divinity ; for the universal nature is the nature of 
all things that are ; and all things that are have a 
relation to all things that come into existence. 
And further, this universal nature is named truth 
and is the prime cause of all things that are true. 
He then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety 
inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving; and he 
also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at 
variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch 
as he disturbs the order by fighting against the 
nature of the world ; for he fights against it, who is 
moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth, 



M. ANTONINUS. IX. 229 

for he had received powers from nature through the 
neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish 
falsehood from truth. And indeed he who pursues 
pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil is guilty 
of impiety. For of necessity such a man must 
often find fault with the universal nature, alleging 
that it assigns things to the bad and the good con- 
trary to their deserts, because frequently the bad 
are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the 
things which procure pleasure, but the good have 
pain for their share and the things which cause 
pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain will 
sometimes also be afraid of some of the things 
which will happen in the world, and even this is 
impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not 
abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. 
Now with respect to the things towards which the 
universal nature is equally affected, — for it would 
not have made both, unless it was equally affected 
towards both, — towards these they who wish to 
follow nature should be of the same mind with it, 
and equally affected. "With respect to pain then 
and pleasure or death and life or honor and dis- 
honor, which the universal nature employs equally, 
whoever is not equally affected is manifestly acting 
impiously. And I say that the universal nature 
employs them equally, instead of saying that they 



+ 



230 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 

happen alike to those who are produced in con- 
tinuous series and to those who come after them 
by virtue of a certain original movement of provi- 
dence, according to which it moved from a certain 
beginning to this ordering of things, having con- 
ceived certain reasons of the things which were to 
be, and having detei*mined generative powers of 
substances and changes and such like succes- 
sions. 

2. It would be a man's happiest lot to depart 
from mankind without having had any taste of 
lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride. How- 
ever to breathe out one's life when a man has had 
enough of these things is the next best voyage, as 
the saying is. Hast thou determined to abide 
with vice, and has not experience yet induced 
thee to fly from this pestilence ? For the de- 
struction of the understanding is a pestilence, 
much more indeed than any such corruption and 
change of this atmosphere which surrounds us. 
For this corruption is a pestilence of animals in 
so far as they are animals ; but the other is a 
pestilence of men in so far as they are men. 

3. Do not despise death, but be well content 
with it, since this too is one of those things which 
nature wills. For such as it is to be young and 
to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, 



M. ANT0N1 NUS. IX. 231 

and to have teeth and beard and gray hairs, and 
to beget and to be pregnant and to bring forth, 
and all the other natural operations which the 
seasons of thy life bring, such also is dissolution. 
This then is consistent with the character of a 
reflecting man to be neither careless nor impa- 
tient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but 
to wait for it as one of the opei'ations of nature. 
As thou now waitest for the time when the child 
shall come out of thy wife's womb, so be ready 
for the time when thy soul shall fall out of this 
envelope. But if thou requirest also a vulgar 
kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou 
wilt be made best reconciled to death by observ- 
ing the objects from which thou art going to be 
removed and the morals of those with whom thy 
soul will no longer be mingled. For it is no way 
right to be offended with men, but it is thy duty 
to care for them and to bear with them gently ; 
and yet to remember that thy departure will be 
not from men who have the same principles as 
thyself. For this is the only thing, if there be 
any, which could draw us the contrary way and 
attach us to life, to be permitted to live with 
those who have the same principles as ourselves. 
. But now thou seest how great is the trouble 
arising from the discordance of those who live 



232 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 

together, so that thou mayst say, Come quick, O 
death, lest perchance I too should forget myself. 

4. He who does wrong does wrong against 
himself. He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to 
himself, because he makes himself bad. 

5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a 
certain thing ; not only he who does a certain 
thing. 

6. Thy present opinion founded on understand- 
ing, and thy present conduct directed to social 
good, and thy present disposition of contentment 
with everything which happens | — that is enough. 

7. Wipe out imagination : check desire : ex- 
tinguish appetite : keep the ruling faculty in its 
own power. 

8. Among the animals which have not reason 
one life is distributed ; but among reasonable ani- 
mals one intelligent soul is distributed : just as 
thei'e is one earth of all things which are of an 
earthy nature, and we see by one light, and 
breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty of 
vision and all that have life. 

9. All things which participate in anything 
which is common to them all move towards that 
which is of the same kind with themselves. Ev- 
erything which is earthy turns towards the earth, 
everything which is liquid flows together, and 



M.ANTONINUS. IX. 233 

everything which is of an aerial kind does the 
same, so that they require something to keep 
them asunder and the application of force. Fire 
indeed moves upwards on account of the elemental 
fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with 
all the fire which is here, that even every sub- 
stance which is somewhat dry, is easily ignited, 
because there is less mingled with it of that which 
is a hindrance to ignition. Accordingly then 
everything also which participates in the common 
intelligent nature moves in like maimer towards 
that which is of the same kind with itself, or 
moves even more. For so much as it is superior 
in comparison with all other things, in the same 
degree also is it more ready to mingle with and 
to be fused with that which is akin to it. Accord- 
ingly among animals devoid of reason we find 
swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and the 
nurture of young birds, and in a manner, loves ; 
for even in animals' there are souls, and that 
power which brings them together is seen to 
exert itself in the superior degree, and in such a 
way as never has been observed in plants nor in 
stones nor in trees. But in rational animals there 
are political communities and friendships, and 
families and meetings of people ; and in wars 
treaties and armistices. But in the things which 



234 M. AN TON I N US. IX. 

are still superior, even though they are separated 
from one another, unity in a manner exists, as in 
the stars. Thus the ascent to the higher degree 
is able to produce a sympathy even in things 
which are separated. See then what now takes 
place. For only intelligent animals have now 
forgotten this mutual desire and inclination, 
and in them alone the property of flowing to- 
gether is not seen. But still though men strive 
to avoid [this union], they are caught and held 
by it, for their nature is too strong for them ; and 
thou wilt see what I say, if thou only observest. 
Sooner then will one find anything earthy which 
comes in contact with no earthy thing than a 
man altogether separated from other men. 

10. Both man and god and the universe pro- 
duce fruit ; at the proper seasons each produces 
it. But if usage has especially fixed these terms 
to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Rea- 
son produces fruit both for all and for itself, and 
there are produced from it other things of the 
same kind as reason itself. 

11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those 
who do wrong ; but if thou canst not, remember 
that indulgence is given to thee for this purpose. 
And the gods too are indulgent to such persons ; 
and for some purposes they even help them to get 



M. ANTONINUS. IX. 235 

health, wealth, reputation ; so kind they are. 
And it is in thy power also ; or say, who hinders 
thee ? 

12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet 
as one avIio would be pitied or admired : but 
direct thy will to one thing only, to put thyself 
in motion and to check thyself, as the social 
reason requires. 

13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or 
rather I have cast out all trouble, for it was not 
outside, but within and in my opinions. 

14. All things are the same, familiar in ex- 
perience, and ephemeral in time, and worthless 
in the matter. Everything now is just as it was 
in the time of those whom Ave have buried. 

15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by 
themselves, neither knowing aught of themselves, 
nor expressing any judgment. What is it then 
which does judge about them ? The ruling fac- 
ulty. 

16. Not in passivity, but in activity lie the evil 
and the good of the rational social animal, just as 
his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in 
activity. 

17. For the stone which has been thrown up 
it is no evil to come down, nor indeed any good 
to have been carried up. (vin. 20.) 



236 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 

18. Penetrate inwards into men's leading prin- 
ciples, and thou wilt see what judges thou art 
afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of 
themselves. 

19. All things are changing: and thou thyself 
art in continuous mutation and in a manner in 
continuous destruction, and the universe too. 

20. It is thy duty to leave another man's 
wrongful act there where it is. (vn. 29, ix. 38.) 

21. Termination of activity, cessation from 
movement and opinion, and in a sense their death, 
is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the con- 
sideration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a 
youth, thy manhood, thy old age, for in these also 
every change was a death. Is this anything to 
fear ? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under 
thy grandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, 
then to thy life under thy father ; and as thou 
findest many other differences and changes and 
terminations, ask thyself. Is this anything to 
fear ? In like manner then neither are the ter- 
mination and cessation and change of thy whole 
life a thing to be afraid of? 

22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling fac- 
ulty and that of the universe and that of thy 
neighbor : thy own that thou mayst make it 
just : and that of the universe, that thou mayst 



M. ANTONINUS. IX. 237 

remember of what thou art a part ; and that of 
thy neighbor, that thou mayst know whether he 
has acted ignorantly or with knowledge, and that 
thou mayst also consider that his ruling faculty is 
akin to thine. 

23. As thou thyself art a component part of a 
social system, so let every act of thine be a com- 
ponent part of social life. Whatever act of thine 
then has no reference either immediately or re- 
motely to a social end, this tears asunder thy life 
and does not allow* it to be one, and it is of the 
nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular 
assembly a man acting by himself stands apart 
from the general agreement. 

24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, 
and poor spirits carrying about dead bodies [such 
is everything] ; and so what is exhibited in the 
representation of the mansions of the dead 1 strikes 
our eyes more clearly. 

25. Examine into the quality of the form of 
an object, and detach it altogether from its mate- 
rial part and then contemplate it ; then determine 
the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar 
form is naturally made to endure. 

1 to tt)q NsKviag may be, as Gataker conjectures, a 
dramatic representation of the state of the dead. Schulze 
supposes that it may be also a reference to the Nenvia of 
the Odyssey (lib. xi.) 



238 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 

26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through 
not being contented with thy ruling faculty, when 
it does the things which it is constituted by nature 
to do. But enough [of this]. 

27. When another blames thee or hates thee, 
or when men say about thee anything injurious, 
approach their souls, penetrate within, and see 
what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover 
that there is no reason to take any trouble that 
these men may have this or that opinion about 
thee. However thou must be well disposed tow- 
ards them, for by nature they are friends. And 
the gods too aid them in all ways, by dreams, by 
signs, towards the attainment of those things on 
which they set a value. 

28. The periodic movements of the universe 
are the same, up and down from age to age. And 
either the universal intelligence puts itself in 
motion for every separate effect, and if this is so, 
be thou content with that which is the result of 
its activity ; or it put itself in motion once, and 
everything else comes by way of sequence 2 
in a manner : or indivisible elements are the 
origin of all things. — In a word, if there is a god, 

2 The words which immediately follow nar' hitaKo7Mv- 
&i)auv are corrupt. But the meaning is hardly doubtful. 
(Compare vn. 75.) 



M.ANTONINUS. IX. 239 

all is well ; and if chance rules, do not thou also 
be governed by it. 

Soon will the earth cover us all :. then the earth 
too will change, and the things also which result 
from change will continue to change forever, and 
these again forever. For if a man reflects on the 
changes and transformations which follow one 
another like wave after wave and their rapidity, 
he will despise everything which is perishable. 

29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent : 
it carries everything along with it. But how 
worthless are all these poor people w T ho are en- 
gaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, 
are playing the philosopher ! All drivellers. 
Well then, man : do what nature now requires. 
Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and 
do not look about thee to see if any one will 
observe it ; nor yet expect Plato's Republic : but 
be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and 
consider such an event to be no small matter. 
For who can change men's principles ? and with- 
out a change of principles what else is there than 
the slavery of men who groan while they pretend 
to obey? Come now and tell me of Alexan- 
der and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. 
They themselves shall judge whether they dis- 
covered what the universal nature required and 



240 M.ANTONINUS. IX. 

(rained themselves accordingly. But if they 
acted like tragedy heroes, no one has condemned 
me to imitate them. Simple and modest is the 
work of philosophy. Draw me not aside to 
insolence and pride. 

30. Look down from above on the countless 
herds of men and their countless solemnities, and 
the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and 
calms, and the differences among those who are 
born, who live together, and die. And consider 
too the life lived by others in olden time, and the 
life of those who will live after thee, and the life 
now lived among barbarous nations, and how 
many know not even thy name, and how many 
will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps 
now are praising thee will very soon blame thee, 
and that neither a posthumous name is of any 
value, nor reputation, nor anything else. 

31. Let there be freedom from perturbations 
with respect to the things which come from the 
external cause ; and let there be justice in the 
things done by virtue of the internal cause, that 
is, let there be movement and action terminating 
in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy 
nature. 

32. Thou canst remove out of the way many 
useless things among those which disturb thee, 



M . A NT N INUS. I X. 241 

for they lie entirely in thy opinion ; and thou 
wilt then gain for thyself ample space by com- 
prehending the whole universe in thy mind and 
by contemplating the eternity of time and observ- 
ing the rapid change of every several thing, how 
short is the time from its birth to its dissolution, 
and the illimitable time before its birth as well as 
the equally boundless time after its dissolution. 

33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, 
and those who have been spectators of its disso- 
lution will very soon perish too. And he who 
dies at the extremest old age will be brought 
into the same condition with him who died pre- 
maturely. 

34. What are these men's leading principles, 
and about what kind of things are they busy, and 
for what kind of reasons do they love and honor 
Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. 
When they think that they do harm by their 
blame or good by their praise, what an idea ! 

35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the 
universal nature delights in change, and in 
obedience to her all things are now done well, and 
from eternity have been done in like form, and 
will be such to time without end. What then dost 
thou say ? That all things have been and all 
things always will be bad, and that no power has 

16 



242 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 

ever been found in so many gods to rectify these 
things, but the world has been condemned to be 
bound in never ceasing evil ? 

36. The rottenness of the matter which is the 
substance of everything ! water, dust, bones, filth : 
or again, marble rocks, the callosities of the earth ; 
and gold and silver, the sediments ; and garments, 
only bits of hair ; and purple dye, blood ; and 
everything else is of the same kind. And that 
which is of the nature of breath is also another 
thing of the same kind, changing from this to 
that. 

37. Enough of this wretched life and murmur- 
ing and apish tricks. Why art thou disturbed ? 
"What is there new in this ? What unsettles thee ? 
Is it the form of the thing ? Look at it. Or is it 
the matter ? Look at it. But besides these there 
is nothing. Towards the gods then now become at 
last more simple and better. It is the same 
whether we look at these things for a hundred 
years or three. 

38. If any man has done wrong, the harm is 
his own. But perhaps he has not done wrong. 

39. Either all things proceed from one intelli- 
gent source and come together as in one body, and 
the part ought not to find fault with what is done 
for the benefit of the whole : or there are only 



M. ANTONINUS. IX. 243 

atoms and nothing else than mixture and disper- 
sion. Why then art thou disturbed ? Say to the 
ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, 
art thou playing the hypocrite, art thou become a 
beast, dost thou herd and feed with the rest ? 3 

40. Either the gods have no power or they 
have power. If then they have no power, why 
dost thou pray to them ? But if they have 
power, why dost thou not pray for them to give 
thee the faculty of not fearing any of the things 
which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the 
things which thou desirest, or not being pained at 
anything, rather than pray that any of these 
things should not happen or happen ? for certainly 
if they can co-operate with men, they can co- 
operate for these purposes. But perhaps thou 
wilt say, the gods have placed them in thy power. 
Well then, is it not better to use what is in thy 
power like a free man, than to desire in a slavish 
and abject way what is not in thy power ? And 
who has told thee that the gods do not aid us even 
in the things which are in our power ? Begin 

3 There is some corruption at the end of this section. 
I believe that the translation expresses the emperor's 
meaning. Whether intelligence rules all things or 
chance rules, a man must not be disturbed. He must 
use the power that he has, and be tranquil. 



244 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 

then to pray for such things and thou wilt see. 
One man prays thus : How shall I be able to lie 
with that woman ? Do thou pray thus : How 
shall I not desire to lie with her ? Another prays 
thus, How shall I be released from this ? Another 
prays : How shall I not desire to be released ? 
Another thus, How shall I not lose my little son ? 
Thou thus, How shall I not be afraid to lose him. 
In fine, turn thy prayers this way, and see what 
comes. 

41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conver- 
sation was not about my bodily sufferings, nor, says 
he, did I talk on such subjects to those who visited 
me ; but I continued to discourse on the nature of 
things as before, keeping to this main point, how 
the mind while participating in such movements 
as go on in the poor flesh shall be free from per- 
turbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did 
I, he says, give the physicians an opportunity of 
putting on solemn looks, as if they were doing 
something great, but my life went on well and 
happily. Do then the same that he did both in 
sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other circum- 
stances ; for never to desert philosophy in any 
events that may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk 
either with an ignorant man or with one unac- 
quainted with nature, is a principle of all schools 



M. ANTONINUS. IX. 245 

of philosophy ; but to be intent only on that which 
thou art now doing and on the instrument by 
which thou doest it. 

42. When thou art offended with any man's 
shameless conduct, immediately ask thyself, Is it 
possible then that shameless men should not be in 
the world ? It is not possible. Do not then require 
what is impossible. For this man also is one of 
those shameless men, who must of necessity be in 
the world. Let the same considerations be present 
to thy mind in the case of the knave, and the 
faithless man, and of every man who does wrong 
in any way. For at the same time that thou dost 
remind thyself that it is impossible that such kind 
of men should not exist, thou wilt become better 
disposed towards every one individually. It is use- 
ful to perceive this too immediately when the occa- 
sion arises, what virtue nature has given to man to 
oppose to every wrongful act. For she has given 
to man as an antidote, against the stupid man 
mildness, and against another kind of man some 
other power. And in all cases it is possible for 
thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone 
astray ; for every man who errs misses his object 
and is gone astray. Besides wherein hast thou 
been injured? For thou wilt find that no one 
among those against whom thou art irritated has 



246 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 

done anything by which thy mind could be made 
worse ; but that which is evil to thee and harmful 
has its foundation only in the mind. And what 
harm is done or what is there strange, if the man 
■who has not been instructed does the acts of an 
uninstructed man ? Consider whether thou shouldst 
not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not 
expect such a man to err in such a way. For thou 
hadst means given thee by thy reason to suppose 
that it was likely that he would commit this error, 
and yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed that he 
has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a 
man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For 
the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thon didst 
trust that a man who had such a disposition would 
keep his promise, or when conferring thy kindness 
thou didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet in such 
way as to have received from thy very act all the 
profit. For what more dost thou want when thou 
hast done a man a service ? art thou not content 
that thou hast done something conformable to thy 
nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just 
as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing, 
or the feet for walking. For as these members 
are formed for a particular purpose, and by 
working according to their several constitutions 
obtain what is their own ; so also as man is formed 



M. ANTONINUS. IX 



247 



by nature to acts of benevolence, when he hag 
done anything benevolent or in any other way 
conducive to the common interest, he has acted 
conformably to his constitution and he gets what 
is his own. 




X. 




|JLT thou then, my . soul, never be 
good and simple and one and naked, 
more manifest than the body which 
surrounds thee ? "Wilt thou never 
enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition? 
"Wilt thou never be full and without a want of any 
kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring any- 
thing either animate or inanimate for the enjoy- 
ment of pleasures ? nor yet desiring time wherein 
thou shalt have longer enjoyment, or place, or 
pleasant climate, or society of men with whom 
thou mayst live in harmony? but wilt thou be 
satisfied with thy present condition, and pleased 
with all that is about thee, and wilt thou convince 
thyself that thou hast everything and that it 
comes from the gods, that everything is well for 
thee and will be well, whatever shall please them, 
and whatever they shall give for the conservation 
of the perfect living being, the good, and just and 
beautiful, which generates and holds together all 



M. ANTONINUS. X. 249 

things, and contains and embraces all things which 
are dissolved for the production of other like 
things ? Wilt thou never he such that thou shalt 
so dwell in community with gods and men as' 
neither to find fault with them at all nor to be 
condemned by them ? 

2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as 
thou art governed by nature only : then do it and 
accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art a living 
being shall not be made worse by it. And next 
thou must observe what thy nature requires so far 
as thou art a living being. And all this thou 
mayst allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou 
art a rational animal, shall not be made worse by 
it. But the rational animal is consequently also 
a political [social] animal. Use these rules then 
and trouble thyself about nothing else. 

3. Everything which happens either happens in 
such wise that thou art formed by nature to bear 
it, or that thou art not formed by nature to bear 
it. If then it happens to thee in such way that 
thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not com- 
plain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to 
bear it. But if it happens in such wise that thou 
art not able to bear it, do not complain, for it will 
perish after it has consumed thee. Remember 
however that thou art formed by nature to bear 



250 M. ANTONINUS. X. 

everything, with respect to which it depends on 
thy own opinion to make it endurable and toler- 
able, by thinking that it is either thy interest or 
thy duty to do this. 

4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly 
and show him his error. But if thou art not able, 
blame thyself, or blame not even thyself. 

5. "Whatever may happen to thee, it was pre- 
pared for thee from all eternity ; and the impli- 
cation of causes was from eternity spinning the 
thread of thy being and of that which is incident 
to it. (in. 11 ; iv. 26.) 

6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] 
atoms, or nature [is a system], let this first be 
established, that I am a part of the whole which 
is governed by nature ; next, I am in a manner 
intimately related to the parts which are of the 
same kind with myself. For remembering this, 
inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented 
with none of the things which are assigned to me 
out of the whole ; for nothing is injurious to the 
part, if it is for the advantage of the whole. For 
the whole contains nothing which is not for its 
advantage ; and all natures indeed have this com- 
mon principle, but the nature of the universe has 
this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled 
even by any external cause to generate anything 



M. ANTONINUS. X. 251 

harmful to itself. By remembering then that 1 
am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with 
everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am 
in a manner intimately related to the parts which 
are of the same kind with myself, I shall do 
nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself 
to the things which are of the same kind with 
myself, and I shall turn all my eiforts to the com- 
mon interest, and divert them from the contrary. 
Now if these things are done so, life must flow on 
happily, just as thou mayst observe that the life of 
a citizen is happy, who continues a course of action 
which is advantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is 
content with whatever the state may assign to him. 
7. The parts of the whole, everything I mean 
which is naturally comprehended in the universe, 
must of necessity perish ; but let this be understood 
in this sense, that they must undergo change. 
But if this is naturally both an evil and a necessity 
for the parts, the whole would not continue to 
exist in a good condition, the parts being subject 
to change and constituted so as to perish in various 
ways. For whether did nature herself design to 
do evil to the things which are parts of herself, 
and to make them subject to evil and of necessity 
fall into evil, or have such results happened with- 



252 M. ANTONINUS. X. 

out her knowing it ? Both these suppositions in- 
deed are incredible. But if a man should even 
drop the terra Nature [as an efficient power] and 
should speak of these things [change] as natural, 
even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the 
same time that the parts of the whole are in their 
nature subject to change, and at the same time to 
be surprised or vexed as if something were hap- 
pening contrary to nature, particularly as the dis- 
soluiion of things is into those things of which each 
thing is composed. For there is either a disper- 
sion of the elements out of which everything has 
been compounded, or a change from the solid to 
the earthy and from the airy to the aerial, so that 
these parts are taken back into the universal rea- 
son, whether this at certain periods is consumed by 
fire or renewed by eternal changes. And do not 
imagine that the solid and the airy part belong to 
thee from the time of generation. For all this 
received its accretion only yesterday and the day 
before, as one may say, from the food and the air 
which is inspired. This then, which has received 
[the accretion], changes, not that which thy moth- 
er brought forth. But suppose that this [which 
thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very 
much with that other part, which has the peculiar 



M. ANTONINUS. X. 255 

quality [of change], this is nothing in fact in the 
way of objection to what is said. 1 

8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, 
modest, true, rational, a man of equanimity, and 
magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change 
these names ; and if thou shouldst lose them, 
quickly return to them. And remember that the 
term Rational was intended to signify a discrimi- 
nating attention to every several thing and freedom 
from negligence ; and that Equanimity is the 
voluntary acceptance of the things which are as- 
signed to thee by the common nature ; and that 
Magnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part 
above the pleasurable or painful sensations of the 
flesh and above that poor thing called fame, and 
death, and all such things. If then thou main- 
tainest thyself in the possession of these names, 
without desiring to be called by these names by 
others, thou wilt be another person and wilt enter 
on another life. For to continue to be such as thou 
hast hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and 
defiled in such a life, is the character of a very 
stupid man and one overfond of his life, and like 
those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who 

1 The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The 
meaning is very obscure. I have given that meaning 
which appears to be consistent with the whole argument. 



254 M. A NTONINUS. X. 

though covered with wounds and gore, still intreat 
to be kept to the following day, though they will 
be exposed in the same state to the same claws 
and bites. Therefore fix thyself in the possession 
of these few names : and if thou art able to abide 
in them, abide as if thou wast removed to certain 
islands of the Happy. 2 But if thou shalt perceive 
that thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain 
thy hold, go courageously into some nook where 

2 The islands of the Happy or the Fortunatae Insulae 
are spoken of by the Greek and Roman writers. They 
were the abode of Heroes, like Achilles and Diomedes, 
as we see in the Scolion of Harmodius and Aristogiton. 
Sertorius heard of the islands at Cadiz from some sailors 
who had been there, and he had a wish to go and live in 
them and rest from his troubles. (Plutarch, Sertorius, 
c. 8.) In the Odyssey, Proteus told Menelaus that he 
should not die in Argos, but be removed to a place at 
the boundary of the earth where Ehadamanthus dwelt: 
(Odyssey, iv. 565.) 

For there in sooth man's life is easiest . 
Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there, 
But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr 
Oceanus sends up to gladden man. 

It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only 
follows some old legend without having any knowledge 
of any place which corresponds to his description. The 
two islands which Sertorius heard of may be Madeira 
and the adjacent island. 



M. ANTONINUS. X. 255 

thou shalt maintain them, or even depart at once 
from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and 
freedom and modesty, after doing this one [laud- 
able] thing at least in thy life, to have gone out 
of it thus. In order however to the remembrance 
of these names, it will greatly help thee, if thou 
rememberest the gods and that they wish not to 
be flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be 
made like themselves ; and if thou rememberest 
that what does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, 
and that what does the work of a dog is a dog, 
and that what does the work of a bee is a bee, 
and that what does the work of a man is a man. 

9. Mimi, 3 war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, 
will daily wipe out those holy principles of thine. 
f How many things without studying nature dost 
thou imagine and how many dost thou neglect ? * 
But it is thy duty so to look on and so to do 
everything, that at the same time the power of 
dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the 
contemplative faculty is exercised, and the con- 
fidence which comes from the knowledge of each 
several thing is maintained without showing it, 

3 Corae conjectured fdaog " hatred " in place of Mimi, 
Roman plays in which action and gesticulation were all 
or nearly all. 

4 This is corrupt. 



256 M. ANTONINUS. X. 

but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy 
simplicity, when gravity, and when the knowledge 
of every several thing, both what it is in substance, 
and what place it has in the universe, and how 
Ion or it is formed to exist and of what things it is 
compounded, and to whom it can belong, and- 
who are able both to give it and take it away ? 

10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, 
and another when he has caught a poor hare, and 
another when he has taken a little fish in a net, 
and another when he has taken wild boars, and 
another when he has taken bears, and another 
when he lias taken Sarmatians. Are not these 
robbers, if thou examinest their principles ? 5 

11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing 
how all things change into one another, and COn- 
stantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about 
this part [of philosophy]. For nothing is so much 
adapted to produce magnanimity. Such a man 
has put off the body, and as he sees that he must, 
no one knows how soon, go away from among men 
and leave everything here, he gives himself up 
entirely to just doing in all his actions, and in 
everything else that happens he resigns himself 

5 Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. 
He himself warred against Sarmatians, and was a rob- 
ber, as he says, like the rest. 



M. ANTONINUS. X. 25? 

to the universal nature. But as to what any man 
shall say or think about him or do against him, 
he never even thinks of it, being himself con- 
tented with these two things, with acting justly in 
what he now does, and being satisfied with what 
is now assigned to him ; and he lays aside all dis- 
tracting and busy pursuits and desires nothing 
else than to accomplish the straight course through 
the law, 6 and by accomplishing the straight course 
to follow god. 

12. What need is there of suspicious fear, 
since it is in thy power to inquire what ought to 
be done ? And if thou seest clear, go by this way 
content, without turning back : but if thou dost 
not see clear, stop and take the best advisers. 
But if any other things oppose thee, go on accord- 
ing to thy powers with due consideration, keeping 
to that which appears to be just. For it is best 
co reach this object, and if thou dost fail, let thy 
failure be in attempting this. He who follows 
reason in all things is both tranquil and active at 
the same time, and also cheerful and collected. 

18. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest 
from sleep, whether it will make any difference to 



6 By the law, he means the divine law, obedience to 
the will of God. 

17 



258 M. ANTONINUS. X. 

thee, if another does what is just and right. It 
will make no difference. 

Hast thou forgotten that those who assume 
arrogant airs in bestowing their praise or blame 
on others, are such as they are at bed and at board, 
and hast thou forgotten what they do, and what 
they avoid and what they pursue, and how they 
steal and how they rob, not with hands and feet, 
but with their most valuable part, by means of 
which there is produced, when a man chooses, 
fidelity, modesty, truth, law, a good daemon 
[happiness] ? (vn. 17.) 

14. To her who gives and takes back all, to 
nature, the man who is instructed and modest says : 
Give what thou wilt ; take back what thou wilt. 
And he says this not proudly, but obediently and 
well pleased with her. 

15. Short is the little which remains to thee of 
life. Live as on a mountain. For it makes no 
difference whether a man lives there or here, if he 
lives everywhere in the world as in a state [polit- 
ical community]. Let men see, let them know a 
real man who lives according to nature. If they 
cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that 
is better than to live thus [as men do]. 

16. No longer talk about the kind of man that 
a good man ought to be, but be such. 



M. ANTONINUS. X. 259 

17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time 
and the whole of substance, and consider that all 
individual things as to substance are a grain of a 
fig, and as to time, the turning of a gimlet. 

18. Look at everything that exists and observe 
that it is already in dissolution and in change and 
as it were putrefaction or dispersion, or that every- 
thing is so constituted by nature as to die. 

19. Consider what men are when they are eat- 
ing, sleeping, generating, easing themselves and 
so forth. Then what kind of men they are when 
they are imperious f and arrogant, or angry and 
scolding from their elevated place. But a short 
time ago to how many they were slaves and for 
what things ; and after a little time consider in 
what a condition they will be. 

20. That is for the good of each thing, which 
the universal nature brings to each. And it is 
for its good at the time when nature brings it. 

21. "The earth loves the shower;." and "the 
solemn aether loves : " and the universe loves to 
make whatever is about to be. I say then to the 
universe, that I love as thou lovest. And is not 
this too said, that " this or that loves [is wont] to 
be produced ? " 7 

7 These words are from Euripides. They are cited 
by Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom. vm. 1. Athenaeus (xm. 



260 M. ANTONINUS. X. 

22. Either thou livest here and hast already 
accustomed thyself to it, or thou art going away, 
and this was thy own will ; or thou art dying and 
hast discharged thy duty. But besides these 
things there is nothing. Be of good cheer then. 

23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this 
piece of land is like any other; and that all things 
here are the same with things on the top of a 
mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou 
choosest to be. For thou wilt find just what 
Plato says, Making the walls of the city like a 
shepherd's fold on a mountain. [The three last 
words are omitted. They are unintelligible.] 8 

24. What is my ruling faculty now to me ? and 
of what nature am I now making it ? and for what 
purpose am I now using it ? is it void of under- 

296.) and Stobaeus quote seven complete lines beginning 
ipg, fiev ofippov yala. There is a similar fragment of 
Aeschylus. 

It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the mean- 
ings of words. So Antoninus here takes the verb filet, 
" loves/' which has also the sense of " is wont," " uses," 
and the like. He finds in the common language of man- 
kind a philosophical truth, and most great truths are 
expressed in the common language of life ; some un- 
derstand them, but most people express them without 
knowing how much they mean. 

8 Plato, Theaet. 174 D. E. 



M. ANTONINUS. X. 2fil 

standing ? is it loosed and rent asunder from social 
life ? is it melted into and mixed with the poor 
flesh so as to move together with it ? 

25. He who flies from his master is a runaway ; 
but the law is master, and he who breaks the law 
is a runaway. And he also who is grieved or 
angry or afraid,f is dissatisfied because something 
has been or is or shall be of the things which are 
appointed by him who rules all tilings, and he is 
Law, and assigns to every man what is fit. He 
then who fears or is grieved or is angry is a 
runaway. 9 

26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes 
away, and then another cause takes it, and labors 
on it and makes a child. What a thing from such 
a material ! Again, the child passes food down 
through the throat, and then another cause takes 
it and makes perception and motion, and in fine 
life and strength and other things ; how many and 
how strange ! Observe then the things which are 
produced in such a hidden way, and see the power 
just as we see the power which carries things 
downwards and upwards, not with the eyes, but 
still no less plainly. 

9 Antoninus is here playing on the etymology of vopo},, 
law, assignment, that which assigns (vifzei) to every man 
his portion. 



262 M. ANTONINUS. X. 

27. Constantly consider how all things such as 
they now are, in time past also were ; and consider 
that they will be the same again. And place 
before thy eyes entire dramas and stages of the 
same form, whatever thou hast learned from thy 
experience or from older history ; for example the 
whole court of Hadrianus, and the whole court of 
Antoninus, and the whole court of Philippus, 
Alexander, Croe.-us ; for all those were such 
dramas as we see now, only with different actors. 

28. Imagine every man who is grieved at any- 
thing or discontented to be like a pig which is 
sacrificed, and kicks and screams. 

Like this pig also is he who on his bed in ' 
silence laments the bonds in which we are held. 
And consider that only to the rational animal is it 
given to follow voluntarily what happens ; but 
simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all. 

29. Severally on the occasion of everything that ?. 
thou doe?t pause and ask thyself, if death is a 
dreadful thing because it deprives thee of this. 

30. When thou art offended at any man's fault, 
forthwith turn to thyself and reflect in what like 
maimer thou dost err thyself; for example, in 
thinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, 
or reputation and the like. For by attending to 
•*itiis thou wilt quickly forget thy anger, if this 



M . A N TONIJSTUS. X . 263 

consideration also is added, that the man is com- 
pelled : for what else could he do ? or, if thou art 
able, take away from him the compulsion. 

3 1 . When thou hast seen Satyron the Socratic,f 
think of either Eutyches or Hymen, and when 
thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion or 
Silvanus, and when thou hast seen Alciphron 
think of Tropaeophorus, and when thou hast seen 
Xenophon think of Crito or Severus, and when 
thou hast looked on thyself, think of any other 
Caesar, and in the case of every one do in like 
manner. Then let this thought be in thy mind, 
Where then are those men ? Nowhere, or nobody 
knows where. For thus continuously thou wilt 
look at human tilings as smoke and nothing at all ; 
especially if thou reflectest at the same time that 
what has once changed will never exist again in 
the infinite duration of time. But thou, in what 
a brief space of time is thy existence ? And why 
art thou not content to pass "through this short 
time in an orderly way ? What matter and oppor- 
tunity [for thy activity] art thou avoiding ? For 
what else are all these things, except exercises for 
the reason, when it has viewed carefully and by 
examination into their nature the things which 
happen in life ? Persevere then until thou shalt 
have made these things thy own, as the stomach 



264 M. ANTONINUS. X. 

which is strengthened makes all things its, own, as 
the blazing fire" makes flame and brightness out 
of everything that is thrown into it. 

32. Let it not be in any man's power to say 
truly of thee that thou art not simple or that thou 
art not good ; but let him be a liar whoever shall 
think anything of this kind about thee ; and this 
is altogether in thy power. For who is he that 
shall hinder thee from being good and simple ? 
Do thou only determine to live no longer, unless 
thou shalt be such. For neither does reason 
allow [thee to live], if thou art not such. 

33. What is that which as to this material [our 
life] can be done or said in the way most con- 
formable to reason ? For whatever this may be, 
it is in thy power to do it or to say it ; and do not 
make excuses that thou art hindered. Thou wilt 
not cease to lament till thy mind is in such a con- 
dition, that, what luxury is to those who enjoy 
pleasure, such shall be to thee, in the matter which 
is subjected and presented to thee, the doing of the 
things which are conformable to man's constitu- 
tion ; for a man ought to consider as an enjoyment 
everything which it is in his power to do accord- 
ing to his own nature. And it is in his power 
everywhere. Now it is not given to a cylinder to 
move everywhere by its own motion, nor yet to 



M. A N TONINUS. X . 265 

water nor fire, nor to anything else which is gov- 
erned by nature or an irrational soul, for the 
things which check them and stand in the way 
are many. But intelligence and reason are able 
to go through everything that opposes them, and 
in such manner as they are formed by nature 
and as they choose. Place before thy eyes this 
facility with which the reason will be carried 
through all things, as fire upwards, as a stone 
downwards, as a cylinder down an inclined sur- 
face, and seek for nothing further. For all other\ 
obstacles either affect the body only which is a 
dead thing; or, except through opinion and the 
yielding of the reason itself, they do not crush 
nor do any harm of any kind ; for if they did, he 
who felt it would immediately become bad. Now 
in the case of all things which have a certain 
constitution, whatever harm may happen to any 
of them, that which is so affected becomes con- 
sequently worse ; but in the like case, a man be- 
comes both better, if one may say so, and more 
worthy of praise by making a right use of these 
accidents. And finally remember that nothing 
harms him who is really a citizen, which does not 
harm the state ; nor yet does anything harm the 
state, which does not harm law [order] ; and of 
these things which are called misfortunes not one 



266 M . A NT N 1 N (J S . X . 

harms law. What then does not harm law does 
not harm either state or citizen. 

34. To him who is penetrated by true princi- 
ples even the briefest precept is sufficient, and any 
common precept, to remind him that he should be 
free from grief and fear. For example — 

Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground — 
So is the race of men. 10 

Leaves also are thy children ; and leaves too are 
they who cry out as if they were worthy of 
credit and bestow their praise, or on the con- 
trary curse, or secretly blame and sneer ; and 
leaves in like manner are those who shall receive 
and transmit a man's fame to after times. For all 
such things as these " are produced in the season 
of spring," as the poet says ; then the wind 
casts them down ; then the forest produces other 
leaves in their places. But a brief existence is 
common to all things, and yet thou avoidest and 
pursuest all things as if they would be eternal. 
A little time, and thou shalt close thy eyes ; and 
him who has attended thee to thy grave another 
soon will lament. 

35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible 
things and not to say, I Avish for green things ; 

10 Homer, II. vi. 146. 



M. ANTONINUS. X. 267 

for this is the condition of a diseased eye. And 
the healthy hearing and smelling ought to be 
ready to perceive all that can be heard and 
smelled. And' the healthy stomach ought to be 
with respect to all food just as the mill with re- 
spect to all things which it is formed to grind. 
And accordingly the healthy understanding ought 
to be prepared for everything which happens ; but 
that which says, Let my dear children live, and 
let all men praise whatever I may do, is an eye 
which seeks for green things, or teeth which seek 
for soft things. 

36. There is no man so fortunate that there 
shall not be by him when he is dying some who 
are pleased with what is going to happen. 11 Sup- 
pose that he was a good and wise man, will there 
not be at last some one to say of him, Let us at . 
last breathe freely being relieved from this school- 
master. It is true that he was harsh to none of 
us, but I perceived that he tacitly condemns us. — 
This is what is said of a good man. But in our 
own case how many other things are there for 
which there are many who wish to get rid of us. 
Thou wilt consider this then when thou art dying, 

11 He says mnov, but as he affirms in other places that 
death is no evil, he must mean what others may call an 
evil, and he means only " what is going to happen." 



268 M. ANTONINUS. X. 

and thou wilt depart more contentedly by reflect- 
ing thus : I am going away from such a life, in 
which even my associates in behalf of whom I 
have striven so much, prayed, and cared, them- 
selves wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get 
some little advantage by it. Why then should a 
man cling to a longer stay here ? Do not how- 
ever for this reason go away less kindly disposed 
to them, but preserving thy own character, and 
continuing friendly and benevolent and kind, and 
on the other hand not as if thou wast torn away ; 
but as when a man dies a quiet death, the soul is 
easily separated from the body, such also ought 
thy departure from men to be, for nature united 
thee to them and associated thee. But does she 
now dissolve the union ? Well, I am separated as 
from kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but 
without compulsion ; for this too is one of the 
things according to nature. 

37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on 
the occasion of anything being done by any per- 
son to inquire with thyself, For what object is 
this man doing this ? but begin with thyself, and 
examine thyself first. 

38. Remember that this which pulls the strings 
is the thing which is hidden within : this is the 
power of persuasion, this is life, this, if one may 



M. ANTONINUS. X. 269 

so say, is man. In contemplating thyself never 
include the vessel which surrounds thee and 
these instruments which are attached about it. 
For they are like to an axe, differing only in this 
that they grow to the body. For indeed there is 
no more use in these parts without the cause 
which moves and checks them, than in the 
weaver's shuttle, and the writer's pen and the 
driver's whip. 1 ' 2 

12 See " The Philosophy of Antoninus.'' 





XL 

HESE are the properties of the ra- 
tional soul : it sees itself, analyses 
fefyi itself, and makes itself such as it 
chooses ; the fruit which it bears it- 
self enjoys — for the fruits of plants and that in 
animals which corresponds to fruits others enjoy — 
it obtains its own end, wherever the limit of life 
may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a play 
and in such like things, where the whole action is 
incomplete, if anything cuts it short ; but .in every 
part and wherever it may be stopped, it "makes 
what has been set before it full and complete, so 
that it can say, I have what is my own. And 
further it traverses the whole universe, and the 
surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and it 
extends itself into the infinity of time and em- 
braces and comprehends the periodical renova- 
tion of all things, and it comprehends that those 
who come after us will see nothing new, nor have 
those before us seen anything more, but in a 



M. ANTONINUS. XI. 271 

manner he who is forty years old, if he has any 
understanding at all, has seen by virtue of the 
uniformity that prevails all things which have 
been and all that will be. This too is a property 
of the rational soul, love of one's neighbor, and 
truth and modesty, and to value nothing more 
than itself, which is also the property of Law. 1 
Thus then right reason differs not at all from the 
reason of justice. 

2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song 
and dancing and the pancratium, if thou wilt dis- 
tribute the melody of the voice into its several 
sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art 
mastered by this ; for thou wilt be prevented by 
shame from confessing it : and in the matter of 
dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou 
wilt do the same ; and the like also in the matter 
of the pancratium. In all things then, except 
virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply 
thyself to their several parts, and by this division 
to come to value them little : and apply this rule 
also to thy whole life. 

3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any 
moment it must be separated from the body, and 
ready either to be extinguished or dispersed or 
continue to exist ; but so that this readiness 

1 Law is the order by which all things are governed. 



272 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 

comes from a man's own judgment, not from mere 
obstinacy, as with the Christians, but considerately 
and with dignity and in a way to persuade an- 
other, without tragic show. 

4. Have I done something for the general in- 
terest ? Well theii I have had my reward. Let 
this always be present to thy mind, and never 
stop [doing good]. 

5. What is thy art? to be good. And how is 
this accomplished well except by general princi- 
ples, some about the nature of the universe, and 
others about the proper constitution of man ? 

6. At first tragedies were brought on the stage 
as means of reminding men of the things which 
happen to them, and that it is according to nature 
for things to happen so, and that, if thou art de- 
lighted with what is shown on the stage, thou 
shouldst not be troubled with that which takes 
place on the larger stage. For thou seest that 
these things must be accomplished thus, and that 
even they bear them who cry out 2 " Cithae- 
ron." And indeed some things are said well by 
the dramatic writers, of which kind is the follow- 
ing especially : — 

Me and my children if the gods neglect, 
This has its reason too. 3 

2 Sophocles, Oedipus Rex. 
8 See vti. 41. 38. 40 



M. ANTONINUS. XI. 273 

And again 

We must not chafe and fret at that which happens. 
And 

Life's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear. 

And other things of the same kind. 

After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, 
•which had a magisterial freedom of speech, and 
by its very plainness of speaking was useful in 
reminding men to beware of insolence ; and for 
this purpose too Diogenes used to take from these 
writers. 

But as to the middle comedy which came next, 
observe what it was, and again, for what object 
the new comedy was introduced, which gradually 
sunk down into a mere mimic artifice. That some 
good things are said by these writers too, every- 
body knows : but the whole plan of such poetry 
and dramatm'gy, to what end does it look ! 

7. How plain does it appear that there is not 
another condition of life so well suited for philos- 
ophizing as this in which thou now happenest 
to be. 

8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch 
must of necessity be cut off from the whole tree 
also. So too a man when he is separated from 
another man has fallen off from the whole social 

18 



274 M. ANTONINUS. XI. 

community. Now as to a branch, another cuts it 
off, but a man by his own act separates himself 
from his neighbor when he hates him and turns 
away from him, and he does not know that he 
has at the same time cut himself off from the 
whole social system. Yet he has this privilege 
ceriainly from Zeus who framed society, for it is 
in our power to grow again to that which is near 
to us and again to become a part which helps to 
make up the whole. However if it often happens, 
this kind of separation, it makes it difficult for 
that which detaches itself to be brought to unity 
and to be restored to its former condition. Fi- 
nally, the branch, which from the first grew to- 
gether with the tree and has continued to have 
one life with it, is not like that which after being 
cut off is then ingrafted, but it is something like 
what the gardeners mean when they say that it 
grows with the rest of the tree, but | that it has 
not the same mind with it. 

9. As those who try to stand in thy way when 
thou art proceeding according to right reason, 
will not be able to turn thee aside from thy proper 
action, so neither let them drive thee from thy 
benevolent feelings towards them, but be on thy 
guard equally in. both matters, not only in the 
matter of steady judgment and action, but also in 



M. ANTONINUS. XI. 275 

the matter of gentleness towards those who try to 
hinder or otherwise trouble thee. For this also is 
a weakness, to be vexed at thera, as well as to 
be diverted from thy course of action and to give 
way through fear ; for both are equally deserters 
from their post, the man who does it through 
fear, and the man who is alienated from him w r ho 
is by nature a kinsman and a friend. 

10. There is no nature which is inferior to an. 
for the arts imitate the natures of things. But it 
this is so. that nature which is the most perfect 
and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot 
fall short of the skill of art. Now all arts do the 
inferior things for the sake of the superior ; there- 
fore the universal nature does so too. And indeed 
hence is the origin of justice, and in justice the 
other virtues have their foundation : for justice 
will not be observed, if we either care for middle 
things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived 
and careless and changeable, (v. 16. 80 ; vn. 
55.) 

11. If the things do not come to thee, the pur- 
suits and avoidances of which disturb thee, still 
in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy 
judgment about them be at rest, and they will 
remain quiet, and thou wilt not be seen either 
pursuing or avoiding. 



276 M. ANTONINUS. XI. 

12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its 
figure, when it is neither extended towards any 
object, nor contracted inwards, nor dispersed nor 
sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which 
it sees the truth, the truth of all things and the 
truth that is in itself, (vur. 41. 45 ; xn. 3.) 

13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let 
him look to that himself. But I will look to this, 
that I be not discovered doing or saying anything 
deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me ? 
Let him look to it. But I will be mild and be- 
nevolent towards every man and even to him, 
ready to show him his mistake, not reproachfully, 
nor yet as making a display of my endurance, but 
nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless 
indeed he only assumed it. For the interior 
[parts] ought to be such, and a man ought to be 
seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with anything 
nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if 
thou art now doing what is agreeable to thy own 
nature and art satisfied with that which at this 
moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, 
since thou art a human being placed at thy post 
fto endure whatever is for the common advantage ? 

14. Men despise one another and flatter one 
another ; and men wish to raise themselves above 
one another and crouch before one another. 



M . AN T ON IN US. XI. 277 

15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, 
I have determined to deal with thee in a fair way. 
— What art thou doing, man ? There is no oc- 
casion to give this notice. It will soon show 
itself by acts. The voice ought to be plainly 
written on the forehead. Such as a man's charac- 
ter is,f he immediately shows it in his eyes, just 
as he who is beloved forthwith reads everything 
in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest 
and good ought to be exactly like a man who 
smells strong, so that the bystander as soon 
as he comes near him must smell whether he 
choose or not. But the affectation of simplicity is 
like a crooked stick. 4 Nothing is more disgraceful 
than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid 
this most of all. The good and simple and 
benevolent show all these things in the eyes, and 
there is no mistaking. 

16. As to living in the best way, this power is 
in the soul, if it be indifferent to things which are 
indifferent. And it will be indifferent, if it looks 
on each of these things separately and all together, 

4 Instead of oKaKyri Sauraaise reads mcafijlri. There is 
a Greek proverb, OKayfidv £,vkov ov6ettot' bp&bv : " You 
cannot make a crooked stick straight." 

The wolfish friendship is an allusion to the fable of 
the sheep and the wolves. 



278 M. ANTONINUS. XI. 

and if it remembers that not one of them pro- 
duces in us an opinion about itself, nor comes to 
us ; but these things remain immovable, and it is 
we ourselves who produce the judgments about 
them, and, as we may say, write them in ourselves, 
it being in our power not to write them, and it 
being in our power, if perchance these judgments 
have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, 
to wipe them out ; and if we remember also that 
such attention will only be for a short time, and 
then life will be at an end. Besides what trouble 
is there at all in doing this ? For if these things 
are according to nature, rejoice in them, and they 
will be easy to thee: but if contrary to nature, 
seek what is conformable to thy own nature, and 
strive towards this, even if it bring no reputation ; 
for every man is allowed to seek his own good. 

17. Consider whence each thing is come, and 
of what it consists,! and into what it changes, and 
what kind of a thing it will be when it has 
changed, and that it will sustain no harm. 

18. [If any have offended against thee, consider 
first] : What is my relation to men, and that we 
are made for one another ; and in another respect, 
I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the 
flock or a bull over the herd. But examine the 
matter from first principles, from this : If all 



M. ANTONINUS. XI. 279 

things are not mere atoms, it is nature which 
orders all things : if this is so, the inferior things 
exist for the sake of the superior and these for 
the sake of one another, (n. 1 ; ix. 39 ; v. 1 6 ; 
hi. 4.) 

Second, consider what kind of men they are 
at table, in bed, and so forth : and particularly, 
under what compulsions in respect of opinions 
they are ; and as to their acts, consider with what 
pride they do what they do. (viii. 14; ix. 84.) 

Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we 
ought not to be displeased ; but if they do not 
right, it is plain that they do so involuntarily and 
in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly 
deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly 
deprived of the power of behaving to each man 
according to his deserts. Accordingly men are 
pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, 
and greedy, and in a word wrongdoers to their 
neighbors, (vil. 62, 63 ; II. 1 ; VII. 26 ; VIII. 29.) 

Fourth, consider that thou also doest many 
things wrong, and that thou art a man like oth- 
ers ; and even if thou dost abstain from certain 
faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit 
them, though either through cowardice, or con- 
ceni about reputation or some such mean motive, 
thou dost abstain from such faults, (i. 17.) 



280 M. ANTONINUS. XI. 

Fifth, consider that thou dost not even under- 
stand whether men are doing wrong or not, for 
many things are done with a certain reference to 
circumstances. And in short, a man must learn 
a great deal to enable him to pass a correct judg- 
ment on another man's acts. (rx. 38 ; iv. 51.) 

Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or 
grieved, that man's life is only a moment, and 
after a short time we are all laid out dead, 
(vn. 58 ; iv. 48.) 

Seventh, that it is not men's acts which dis- 
turb us, for th*ose acts have their foundation in 
men's ruling principles, but it is our own opin- 
ions which disturb us. Take away these opin- 
ions then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgment 
about an act as if it were something grievous, and 
thy anger is gone. How then shalt thou take 
away these opinions ? By reflecting that no 
wrongful act of another brings shame on thee : 
for unless that which is shameful is alone bad, 
thou also must of necessity do many things 
wrong and become a robber and . everything 
else. (v. 25 ; vn. 16.) 

Eighth, consider how much more pain is 
brought on us by the anger and vexation caused 
by such acts than by the acts themselves, at 
which we are angry and vexed, (iv. 39. 49 ; 
vn. 24.) 



M. ANTONINUS. XI. 281 

Ninth, consider that benevolence is invinci- 
ble, if it be genuine, and not an affected smile 
and acting ""a~ , paTtr' J *For what will the most vio- 
lent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of 
a benevolent disposition towards him, and if, as 
opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him 
and calmly correctest his en-ors at the very time 
when he is trying to do thee harm, saying, Not 
so, my child : we are constituted by nature for 
something else : I shall certainly not be injured, 
but thou art injuring thyself, my child. — And 
show him with gentle tact and by^ general prin- 
ciples that this is so, and that even bees do not 
do as he does, nor any animals which are formed 
by nature to be gregarious. And thou must do 
this neither with any double meaning nor in the 
way of reproach, but affectionately and without 
any rancour in thy soul ; and not as if thou wert 
lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may 
admire, but either when he is alone, and if others 
are present . . . 5 

Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst 
received them as a gift from the Muses, and 
begin at last to be a man, so long as thou livest. 
But thou must equally avoid nattering men and 
being vexed at them, for both are unsocial and 

5 It appears that there is a defect in the text here. 



# 



282 M. A NT XI XL'S. XI. 

lead to harm. And let this truth be present to 
thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved 
by passion is not manly, but that mildness and 
gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human 
nature, so also are they more manly ; and he 
who possesses these qualities possesses strength, 
nerves, and courage, and not the man who is 
subject to fits of passion and discontent. For 
in the same degree in which a man's mind is 
nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same 
degree also is it nearer to strength : and as the 
sense of pain 'is a characteristic of weakness, so 
also is anger. For he who yields to pain and he 
who yields to anger, both are wounded and both 
submit. But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth 
present from the leader of the Muses [Apollo], 
and it is this — that to expect bad men not to 
do wrong is madness, for he who expects this 
desires an impossibility. But to allow men to 
behave so to others, and to expect them not to 
do thee any wrong, is irrational and tyrannical. 
19. There are four principal aberrations of 
the superior faculty against which thou shouldst 
be constantly on thy guard, and when thou hast 
detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and 
say on each occasion thus : this thought is not 
necessary : this tends to destroy social union : 



M. ANTONINUS. XI, 283 

this which thou art going to say comes not from 
the real thoughts ; for thou shouldst consider it 
among the most absurd of things for a man not 
to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth 
is when thou shalt reproachf thyself for any- 
thing, for this is an evidence of the diviner part 
within thee being overpowered and yielding to 
the less honorable and to the perishable part, 
the body, and to its gross pleasures, (iv. 24 ; 
n. 16.) 

20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts 
which are mingled in thee, though by nature they 
have an upward tendency, still in obedience to 
the disposition of the universe they are over- 
powered here in the compound mass [the body]. 
And also the whole of the earthy part in thee 
and the watery, though their tendency is down- 
ward, still are raised up and occupy a position 
which is not their natural one. In this manner 
then the elemental parts obey the universal, for 
when they have been fixed in any place perforce 
they remain there until again the universal shall 
sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then 
strange that thy intelligent part only should be 
disobedient and discontented with its own place ? 
And yet no force is imposed on it, but only those 
things which are conformable to its nature : still 



284 M. ANTONINUS. XL 

it does not submit, but is carried in tbe opposite 
direction. For the movement towards injustice 
and intemperance and to anger and grief and 
fear is nothing else than the act of one who 
deviates from nature. And also when the ruling 
faculty is discontented with anything that hap- 
pens, then too it deserts its post : for it is con- 
stituted for piety and reverence towards the gods 
no less than for justice. For these qualities also 
are comprehended under the generic term of 
contentment with the constitution of things, and 
indeed they are prior 6 to acts of justice. 

6 The word npsa^vrspa, which is here translated 
" prior," may also mean " superior : " but Antoninus 
seems to say that piety and reverence of the gods pre- 
cede all virtues, and that other virtues are derived from 
them, even justice, which in another**passage (xi. 10) 
he makes the foundation of all virtues. The ancient 
notion of justice is that of giving to every one his due. 
It is not a legal definition, as some have supposed, but a 
moral rule which law cannot in all cases enforce. Be- 
sides law has its own rules, which are sometimes moral 
and sometimes immoral ; but it enforces them all simply 
because they are general rules, and if it did not or could 
not enforce them, so far Law would not be Law. Jus- 
tice, or the doing what is just, implies a universal rule 
and obedience to it ; and as we all live under universal 
Law, which commands both our body and our intelli- 
gence, and is the law of our nature, that is the law of 



M. ANTONINUS. XI. 285 

21. He who has not one and always the same 
object in life, cannot be one and the same all 
through his life. But what I have said is not 
enough, unless this also is added, what this object 
ought to be. For as there is not the same opin- 
ion about all the things which in some way or 
other are considered by the majority to be good, 
but only about some certain things, that is, things 
which concern the common interest ; so also 
ought we to propose to ourselves an object which 
shall be of a common kind [social] and political. 
For he who directs all his own efforts to this 
object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will 
always be the same. 

22. Think of the country mouse and of the 
town mouse, and of the alarm and trepidation of 
the town movtSe.' 7 

23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the 
many by the name of Lainiae, bugbears U 
frighten children. 

the whole constitution of man, we must endeavour tc 
discover what this supreme Law is. It is the will of 
the power that rules all. By acting in obedience to this 
will, we do justice, and by consequence everything else 
that we ought to do. 

7 The story is told by Horace in his Satires (n. 6), 
and by others since, but not better. 



286 M . ANT NIN U S . XI. 

24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spec- 
tacles used to set seats in the shade for strangers, 
but themselves sat down anywhere. 

25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas 8 for 
not going to him, saying, It is because I would not 
perish by the worst of all ends, that is, I would 
not receive a favor and then be unable to return it. 

26. In the writings of the [Ephesians] 9 there 
was this precept, constantly to think of some one 
of the men of former times who practised virtue. 

27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning 
look to the heavens that we may be reminded of 
those bodies which continually do the same things 
and in the same manner perform their work, and 
also be reminded of their purity and nudity. For 
there is no veil over a star. 

28. Consider what a man Sod%ttes was when 
he dressed himself in a skin, after Xanthippe had 
taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates 
said to his friends who were ashamed of him and 
drew back from him when they saw him dressed 
thus. 

29. Neither in writing: nor in reading wilt thou 

8 Perhaps the emperor made a mistake here, for other 
writers say that it was Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, 
who invited Socrates to Macedonia. 

9 Gataker suggested 'EiriKovpeiuv for 'Efpeciuv. 



M. ANTONINUS. XI. 287 

be able to lay down rules for others before thou 
shalt have first learned to obey rules thyself. 
Much more is this so in life. 

30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for 
thee. 

31. And my heart laughed within. (Od. 

tx. 413.) 

32. And virtue they will curse speaking harsh 

words. (Hesiod, Works and Days, 184.) 

33. To look for the fig in winter is a madman's 
act : such is he who looks for his child when it is 
no longer allowed. (Epictetus, in. 24.) 

34. When a man kisses his child, said Epicte- 
tus, he should whisper to himself, " To-morrow 
perchance thou wilt die " — But those are words 
of bad omen — " No word is a word of bad 
omen," said Epictetus, " which expresses any 
work of nature ; or if it is so, it is also a word 
of bad omen to speak of the ears of corn being 
reaped." (Epictetus, in. 24.) 

35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the 
dried grape, all are changes, not into nothing, but 
into something which exists not yet. (Epictetus, 
in. 24.) 

36. No man can rob us of our free will. 
(Epictetus, in. 22.) 

37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover 



288 M.ANTONINUS. XI. 

an art [or rules] with respect to giving his as- 
sent ; and in respect to his movements he must 
be careful that they be made with regard to cir- 
cumstances, that they be consistent with social 
interests, that they have regard to the value of 
the object ; and as to sensual desire, he should 
altogether keep away from it ; and as to avoid- 
ance, [aversion] he should not show it with re- 
spect to any of the things which are not in our 
power. 

38. The dispute then, he said, is not about 
any common matter, but about being mad or not. 

89. Socrates used to say, What do you want ? 
Souls of rational men or irrational ? — Souls of 
rational men — Of what rational men ? Sound or 
unsound ? — Sound — Why then do you not seek 
for them ? — Because we have them — Why then 
do you fight and quarrel ? 




XII. 




> LL those things at which thou wish- 
est to arrive by a circuitous road, 
thou . canst have now, if thou dost 
not refuse them to thyself. And 
this means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the 
past, and trust the future to providence, and di- 
rect the present only conformably to piety and jus- 
tice. Conformably to piety, that thou inayst be 
content with the lot which is assigned to thee, for 
nature designed it for thee and thee for it. Con- 
formably to justice, that thou mayst always speak 
the truth freely and without disguise, and do the 
things which are agreeable to law and according 
to the worth of each. And let neither another 
man's wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor 
voice, nor yet the sensations of the poor flesh 
which has grown about thee ; for the passive part 
will look to this. If then, whatever the time may 
be when thou shalt be near to thy departure, neg- 
lecting everything else thou shalt respect only thy 
19 



290 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 

ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and 
if thou shalt be afraid not because thou must 
some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear 
never to have begun to live according to nature 
— then thou wilt be a man worthy of the uni- 
verse which has produced thee, and thou wilt 
cease to be a stranger in thy native land, and to 
wonder at things which happen daily as if they 
were something unexpected, and to be dependent 
on this or that. 

2. God sees the minds (ruling principles) of 
all men bared of the material vesture and rind 
and impurities. With his intellectual part alone 
he touches the intelligence only which has flowed 
and been derived from himself into these bodies. 
And if thou also usest thyself to do this, thou wilt 
rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who 
regards not the poor flesh which envelopes him, 
surely will not trouble himself by looking after 
raiment and dwelling and fame and such like 
externals and show. 

3. The things are three of which thou art 
composed, body, breath [life], intelligence. Of 
these the first two are thine, so far as it is thy 
duty to take care of them ; but the third alone is 
propeily thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate 
from thyself, that is, from thy understanding, what- 



M. ANTONINUS. XII. 291 

ever others do or say, and whatever thou hast 
done or said thyself, and whatever future things 
trouble thee because they may happen, and what- 
ever in the body which envelopes thee or in the 
breath, [life] which is by nature associated with 
the body, is attached to thee independent of thy 
will, and whatever the external circumfluent vor- 
tex whirls round, so that the intellectual power 
exempt from the things of fate can live pure and 
free by itself, doing what is just and accepting 
what happens and saying the truth : if thou wilt 
separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things 
which are attached to it by the impressions of 
sense, and the things of time to come and of time 
that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empe- 
docles' sphere, — 



All round, and in its joyous rest reposing 



and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really 
thy life, that is, the present — then thou wilt be 
able to pass that portion of life which remains for 
thee up to the time of thy death, free from per- 
turbations, nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon 
[to the god that is within thee], (n. 13. 17 : in. 
5, 6; xi. 12.) 

1 The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. 
It has been restored by Peyron thus : 

S0aipof Kvn?\,0Tep7j<; fioviri irepiy?]$ei yaiuv. 



292 M. ANTONINUS/ XII. 

4. I have often wondered how it is that every 
man loves himself more than all the rest of men, 
but yet sets less value on his own opinion of him- 
self than on the opinion of others. If then a god 
or a wise teacher should present himself to a man 
and bid him to think of nothing and to design 
nothing which he would not express as soon as he 
conceived it, he could not endure it even for a 
single day. So much more respect have we to 
what our neighbors shall think of us than to what 
we shall think of ourselves. 

5. How can it be that the gods after having 
arranged all things well and benevolently for man- 
kind, have overlooked this alone, that some men 
and very good men, and men who, as we may say, 
have had most communion with the divinity, and 
through pious acts and religious observances have 
been most intimate with the divinity, when they 
have once died should never exist again, but 
should be completely extinguished ? 

But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to 
have been otherwise, the gods would have done it. 
For if it were just, it would also be possible ; and 
if it were according to nature, nature would have 
had it so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is 
not so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have 
been so : — for thou seest even of thyself that in 



M. ANTONINUS. XII. 293 

this inquiry thou art disputing with the deity; 
and we should not thus dispute with the gods, 
unless they were most excellent and most just ; — 
but if this is so, they would not have allowed any- 
thing in the ordering of the universe to be neg- 
lected unjustly and irrationally. 

6. Practise thyself even in the things which 
thou despairest of accomplishing. For even the 
left hand, which is ineffectual for all other things 
for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigor- 
ously than the right hand ; for it has been prac- 
tised in this. 

7. Consider in what condition both in body and 
soul a man should be when he is overtaken by 
death ; and consider the shortness of life, the 
boundless abyss of time past and future, the 
feebleness of all matter. 

8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] 
of things bare of their coverings ; the purposes of 
actions ; consider what pain is, what pleasure is, 
and death, and fame ; who is to himself the cause 
of his uneasiness ; how no man is hindered by an- 
other ; that everything is opinion. 

9. In the application of thy principles thou 
must be like the pancratiast, not like the gladia- 
tor ; for the gladiator lets fall the sword which 
he uses and is killed ; but the other always has 



294 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 

his hand, and needs to do nothing else than 
use it. 

10. See what things are in themselves, dividing 
them into matter, form and purpose. 

11. "What a power man has to do nothing ex- 
cept what God will approve, and to accept all that 
God may give him. 

12. With respect to that which happens con- 
formably to nature, we ought to blame neither 
gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily 
or involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing 
wrong except involuntarily. Consequently we 
should blame nobody, (n. 11, 12, 13 ; vn. 62 ; 
vni. 17.) 

13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is 
who is surprised at anything which happens in 
life. 

14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invin- 
cible order, or a kind providence, or a confusion 
without a purpose and without a director. If 
then there is an invincible necessity, why dost 
thou resist? But if there is a providence which 
allows itself to be propitiated, make thyself 
worthy of the help of the divinity. But if 
there is a confusion without a governor, be content 
that in such a tempest thou hast in thyself a cer- 
tain ruling intelligence. And even if the tempest 



M.ANTONINUS. XII. 295 

carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, 
the breath, everything else ; for the intelligence at 
least it will not" carry away. 

1 5. Does the light of the lamp shine without 
losing its splendor until it is extinguished ; and 
shall the truth which is in thee and justice and 
temperance be extinguished [before thy death] ? 

16. When a man has presented the appearance 
of having done wrong, [say,] How then do I know 
if this is a wrongful act ? And even if he has 
done wrong, how do I know that he has not con- 
demned himself? and so this is like tearing his 
own face. Consider that he, who would not have 
the bad man do wrong, is like the man who would 
not have the fig-tree to bear juice in the figs and 
infants to cry and the horse to neigh, and what- 
ever else must of necessity be. For what must a 
man do who has such a character ? If then thou 
art irritable,! cure this man's disposition. 2 

17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not 
true, do not say it. [For let thy efforts be. — ] 3 

18. In everything always observe what the 
thing is which produces for thee an appearance, 

2 The interpreters translate yopyog by the words " acer, 
validusque," and "skilful." But in Epictetus yopyfc 
means "vehement," "prone to anger," "irritable." 

3 There is something wrong here, or incomplete. 



296 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 

and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the 
material, the purpose, and the time within which 
it must end. 

19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee 
something better and more divine than the 
things which cause the various affects, and as it 
were pull thee by the strings. What is there 
now in my mind ? is it fear, or suspicion, or de- 
sire, or anything of the kind ? (v. 1 ] .) 

20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor with- 
out a purpose. Second, make thy acts refer to 
nothing else than to a social end. 

21. Consider that before long thou wilt be no- 
body and nowhere, nor will any of the things ex- 
ist which thou now seest, nor any of those who 
are now living. For all things are formed by 
nature to change and be turned and to perish in 
order that other things in continuous succession 
may exist. 

22. Consider that everything is opinion, and 
opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when 
thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner, 
who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find 
calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay. 

23. Any one activity whatever it may be, when 
it has ceased at its proper time, suffers no evil be- 
cause it has ceased ; nor he who has done this act, 



31. ANTONINUS. XII. 297 

does he suffer any evil for this reason that the act 
has ceased. In like manner then the whole which 
consists of all the acts, which is our life, if it 
cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for this 
reason that it has ceased ; nor he who has termi- 
nated this series at the proper time, has he been 
ill dealt with. But the proper time and the limit 
nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar 
nature of man, but always the universal nature, 
by the change of whose parts the whole universe 
continues ever young and perfect. And every- 
thing which is useful to the universal is always 
good and in season. Therefore the termination 
of life for every man is no evil, because neither is 
it shameful, since it is both independent of the 
will and not opposed to the general interest, but 
it is good, since it is seasonable and profitable to 
and congruent with the universal. For thus too 
he is moved by the deity who is moved in the 
same manner with the deity and towards the 
same things in his mind. 

24. These three principles thou must have in 
readiness. In the things which thou doest do 
nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than 
as justice herself would act ; but with respect to 
what may happen to thee from without, consider 
that it happens either by chance or according to 



298 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 

providence, and thou must neither blame chance 
nor accuse providence. Second, consider what 
every being is from the seed to the time of ita 
receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul 
to the giving back of the same, and of what things 
every being is compounded and into what things 
it is resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly 
be raised up above the earth, and shouldst look 
down on human things, and observe the variety 
of them how great it is, and at the same time also 
shouldst see at a glance how great is the number 
of beings who dwell all around in the air and the 
aether, consider that as often as thou shouldst be 
raised up, thou wouldst see the same things, same- 
ness of form and shortness of duration. Are 
these things to be proud of? 

25. Cast away opinion : thou art saved. Who 
then hinders thee from casting it away ? 

26. When thou art troubled about anything, 
thou hast forgotten this, that all things happen 
according to the universal nature ; and forgotten 
this, that a man's wrongful act is nothing to thee ; 
and further thou hast forgotten this, that every- 
thing which happens, always happened so and will 
happen so, and now happens so everywhere ; for- 
gotten this too, how close is the kinship between 
a man and the whole human race, for it is a com- 



M. ANTONINUS. XII. 299 

munity, not of a little blood or seed, but of intel- 
ligence. And thou hast forgotten this too, that 
every man's intelligence is a god, and is an efflux 
of the deity ; and forgotten this, that nothing is a 
man's own, but that his child and his body and 
his very soul came from the deity ; forgotten this, 
that everything is opinion ; and lastly thou hast 
forgotten that every man lives the present time 
only, and loses only this. 

27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those 
who have complained greatly about anything, 
those who have been most conspicuous by the 
greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or for- 
tunes of any kind : then think where are they all 
now ? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a 
tale. And let there be present to thy mind also 
everything of this sort, how Fabius Catullinus 
lived in the* country, and Lucius Lupus in his 
gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at 
Capreae and Velius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia] ; 
and in fine think of the eager pursuit of anything 
conjoined with pride ; and how worthless every- 
thing is after which men violently strain ; and how 
much more philosophical it is for a man in the 
opportunities presented to him to show himself 
just temperate, obedient to the gods, and to do 
this with all simplicity : for the pride which is 



300 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 

proud of its want of pride is the most intolerable 
of all. 

28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen 
the gods or how dost thou comprehend that they 
exist and so worshippest them, I answer, in the 
first place, they may be seen even with the eyes ; 4 

4 " Seen even with the eyes." It is supposed that this 
may be explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe 
is a god (iv. 23), and that the celestial bodies are gods 
(vm. 19). But the emperor may mean that we know 
that the gods exist, as he afterwards states it, because 
we see what they do ; as we know that man lias intellect- 
ual powers, because we see what he does, and in no other 
way do we know it. This passage then will agree with 
the passage in the Epistle to the Romans (i. v. 20), and 
with the Epistle to the Colossians (i. v. 15), in which 
Jesus Christ is named " the image of the invisible 
god ; " and with the passage in the Gospel of St. John 
(xiv. v. 9). 

Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of 
learning, and all of it sound and good, quotes a passage 
of Calvin which is founded on St. Paul's language (Rom. 
i.e. 20) : " God by creating the universe [or world, 
mundum], being himself invisible, has presented himself 
to our eyes conspicuously in a certain visible form." 
He also quotes Seneca (De Benef. iv. c. 8.): " Quo- 
cunque te flexeris, ihi ilium videbis occurrentem tibi : 
nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse implet." Compare 
also Cicero, De Senectute (c. 22), and Xenophon's 
Cyropaedia. (vm. 7-) I think that my interpretation of 
Antoninus is right. 



M. ANTONINUS. XII. 301 

in the second place neither have I seen even my 
own soul and yet I honor it. Thus then with 
respect to the gods, from what I constantly expe- 
rience of their power, from this I comprehend 
that they exist and I venerate them. 

29. The safety of life is this, to examine every- 
thing all through, what it is itself, what is its ma- 
terial, what its formal part ; with all thy soul to 
do justice and to say the truth. What remains 
except to enjoy life by joining one good thing to 
another so as not to leave even the smallest inter- 
vals between ? 

30, There is one light of the sun, though it is 
distributed over walls, mountains, and other things 
infinite. There is one common substance, though 
it is distributed among countless bodies which 
have their several qualities. There is one soul, 
though it is distributed among infinite natures 
and individual circumscriptions [or individuals]. 
There is one intelligent soul, though it seems to 
be divided. Now in the things which have been 
mentioned all the other parts, such as those which 
are air and substance, are without sensation and 
have no fellowship : and yet even these parts the 
intelligent principle holds together and the gravi- 
tation towards the same. But intellect in a pecul- 
iar manner tends to that which is of the same kin, 



302 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 

and combines with it, and the feeling for com- 
munion is not interrupted. 

31. What dost thou wish? to continue to exjst? 
Well, dost thou wish to have sensation ? move- 
ment ? growth ? and then again to cease to grow ? 
to use thy speech ? to think ? What is there of 
all these things which seems to thee worth desir- 
ing ? But if it is easy to set little value on all 
these things, turn to that which remains, which is 
to follow reason and god. But it is inconsistent 
with honoring reason and god to be troubled be- 
cause by death a man will be deprived of the 
other things. 

32. How small a part of the boundless and un- 
fathomable time is assigned to every man ? for it 
is very soon swallowed up in the eternal. And 
how small a part of the whole substance ? and 
how small a part of the universal soul ? and on 
what a small clod of the whole earth thou creep- 
est ? Reflecting on all this consider nothing to be 
great, except to act as thy nature leads thee, and 
to endure that which the common nature brings. 

33. How does the ruling faculty make use of 
itself? for all lies in this. But everything else, 
whether it is in the power of thy will or not, is 
only lifeless ashes and smoke. 

34. This reflection is most adapted to move us 



M. ANTONINUS. XII. 303 

to contempt of death, that even those who think 
pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still have 
despised it. 

35. The man to whom that only is good which 
comes in due season, and to whom it is the same 
thing whether he has done more or fewer acts con- 
formable to right reason, and to whom it makes 
no difference whether he contemplates the world 
for a longer or a shorter time — for this man 
neither is death a terrible thing, (in. 7 ; vi. 23 ; 
x. 20 ; xii. 23.) 

36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great 
state [the world] : what difference does it make 
to thee whether for five years [or three] ? for that 
which is conformable to the laws is just for all. 
Where is the hardship then, if no tyrant nor yet 
an unjust judge sends thee away from the state, 
but nature who brought thee into it ? the same as 
if a praetor who has employed an actor dismisses 
him from the stage — " But I have not finished 
the five acts, but only three of them " — Thou 
sayest well, but in life the three acts are the whole 
drama ; for what shall be a complete drama is 
determined by him who was once the cause of its 
composition, and now of its dissolution : but thou 
art the cause of neither. Depart then satisfied, 
for he also who releases thee is satisfied. 



INDEX. 



INDEX. 

a6u'i<popa (indifferentia, Cicero) ; things indifferent, nei- 
ther good nor bad ; the same as fieaa. 

aiaxpog (turpis, Cic J, ugly ; morally ugly. 

airia, cause. 

alnudec, alrwv, to, the formal principle, the cause. 

avafopu, reference, relation to a purpose. 

unop'p'oia, efflux. 

tnrpoaioETa, -a, the things which are not in our will or 
power. 

apxv, a. first principle. 

arofioi (corpora individua, Cic), atoms. 

airapnELa, est quae parvo contenta omne id respuit quod 
abundat (Cicero) ; contentment. 

aiiTufiKijc, sufficient in itself; contented. 

ytyvbfieva, ra, things which are produced, come into ex- 
istence. 

6ai/MJv, god, god in man, man's intelligent principle. 

6ia-&Eaii, disposition, affection of the mind. 

diaipeoig, division of things into their parts, dissection, 
resolution, analysis. 

dLaleKTiKTj, ars bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudicandi 
(Cic.) 

(5id7,u£7£f, dissolution, the opposite of cvyicpime. 

diavoia, understanding ; sometimes, the mind generally, 
the whole intellectual power. 

doyfiara (decreta, Cic), principles. 

kyuoaTEia, temperance, self-restraint. 



308 INDEX. 

bldog, in divisione formae sunt, quas Graeci tidy vocant; 
nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant (Cic) 
But eldog is used by Epictetus and Antoninus less ex- 
actly and as a general term, like genus. Index Epict. 
ed. Schweigh. — '&f tie ye al irpurai ovaiac rcpdg to. aXka 
eXOVOLV, ovtcj teal to eldog npbg to yevog exei ' vwonelTat 
yup rd eldog r£> yivzi. (Aristot. Cat. c. 5.) 

eifiapjiivri, (fatalis necessitas, latum, Cic), destiny, neces- 
sity. 

eKuMoetg, aversions, avoidance, the turning away from 
things ; the opposite of bpe^eig. 

tfiipvxa, ~d, things which have life. 

kvepyeia, action, activity. 

evvoia, ivvoiai, notio, notiones (Cic), or " notitiae rerum ; " 
notions of things. (Notionem appello quam Graeci turn 
evvoiav, turn Tzpokqipiv, Cic.) 

kmaTpo<pf], attention to an object. 

evdvfiia, animi tranquillitas, (Cic.) 

Tjye/iovuidv, to, the ruling faculty; principatus, ("Cicero.) 

^eupfifiara, percepta (Cic), things perceived, general 
principles. 

nakog, beautiful. 

KdTafajrpcs, comprehension ; cognitio, perceptio, compre- 
hensio (Cicero). 

KaTaoKEVT], constitution. 

naTopduoeig, tcaTop$6[uiTa ; recta, recte facta (Cicero) ; 
right acts, those acts to which we proceed by the right 
or straight road. 

Koa/iog, order, world, universe. 

Koa^iog, 6 oXog, the universe, that which is the One and 
the All, (vi. 25.) 

TioycKa, to,, the things which have reason. 

7Myuibg, rational. 

?u6yog, reason. 

loyog c-izepfia.TUi6g, seminal principle. 

ueaa, to,, things indifferent, viewed with respect to vir- 
tue. 



INDEX. 809 

poepoc, intellectual. 

vofiog, law. 

vovg, intelligence. 

oiTiaig, arrogance, pride. It sometimes means in Anto- 
ninus the same as TvQog ; but it also means " opinion." 

o'iKovofj.ia (dispositio, ordo, Cic), has sometimes the pe- 
culiar sense of artifice, or doing something with an 
apparent purpose different from the real purpose. 

blov, to, the universe, the whole. 

ovra, to., things which exist ; existence, being. 

opefif, desire of a thing, which is opposed to ckkTuois, 
aversion. 

Spfifj, movement towards an object, appetite ; appetitio, 
naturalis appetitus, appetitus animi (Cicero). 

ovaia, substance, (vi. 49.) Modern writers sometimes 
incorrectly translate it " essentia." It is often used by 
Epictetus in the same sense as v"krj. Aristotle (Cat. 
c. 5) defines ovaia, and it is properly translated " sub- 
stantia " (ed. Jul. Pacius). Porphyrius (Isag. c. 2) : 
7] ovaia uvututo ovaa r£> [irjdlv elvai Tcpb avrfiq yivog }jv t& 
-yeviKUTarov. 

■KapaKovlr]-&LK7i 6bvap.LQ, tj, the power which enables us to 
observe and understand. 

7r«CT£f, passivity, opposed to hepysia. 

■jiEpiardaEic, circumstances, the things which surround 

us ; troubles, difficulties. 
Trsnpu[iivT], r), destiny. 

irpoaipeaig, purpose, free will. 

Tzpoaipera, to., things which are within our will or power. 

■KpoaipeTLKov, to, free will. 

npotieaic;, a purpose, proposition. 

npovoia (providentia, Cic), providence. 

(T/co7r6f, object, purpose. 

oroixdov, element. 

avyKaTU'&saic (assensio, approbatio, Cic), assent; avyna- 
Tadeoeig (probationes, Gellius, xix. 1). 

cvyKpiaig, the act of combining elements out of which a 
body is produced, combination. 






A ■ / 









310 INDEX. 






$7iy, matter, material. 

i)h,n6v, to, the material principle. 

bneZalpecig, expeption, reservation ; fisd' vTret-aipioeag, con- 
ditionally. 

VTrodecig , material to work on ; thing to employ the rea- 
son on ; proposition, thing assumed as matter for argu- 
ment and to lead to conclusions. (Quaestionum duo 
sunt genera ; alteram infinitum, definitum alteram. 
Definitum est, quod VTrbdeciv Graeci, nos causam : infi- 
nitum, quod -&EOIV illi appellant, nos propositum possu- 
mus nominare. Cic. See Aristot. Anal. Post. i. c. 2). 

vnoTajipig, opinion. 

vnoGTaoLg, basis, substance, being (x. 5). Epictetus has 
t'l rb vnoaTaTMbv nal ovaiudeg. 

i<picTao&ai, to subsist, to be. 

(pavraoiai (visus, Cic); appearances, thoughts, impres- 
sions (visa animi: Gellius, xix. 1) : Qavraoia, tori 
tvituolq kv ipvxy. 

(fiavTacfxa, seems to be used by Antoninus in the same 
sense as tyavTaoia. Epictetus uses only ^avraaia. 

tpavraoTov, that which produces a favraala : ^avraardv Td 
TTSTroiT/Kog rfjv (j)avraalav aia^r]rbv. 

tyvaig, nature. 

(pvoig, tj tuv ohuv, the nature of the universe. 

ipvxfi, soul, life, living principle. 

fvxn Twjikt), voepd, a rational soul, an intelligent soul. 



THE END. 



